This article investigates the recent rise of criminal background screening in rental housing as a case study of the diffusion of actuarial social control. That case study suggests that actuarial techniques have spread more widely through the crime prevention field than sociolegal scholars have recognized, replacing disciplinary efforts to diagnose and alter the behavior of individuals with actuarial efforts to identify and isolate high-risk groups. This actuarial strategy has proliferated not only because new discourses encouraged it but also because new institutional structures facilitated it. That conclusion illustrates the importance of structural (rather than cultural) factors in shaping society's response to crime—particularly the growing availability of the collective institutional capacity that actuarial social control requires.

Kalven and Zeisel's (1966) classic study, The American Jury, concluded that juries were “in revolt” from the law when they acquitted when judges would have convicted. Using data collected by the National Center for State Courts to examine jury decision making in four different communities, this article reexamines the question of the judge and jury's respective fidelity to the law and evidence by examining the influence on judge and jury of the defendant's evidence, his criminal record, and his reason for refusing to plead. No data can tell us definitively whether the judge is correct and the jury in error when they disagree, but the data analyzed in the present study can tell us whether the factors that move the jury and fail to move the judge are or are not consistent with the innocence of the accused.

This study examines the coverage of the Supreme Court of Israel functioning as the High Court of Justice (HCJ) in the popular and elite press over a period marked by growing activism of the Israeli Supreme Court and an increasingly adversarial and critical media. Our results show that more prominent coverage of the HCJ over time, especially in the elite press, accentuates the salience of the Supreme Court in public life. In addition, the topics, the stages of the HCJ proceedings, the petitioners, and the outcome of the cases covered by the press, as well as the generally uncritical reporting of the Court decisions help create the frame of an autonomous, powerful Court that frequently opposes and restrains the government. We suggest that this pattern of media coverage of the HCJ benefits both the Court and the media: it reinforces the image of the media as a critical watchdog of the government, while at the same time it legitimates the Court's expansion of power and strengthens its image as an apolitical and independent institution.

A recurring theme of sociolegal studies is how legal procedures function to reproduce social inequality by disadvantaging less powerful groups. However, there is little research about how disadvantaged groups achieve occasional victories in legal settings. Using transcripts of state legislative committee hearings in which birth activists seek certification or licensure for independent midwifery, I identify and investigate five ways in which legal ideals structure interaction and rhetoric in legislative hearings. While these ideals are instantiated in ways that disadvantage less powerful groups, activists can be seen adapting to this context by developing strategies to play law's ideals to their advantage. Such findings develop our understanding of how the gap between law's ideals and legal procedures can provide opportunities for collective activity seeking social change.

On March 26, 1951, three years before the historic Brown decision, in Gonzales v. Sheeley (1951), Judge Dave Ling of the United States District Court of Arizona ruled that the segregation of Mexican American students in a separate “Mexican School” was unconstitutional. In this article, we trace the legal arguments in Gonzales through two prior cases, Mendez v. Westminster (1946) and Delgado v. Bastrop (1948). We analyze how racialism, the social science critique of racism and legalism, shaped the arguments in the three cases. Our analysis suggests that Gonzales was a departure from Mendez and Delgado because it was the first case in which a court made an unqualified argument against segregation. The trajectory of the legal arguments across the three cases highlights how new cultural ideas about race were slowly incorporated into civil rights case law, a process that was also shaped by the institutional norms and practices of the legal system.

While developments in intellectual property have opened the door for trademarking color alone or color per se, it is important to observe that color codification is not a new phenomenon. This article outlines the quest to metaphorically trademark purple in antiquity and to provide it with clear “secondary meaning.” It highlights how language, literature, and sumptuary law was deployed to infuse purple with the appropriate symbolism, and it links contemporary debates to some of the historic moves to sequester color.

In recent years scholars from neighboring disciplines have emphasized the importance of conceptual rigor in designing, administering, and interpreting research in the social sciences. Drawing on this new conceptualism, this article analyzes the much talked about notion of “reconciliation.” In an effort at structuring a useful debate on possible departures from historic injustice, the article formulates a systematized concept of reconciliation based on the multitude of meanings contained in theory and practice. It distinguishes varieties of reconciliation, organizing these varieties into types and subtypes. The article argues that while most varieties of reconciliation emanate from the same root concept, the various outer layers of meaning do not overlap. This hampers not only our understanding of reconciliation, but its promotion in the international system as well. In response to this methodological malaise, the article prescribes friendly amendments—conceptual modifications and refinements designed to increase measurement validation of reconciliation as a conceptual variable.

This article reviews Bernard Harcourt's Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (2007). It places the rise of actuarialism in criminal law in the United States in the context of trends in other areas of law, as well as in penology. It further suggests that this move toward actuarial thinking cannot in fact be separated from race; that prediction has always involved racial profiling, and that it is no accident that it does so.

This article discusses Bernard E. Harcourt's Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (2007). The book opposes the use of probabilistic methods, such as profiling, on efficiency, equity, and jurisprudence grounds. By contrast I argue that profiling is always efficient, that there is no theoretical flaw in reliance on actuarial methods, as long as they are implemented properly. I also show that the equity-based criticism of reliance on actuarial methods (Harcourt's ratchet effect argument) is based on two questionable assumptions: that profiling is perfectly efficient (as zero deterrence is assumed), and that the police are making an obvious logical mistake, by gradually increasing the extent to which they target the group with the higher offending rate instead of targeting only them in the first place.

This article reviews Bernard Harcourt's Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (2007), in which he criticizes the use of actuarial prediction methods in the contexts of policing and sentencing. I focus on the latter context. I argue that Harcourt has identified an important, and not exclusively American, trend and develops a valid critique of it that should be pushed further. From a theory of punishment perspective, I argue that Harcourt's critique is no less applicable to clinical prediction methods than to the use of actuarial ones. Harcourt's arguments, however, beg a more general explanation of the flaws of incapacitation as a justification for punishment. If we base our objection to the use of prediction methods on such larger grounds, questions arise as to the legitimacy of other practices that are not considered punitive but rather “regulatory” or “preventive.”

From parole prediction instruments and violent sexual predator scores to racial profiling on the highways, instruments to predict future dangerousness, drug-courier profiles, and IRS computer algorithms to detect tax evaders, the rise of actuarial methods in the field of crime and punishment presents a number of challenging issues at the intersection of economic theory, sociology, history, race studies, criminology, social theory, and law. The three review articles of Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age by Ariela Gross, Yoram Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir, raise these challenges in their very best light. Ranging from the heights of poststructuralist and critical race theory to the intricate details of mathematical economics and criminological analysis, the articles apply different disciplinary lenses to the analysis of the actuarial turn offered in Against Prediction and set forth both substantive and structural challenges to the book. By means of a detailed reply to the three reviews, this article provides a reader's companion to Against Prediction.