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Insights into the uniquely human origins of understanding other minds
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 November 2021
Abstract
We summarize research and theory to show that, from early in human ontogeny, much information about other minds can be gleaned from reading the eyes. This analysis suggests that eyes serve as uniquely human windows into other minds, which critically extends the target article by drawing attention to what might be considered the neurodevelopmental origins of knowledge attribution in humans.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
Knowledge before belief
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Author response
Actual knowledge