The aim of this study is to analyze the impact of the EEC on one border region, the French province of Alsace, through an examination of its economic and social transactions with West Germany since 1960. No great increase in Alsatian social ties with Germany has been observed, but there has been considerable growth in economic contacts, leading to a new prosperity for the province. Alsatian economic integration with the rest of France is not increasing as fast, but it has not been noticeably weakened. Alsatian elite and public opinion generally supports the growth of economic bonds with Germany, largely because of their contribution to economic welfare. Transaction and attitude data indicate a continuation of the present trend of important economic, but only limited social, ties between Alsace and its German neighbor.

The purpose of this research is to examine the conditions for successful United Nations elective officeholding through an interregional comparison of three types of variables. Previous studies have primarily emphasized two types of determinants. Some have suggested that behavior in the United Nations is controlled by the environment of international politics, while others have attempted to link a nation state's level of socioeconomic development to elective officeholding success. This research suggests that the legislative variable may be the most useful predictor of elective officeholding. The legislative dimension is based upon the premise that the political processes in the Organization represent a quasi-legislative system. An examination of the three types of variables led to the conclusion that legislative behavior is the most consistent predictor of elective officeholding success across regions. This finding does not negate the salience of environmental interactions or nation state attributes, but it does suggest that nation state participation in the political processes of the Organization appears to be the best predictor of officeholding success.

The diverse interests of donors and the desires of recipients to shop for the best deals mean that coordination of projects in international assistance causes problems along with promises of greater efficiency. Evidence from East Africa indicates that political competition and lack of candor and comparability in donors' reports limit the effectiveness of efforts at donor coordination. On the other hand, the policies of Kenya and the East African Community permitting virtual autonomy to profitable public corporations in their dealings with foreign governments and businessmen compromise the opportunity to optimize the use of assistance available in a multi-donor situation.