Recent protectionism by the United States has principally taken the form of negotiated barriers to trade, such as voluntary export restraints. These barriers tend to evolve over time and to display three patterns, which we label institutionalized, temporary, and sporadic protectionism. Cartel theory and studies of the politics of protection suggest that the dynamics of negotiated protectionism will depend on three variables: the barriers to entry into an industry, the size of the domestic industry, and the exit barriers for domestic firms. Low barriers to entry will lead to institutionalized protectionism when the domestic industry is large and exit difficult; temporary protectionism results when the domestic industry is small and exit easy; and sporadic protectionism is likely when barriers to entry are high. Brief studies of U.S. protectionism in textiles and apparel, steel, footwear, televisions, and automobiles illustrate the value of this framework.

The theory of political generations asserts that enduring and relevant political consequences result from critical experiences during the formative years. This study draws on a national three-wave panel study of young adults surveyed in 1965, 1973, and 1982 to test the theory with respect to the Vietnam era protest movement. College-educated protestors and nonprotestors are compared with themselves and with each other over time. Generational effects are categorized into absolute, relative, and equivalent continuity. Very strong continuities emerge for attitudes associated with the protestors' political baptism. Although erosion effects appear in more contemporary affairs, the protest generation remains quite distinctive. However, its limited size dampens the generation's political impact and qualifies the general thesis in a fashion that probably characterizes other examples of political generations also.

Changing U.S. attitudes toward new technologies are examined, as are explanations of such changes. We hypothesize that increased concern with the risks of new technologies by certain elite groups is partly a surrogate for underlying ideological criticisms of U.S. society. The question of risk is examined within the framework of the debate over nuclear energy. Studies of various leadership groups are used to demonstrate the ideological component of risk assessment. Studies of scientists' and journalists' attitudes, media coverage of nuclear energy, and public perception of scientists' views suggest both that journalists' ideologies influence their coverage of nuclear energy and that media coverage of the issue is partly responsible for public misperceptions of the views of scientists. We conclude with a discussion of the historical development of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s and the relation of this movement to the public's declining support for nuclear energy.

Differences in voter turnout among industrial democracies are a function of political institutions and electoral law. Specifically, the presence of nationally competitive electoral districts provides incentives for parties and candidates to mobilize voters everywhere, thereby increasing turnout. Disproportionality in the translation of votes into legislative seats provides a disincentive to voting, which lowers turnout. Multipartyism assigns elections a less decisive role in government formation, depressing turnout. By generating more decisive governments, unicameralism provides a clearer link between elections and legislation, increasing turnout. Finally, mandatory voting laws produce a disincentive to not vote. Empirical analyses of average voter-turnout levels in the 1970s and 1960s across 19 democracies are consistent with these expectations, although Switzerland and the United States appear to be outliers. The results have major implications for the way we interpret national differences in voter-turnout rates.

Maldistribution of land in agrarian societies is commonly thought to be an important precondition of mass political violence and revolution. Others argue that because of the difficulty of mobilizing rural populations for political protest, land maldistribution is irrelevant except as part of an inegalitarian distribution of income nationwide. These rival inequality hypotheses have significant implications with respect to the kinds of reforms likely to reduce the potential for insurgency in a society. They are tested using the most comprehensive cross-national compilation of data currently available on land inequality, landlessness, and income inequality. Support is found for the argument that attributes the greater causal import to income inequality. Moreover, the effect of income inequality on political violence is found to hold in the context of a causal model that takes into account the repressiveness of the regime, governmental acts of coercion, intensity of separatism, and level of economic development.

With data from 15 Indian states, in this study I demonstrate that political capacity, defined as the ability of government to penetrate society and extract resources, has a more significant—though indirect—effect on fertility behavior than does level of economic development. A path-analysis model with six variables—crude birth rate (the dependent variable), family-planning-program effort, mean female age at marriage, physical-quality-of-life index (PQLI), income per capita, and political capacity—showed a strong indirect effect by the political-capacity measure on fertility decline through both the PQLI and family-planning effort. Within the model, income per capita had little effect on birth rate or any of the intervening variables. The conclusion drawn is that under conditions of economic backwardness as exist in India, it is politics, not economics, that is the primary determinant of fertility patterns.

Political context has an important impact on individual attitude change. This is an analysis of the dynamic effects of contextual variables. Drawing on data taken from the American National Election Study (ANES) panel study, we demonstrate that the environment shapes the way the citizen views politics. While varying in degree, the results hold for a broad (county-level) and a narrow (residential neighborhood-level) definition of the relevant context. The patterns involved suggest that citizens' evaluations of candidates and parties are most directly influenced by what their neighbors are saying at the moment, that is to say, the content of current discussion. In contrast, citizens' self-identification evinces sensitivity to the more stable partisan character of the environment. The results indicate that the impact of social influence is crucially dependent on the nature of contemporary political debate and that the social setting serves as an intervening mechanism in the broader communication system and not merely as an exogenous source for political information.

A decision-theoretic analysis of the central incident of Homer's Odyssey reveals the insufficiency of rational calculation as a guide for political prudence. Surprisingly, the poet distinguishes between two rational and formally identical calculations in no uncertain terms; he condemns one as utter recklessness and praises the other as consummate wisdom. I maintain that this discrepancy is neither an artifact of sloppy editorial patchwork nor the result of a “homeric nod” but instead points toward a politically significant distinction as yet obscured by a merely rationalistic perspective. The recklessness of Odysseus' crewmen, who deliberately slaughter sacred cattle to forestall starvation, consists in their rationalistic transgression of the limits of reason. These limits are most evident in the defiance of commensurability that characterizes the sacred. The wisdom of Odysseus, by contrast, is manifest in his learning to temper reason with respect for the sacred. By virtue of reverence, Odysseus wins his struggle to preserve his psychê, home and regime.

Voting systems combine balloting methods with decision rules or procedures. Most analyses of approval voting (a balloting method) assume it will be combined with plurality rule but advocates often urge its use with more complex procedures. Because much of the case for approval balloting hinges on its encouragement of sincere voting, we ask whether it retains this advantage when combined with multistage procedures. After distinguishing five forms of sincere and insincere approval voting, we find that certain elements of multistage procedures promote departures from purely sincere strategies, including, in some instances, strictly insincere voting. However, most strategic approval voting involves truncating the approved list, including bullet-voting, which is especially likely under certain threshold rules. Coalitions also increase members' incentive to truncate. We conclude that approval balloting with plurality rule remains preferable to conventional single-vote plurality, but we urge caution and further research regarding combining approval balloting with multistage rules.

The authors elaborate a model of electoral competition for a fixed number of seats in a legislature. The novel feature of this model is that candidates (or parties) not only choose spatial locations as platforms but also determine whether to enter the contest at all. In most previous spatial models, the set of candidates is specified exogenously. Here, however, the spatial positions and the set of candidates are determined endogenously. An equilibrium in this context is defined and results are proved, suggesting that entry may disrupt spatial equilibria. Finally, the authors compare their treatment of spatial competition with entry to that of Palfrey.

Majority-rule spatial voting games lacking a core still always present a “near-core” outcome, more commonly known as the Copeland winner. This is the alternative that defeats or ties the greatest number of alternatives in the space. Previous research has not tested the Copeland winner as a solution concept for spatial voting games without a core, lacking a way to calculate where the Copeland winner was with an infinite number of alternatives. We provide a straightforward algorithm to find the Copeland winner and show that it corresponds well to experimental outcomes in an important set of experimental legislative voting games. We also provide an intuitive motivation for why legislative outcomes in the spatial context may be expected to lie close to the Copeland winner. Finally, we show a connection between the Copeland winner and the Shapley value and provide a simple but powerful algorithm to calculate the Copeland scores of all points in the space in terms of the (modified) power values of each of the voters and their locations in the space.

Why does it happen that ordinary people can come to participate in rebellious collective action? In the June 1986 issue of this Review, Edward N. Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp argued a public-goods model to account for why rational citizens may become rebels. They offered empirical data drawn from samples in New York City and Hamburg, Germany in support of the public-goods model. George Kolsko takes issue with the rationale of Muller and Opp, arguing that their public-goods model is not a rational-choice explanation of rebellious collective action. In response, Muller and Opp clarify their theory and further elaborate its assumptions.

Measuring the southern contribution to the Democratic coalition is an important task. To measure this contribution one must choose appropriate data and the appropriate unit of analysis for studying party coalitions in the United States. Two recent studies of party coalitions use the National Election Studies to estimate the southern contribution to the Democratic party, and these studies illustrate the problems one may encounter. This note demonstrates two points. First, survey research results may lead to erroneous estimates and it is preferable, where possible, to rely upon official election statistics. Second, the contribution of demographic groups to party coalitions should be assessed within the context of the political rules that make such coalitions meaningful.

A subset of citizens in a democratic system directly test their political self-efficacy by petitioning government for assistance of one kind or another. Drawing on survey data gathered in India in 1967, this investigation focuses on the consequences of success or failure for perceived self-efficacy and for perceived government responsiveness. The analysis demonstrates that (1) successful petitioners come to enjoy a somewhat enhanced sense of self-efficacy but do not view government as particularly responsive, (2) unsuccessful petitioners do not see themselves as inefficacious but—possibly instead—do see government responsiveness in distinctly negative terms, and, (3) the kind of evidence that can help sustain a positive sense of self-efficacy will not suffice to undergird a belief in system responsiveness.

In established electorates in developed countries, voting turnout has a familiar curvilinear relationship with age. In new electorates, however, lack of experience and supposed resistance to new behavior among middle-aged voters suggest that turnout might be greater among the young. In peasant societies, the start-up costs that reduce turnout among young adults might not apply because of immobility of the population and resulting familiarity with local politics. Data from an early election in rural Kenya and from rural Turkey show that the familiar relationship holds even in these circumstances. The results suggest that increased electoral experience and resistance to newly available behavior do little to shape turnout. Mobility of the young, even in peasant populations, and psychological factors associated with aging are more powerful elements.