In 1994, feminist activists made headlines at the United Nations Cairo Conference on Population and Development for their highly organised and influential lobbying. The final agreement negotiated at Cairo reflected this involvement by specifically referring to women's reproductive rights, and by recognising the complex relationship between population policy, environmental security and economic growth. International population policy, defined broadly as the array of international projects and actors involved in efforts to curb population growth, is an increasingly important arena for the contestation of social values and the meaning of global community. In this paper, I offer a re-reading of the 1994 Cairo agreement, and population policy more generally, in the context of colonial discourses around race and gender, which articulate with constructions of the population ‘problem’. Focusing on the language of environment and economic growth, I examine how racialised conceptions of ‘dangerous’ fertility are reinforced rather than challenged by the Cairo agreement. Through this analysis, I attempt to first, make explicit the international inequality that structures international law and policy, and secondly, outline some of the challenges facing feminist engagement with international law.

In both the United Kingdom and the United States, there have been a substantial number of copyright disputes concerning the creation of biographical works. Prominent recent examples have involved J D Salinger and Sir Stephen Spender. In many such disputes, the claimant's motive for bringing infringement proceedings is not financial but ‘personal’— for example, to protect privacy or reputation. In this article, it is argued that, when copyright is employed for such motives, inconsistent results can arise. In particular, in such cases, it is demonstrated that the possession of a copyright interest is capable of providing a number of apparently inequitable advantages to claimants whose privacy or reputation is threatened.

This article seeks to show why, historically, the lease/tenancy were viewed as being peripheral to the scheme of land law, not perceived as part of ‘real property It suggests that the continued classification today of leases/tenancies as personalty reflects an uncritical perpetuation of this perception, a failure to reappraise their legal status and function in the context of today law and social relations concerned with land. More generally, it touches on a possible need to reappraise many of the underlying, historically derived schemata and structures of today's property law. Finally, as the offer of a small step in the reappraisal of the place of lease/tenancies, it argues that today, in law, they can and should properly be classified (together with freeholds) as part of real property.

This article addresses the potential advantages and disadvantages of codifying the grounds of judicial review of administrative action. The four principal legal values associated with codification are described: certainty; clarity; democratic legitimacy; and rationality. The extent to which codification might further these values is considered in the light of two comparative models: the United States Administrative Procedure Act 1946 and the Australian Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). It is concluded that codification offers no solution to the practical and theoretical problems of judicial review. Codification places the content of the principles of judicial review in the hands of politicians. Australian legislation limiting the grounds of review available in migration cases shows the danger to the separation of powers inherent in codification. If it is thought desirable to foster the further development of the principles of judicial review, this can best be achieved by leaving the task to the judiciary.

This article seeks to examine the question of what the essential nature and definition of a mistake is. It examines whether it can be properly distinguished from ignorance. The article then seeks to examine the requirement of provability, first in the context of mistakes of fact and then in that of mistakes of law. A Dworkinian approach is taken, arguing that it is possible to be mistaken as to the law. The article then shows why an opinion or misprediction cannot be seen as a mistake, before turning to the topical issue of the manner of the recent removal of the mistake of law bar. Using Dworkin's analysis it will be suggested that where a case is overruled it can be said to have been u mistake to rely on it. The article also argues that Birks’ analysis of the question is flawed, in that he fails to see the real distinction between a mistake and a misprediction.

This article provides a general overview, and analysis of the litigation surrounding General Augusto Pinochet's detention in London in 1998 and the subsequent attempts to extradite him to Spain, for trial on charges relating to human rights abuses committed during the period of his militaty dictatorship in Chile between 1973 and 1990. The complicated sequence of events, from proceedings in the Spanish courts (which started in 1996) up to Pinochet's release from British custody on medical grounds in 2000, is examined und the potential consequences of the two substantive House of Lords decisions are explored from a British-based public international lawyer's perspective. The focus of the analysis is not so much on the detailed technicalities of personal immunity in English law: as on the broad concepts of State jurisdiction over international crimes and immunity for such crimes in international criminal law: notable aspects discussed include the future of universal jurisdiction in customary international law and the position of that law in the UK's municipal courts.

The failure of rape law to convict more men and to protect more women appears to be attributable to the fact that underlying, and assumed by, the law is a male dominated conception of aggressive and possessive male sexuality and a misunderstanding of the real wrong of rape. The sentencing stage of criminal proceedings offers courts the opportunity to challenge these attitudes. Court of Appeal sentencing decisions in cases of marital and relationship rape are analysed and sentencing principles and practice which endorse and reinforce a male dominated conception of sexuality and the wrong of rape are criticised. So, it is argued, an intimate relationship between the offender and the victim should not be a mitigating factor. Nor should forgiveness be a special mitigating factor in cases of marital rape. And attempts to mitigate rape by explaining it in terms of emotional stress, an excess of seductive zeal or other ways that treat aggressive male sexual behaviour and female passivity as the norm, should not be countenanced. Instead, sentencing guidance should foster attitudes which conceive of sexuality as an expression of equal and sharing relationships.