International organisations have recently assumed a more intrusive role in settling conflicts in all continents. At the same time, post-conflict or post-settlement tasks seem to be emerging as an important function, encompassing the conduct of democratic elections, the guarantee of security, development of civil society, etc. In order to operationalise such wide-ranging and deeply intrusive social aims it is not sufficient to have peace-keepers or elections monitoring missions sent into the conflict-torn territories. Concentrated and centrally planned efforts of international governance are needed. In the present day, however, there is no such systematic scheme to which to refer. Yet institutional structures are needed to administer the extensive tasks and functions assigned in certain post-conflict situations. Therefore many questions of legitimacy and fundamental accountability arise.

On 15 May 2001 the Head of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (‘UNMIK’) signed into law Regulation 2001/9 establishing a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo. The document creates a provisional institutional framework for the exercise of public authority by Kosovo's institutions of self-government during the territory's administration under United Nations rule. UNMIK delegates important parts of its responsibilities in the legislative, executive and judicial field to the local institutions envisaged in the document. At the same time, however, crucial areas remain under the direct authority of the United Nations administration. This article examines the modifications brought about by the Constitutional Framework by discussing the legal nature and the contents of the document in the light of the various legal instruments governing Kosovo's institutional system throughout the last thirty years and previous international practice in the field of state-building and territorial reconstruction.

This article seeks to show that both the conceptualization and practice of international human rights education within the mainstream human rights community has been shaped and framed, with mostly negative consequences, by at least three constitutive orthodoxies: a heaven-hell binary distinction between an all but “perfect” West and an all but “hellish” Third World; a consequent unidirectional traffic of human rights teaching from the West to the rest; and a reliance on the abolitionist paradigm of human rights education. It starts by mapping these orthodoxies, and proceeds thereafter to challenge them as fundamentally problematic and as capable of frustrating the project of progressive human rights education. The article ends by offering an insight into the ways in which international human rights education might be re-imagined if it is to have a better chance of achieving its ordinarily laudable mission.

The article critically examines the use of the doctrine of command responsibility by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in two of its judgements, Kayishema & Ruzindana and Musema. It argues that in assessing superior-subordinate relationships the ICTR applied the wrong standard in both cases. While there is no doubt that civilian superiors are liable to prosecution for command responsibility, the doctrine will be properly operative only in cases where the superior's control of subordinates strongly resembles that enjoyed by military commanders. The article builds upon the arguments of the ICTY's Čelebići judgement on this point, and emphasises the difficulty in holding lower-ranking Rwandan civilians responsible as superiors for genocide committed by supposed subordinates.

The Statute of the ICTY incorporates the customary international law principle of superior responsibility. Where a superior knew or had reason to know that subordinates were about to commit or committed a crime, he/she is under an obligation to take preventative or punitive measures against subordinates. The mens rea, or knowledge, of a superior is pivotal in determining his/her criminal responsibility. However, despite the customary law status of the principle of Superior Responsibility, the definition and standard of mens rea applied has varied. The ICTY Trial Chambers in the Čelebići and Blaškić cases reached opposite findings on the definition of the term “had reason to know” under customary law. The Appeals Chamber has rendered its definition of mens rea. However, the standard applied appears inconsistent with the principle of Superior Responsibility.

The proposed establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is a valiant effort to end impunity for the egregious crimes that were committed during the Sierra Leonean civil war. Nonetheless, the Special Court – which will have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and various offences under Sierra Leonean national law – will have a number of major hurdles to cross in order to fulfill its mandate. Most notably the Court as currently empowered lacks the ability to induce the authorities of third states to comply with its orders and has limited temporal jurisdiction: thereby allowing a number of accused to escape justice. More alarmingly the on-going discussions within United Nations Headquarters concerning the financing of the organisation has substantially eroded the credibility of the institution, especially as large numbers of potential accused have been languishing in jail for significant periods without being formally charged.

The European Court of Human Rights found no violation of the Convention in its judgement in the complaints of the former East German political and military leaders Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz. All three were convicted and sentenced to terms in prison by German courts in relation to the deaths of East Germans who were killed in attempts at fleeing across the fortified border between East and West Germany. Nonetheless, the Court's decision constitutes a clear rejection of the Radbruch Formula, which served as a central line of reasoning in the decisions of the German courts in the cases. The author addresses the Court's rejection of the Radbruch Formula, focusing especially on the distinct historical and political circumstances that existed after World War II and in 1989.

The present article describes the dispute settlement system of the Organization of the Islamic Conference through the envisaged creation of the International Islamic Court of Justice. The Court's Statute, adopted in 1987, considers the Islamic Shari'ah or Islamic law as the fundamental law to be applied by the Court for the resolution of international disputes. Therefore, the Court will have a religious character considering a local religious code as the primary applicable law. The International Islamic Court of Justice has not yet been set up. Its creation might have the effect of grouping Islamic states under the same international judicial system, and of causing a strong political impact in respect of the relations with the State of Israel and of the Palestinian question.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which is mandated under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights with promoting and protecting human rights in Africa, has attracted considerable criticism for being an ineffectual body. One of the complaints is that the Charter based regime lacks an effective system of remedies. This paper examines whether this criticism is justified. An analysis of the jurisprudence of the African Commission proves that the Commission is patiently constructing a concept of reparations which has some similarities with that developed by the UN Human Rights Committee.