This paper reviews the panel report on Mexico-Measures A.ecting Telecommunication Services. The panel considered claims by the United States (US) that Mexico acted inconsistently with its obligations with respect to the liberalization of the market for telecommunication services. It is the .rst panel to consider solely the rules agreed in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is also the .rst panel to deal with telecommunication services and its complex layers of legislation, in particular the rules agreed in the Telecommunications Reference Paper (TRP)onpro-competitive regulatory principles. Viewed fromthis perspective, this report is because of its potential precedence value, of particular signi.cance.

The WTO Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreement requires that anti-dumping duties be reviewed at least every five years (Article 11.3); pursuant to this requirement, domestic trade authorities in the US are charged with the task of making a determination as to whether, after five years, revoking the duties would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping (Commerce) and of material injury (ITC). This is called a Sunset Review; a negative determination of likelihood, either with respect to dumping or injury, will result in the duties expiring, the ‘sun’ setting, as it were.

The WTO Anti-Dumping (AD) Agreement requires that anti-dumping duties be reviewed at least every five years (Art. 11.3); pursuant to this requirement, domestic trade authorities in the United States are charged with the task of making a determination as to whether, after five years, revoking the duties would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping (Commerce) and of material injury (US International Trade Commission, or USITC). This is called a Sunset Review; a negative determination of likelihood, either with respect to dumping or injury, will result in the duties expiring, the “sun” setting, as it were.

The following acknowledgement was inadvertently dropped from Donald Maclaren's paper. ‘The role of the WTO in achieving equity and efficiency in international markets for agricultural products’, published in the July 2005 issue of the World Trade Review:

On January 16, 2003, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) issued its report on the appeal by the United States (US) of the Panel decision in United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000. The report concerns the consistency of the United States Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (the “CDSOA,” or the so-called Byrd Amendment) with several WTO provisions. This legislation requests the federal state to distribute proceeds from antidumping and countervailing duties to all US economic operators that have supported a request previously submitted to the ratione materiae competent US authority to investigate alleged dumping or subsidization. The appeal was directed against the Panel’s finding that the Byrd legislation was inconsistent with the US obligations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement (AD), and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). A total of 11 complainants (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Community, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand), and five additional third parties (Argentina, Costa Rica, Hong Kong (China), Israel, and Norway), evidence the interest among WTO Members in the issues at stake in the dispute.

This chapter addresses the Appellate Body (AB) report on European Community – Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil. The underlying Panel determination was appealed by the complainant Brazil only. Following the approach it took before the Panel, Brazil raised a number of issues concerning the antidumping investigation by the European Community (EC).

This note addresses the Word Trade Organization (WTO) dispute United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect To Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada (WT/DS257); denoted “Softwood Lumber IV” below. The issues discussed by the Panel and the Appellate Body (AB) in this dispute are very closely related to those examined by the Panel in United States – Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect To Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada (WT/DS236); to be referred to as “Softwood Lumber III.” This dispute was not appealed, and the AB thus did not have the opportunity to provide its view on the issues raised in the dispute. The fundamental character of several of the issues at stake in both these disputes makes the AB’s determination in Softwood Lumber IV particularly interesting.

Since the inception of the WTO, safeguard measures have regularly been the subject of dispute settlement proceedings. The latest in this chain of disputes concerns the definitive safeguard measures imposed by the United States on a wide range of steel products in 2002.

The safeguards investigation of steel imports was initiated under the US law by the US International Trade Commission (USITC) at the request of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in June, 2001. The request covered four broad categories of steel products, which were divided into 33 categories by the USITC for purposes of data collection. Ultimately, the USITC defined 27 separate “industries” producing steel products within the scope of the investigation. For each of these industries, the USITC proceeded to determine whether imports had increased, and if so, whether increased imports were a substantial cause of serious injury or threat of injury. This analysis resulted in negative determinations for 15 industries, affirmative determinations for eight industries, and “divided” determinations (a 3–3 vote) for four industries.

This chapter reviews the panel report on Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunication Services. The Panel considered claims by the United States that Mexico acted inconsistently with its obligations in respect to the liberalization of its market for telecommunication services. It is the first Panel to consider solely the rules agreed upon in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is also the first Panel to deal with the telecommunication services industry and its complex layers of legislation, in particular the rules agreed to in the Telecommunications Reference Paper (TRP) on pro-competitive regulatory principles. Viewed from this perspective, this report is, because of its potential as a precedent, of particular significance.