MY personal collection of World Politics begins with the January 1957 issue: volume 9, number 2. It skips to October 1964 and is complete from then on. When I left Princeton to become Northwestern University's fifteenth president, I gave away most of my professional library, envisioning all too accurately the demands of a new life. I never considered parting with any copies of World Politics, however. Perhaps in part this sense of possession came from sentiment arising from my long and happy association with this journal. I think, however, that it stemmed mostly from a recognition that World Politics has been the leading journal of international affairs and comparative studies from its founding until now.

Political science attends to causes and consequences of war but only fitfully welcomes study of its conduct, because few grasp how much the dynamics of combat shape politics. Bernard Brodie called for development of strategic studies on the model of the discipline of economics, because neither the military nor academia treated the subject rigorously. His call was answered in the early cold war, with mixed results. Theories about nuclear deterrence burgeoned while empirical studies of war lagged. The late—cold war impasse in nuclear strategy, rooted in NATO doctrine, shifted attention to conventional military operations and empirically grounded theory. Since the cold war, research on general theoretical questions about war and peace has been prospering, but education in military matters has been eroding. Interdisciplinary strategic studies integrate political and military elements of international conflict, but there is no recognized discipline of military science; military analysis is smuggled into political science and history departments, where it is resisted by calls to conceptualize security broadly or focus on purely theoretical work. If serious military studies are squeezed out of universities, there will be no qualified civilian analysts to provide independent expertise in policy and budget debates, and decisions on war and peace will be made irresponsibly by uninformed civilians or by the professional military alone.

Research on the less industrialized regions of the world has undergone major changes in terms of theoretical rigor, methodological sophistication, and the diversification of analytical approaches since the publication of Samuel P. Huntingdon's essay, “Political Development and Political Decay,” in World Politics in 1965. Yet more than three decades later, comparativists are rediscovering political institutions, highlighting the originality of Huntington's scholarly contribution. The resurgence of institutional analysis has redirected attention to the potential variability of political outcomes in the face of sweeping global currents, generated important theoretical insights, and created new bases for dialogue across disparate research traditions. Nevertheless, the horizons of institutional research need to be broadened to address the challenges posed by international influences, two-way interactions between politics and society, and institutional fluidity.

The economic logic of the current international economy does not predict the “eclipse of the state”. Economic globalization does restrict state power, but transnational capital needs capable states as much or more than does domestically oriented business. National success in the current global political economy has been associated not with minimal states but with states that are capable, active, and engaged. Pressure for eclipse flows from the conjunction between transnational economic forces and the political hegemony of an Anglo-American ideology that, in J. P. Nettl's words, “simply leaves no room for any valid notion of the state”. Even this combination of economic and political pressure is unlikely to eclipse the state, but it is likely to put public institutions on the defensive, eclipsing any possibility of the “embedded liberalism” described by John Ruggie. A “leaner, meaner” state is the likely outcome. The possibility of a more progressive alternative outcome would depend in part on whether current zero-sum visions of the relation between the state and civil society can be replaced by a more synergistic view.

Arend Lijphart's 1969 article on consociational democracy was a compelling critique of prevailing theories of democratic stability and the launching pad for one of the most widely regarded research programs in contemporary comparative politics. However, Lijphart and others who adopted consociational approaches encountered severe logical, theoretical, and empirical criticisms of their work. The success of the program and its apparent imperviousness to many of these attacks has been remarkable. Lijphart s primary response was to abandon standard norms of social science in favor of an “impressionistic” approach that protected the attractiveness and wide applicability of the theory at the cost of precision and scholarly rigor. The overall trajectory of the consociationalist research program is explained with reference to a shift from early- to late-Lakatosian commitments—from insisting on corroboration for one's theories through repeated encounters with evidence to a late-Lakatosian stance that expects the political and rhetorical skills of scholars operating on behalf of their research program to be more significant than evidence or theoretical coherence.

Inspired by a seminal essay of Albert O. Hirschman, as well as by the ongoing debate on the empirical foundations of social science, this article “revisits” (1) the paradigm concept popularized by T. S. Kuhn in the 1960s and (2) the relationship between probabilistic and “possibilistic” modes of theorizing that has acquired renewed relevance in comparative politics mainly with respect to recent theories of democratization and development. It does so by reviewing three major paradigm crises in modern political science: the shift from the Aristotelian polls to the social “system,” the refocusing of political explanations from the social to the global environment, and the contemporary attempts to reevaluate the role of technology in political change. The review takes stock of the record of the discipline of comparative politics, of opportunities provided by paradigm shifts, seized upon or missed by the discipline. It also allows one to seek a more even balance between the potential utility and limitations of the paradigm concept, while at the same time pointing to the perils of divorcing the art of the possible from the laws of probability.

Stephen D. Krasner's article in this journal in 1976, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” defined the agenda for years of scholarship by being both lucid and problematic. Krasner presented a clear puzzle but manifestly failed adequately to answer the questions that he raised. His key proposition, that strong international economic regimes depend on hegemonic power, was supported by only half of the six cases that he discussed. Yet the cogency of Krasner's formulation of the argument, and the pungency of his rhetoric, led “State Power” to serve as a focal point in a coordination game among three major constituencies in the international political economy field. Liberal transnationalists, statist realists, and their audiences all benefited from Krasner's lucid specification of the issues. As a result of research prompted by Krasner's article, we understand the relationship between international political structure and economic openness much better than we did before it appeared.

Robert Jervis's article “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” is among the most important works in international relations of the past few decades. In it, Jervis develops two essential arguments. First, he explains that the security dilemma is the key to understanding how in an anarchic international system states with fundamentally compatible goals still end up in competition and at war. The security dilemma exists when “many of the means by which a state tries1 to increase its security decrease the security of others.” It provides the rational foundation for what Jervis termed the “spiral model,” which describes how the interaction between states that are seeking only security can fuel competition and strain political relations.2 Second, Jervis explains that the magnitude and nature of the security dilemma depend on two variables: the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation.3 As a result, the security dilemma can vary across space and time. Although states exist in a condition of international anarchy that does not vary, there can be significant variation in the attractiveness of cooperative or competitive means, the prospects for achieving a high level of security, and the probability of war.