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² Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Universit Press, 1976)Google Scholar, chap. 3, esp. 62–76; these pages provide a more thorough discussion of the basic workings of the security dilemma than does “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma.” For an early discussion of this type of interaction, see Singer, J. David, “Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (March 1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a recent discussion, see Glaser, Charles L., “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” World Politics 44 (July 1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁴ The major statement of the standard structural-realist analysis is Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar; also important are idem, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)Google Scholar, esp. chaps. 6, 7; and idem, “Reflections on Theory of International Politicr. A Response to My Critics,” in Keohane, Robert O., ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York; Columbia University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

⁵ See Glaser, Charles L., “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19 (Winter 1994–95)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, vol. 1, The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).

⁶ Although not framed in terms of the security dilemma, see, for example, Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross, “Beyond Deterrence Journal of Social Issues 43 (Winter 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Stein,“Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Tetlock, Philip E. et aL, Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991)Google Scholar, esp. 17; this essay gives somewhat greater prominence to the security dilemma. On the more general question of resolving political rivalries, see Sean Lynn-Jones, “Rivalry and Rapprochement: Accommodation between Adversaries in International Politics” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, in process).

⁷ Matthew Evangelism,“Sources of Moderation in Soviet Security Policy,” in Tetlock et al. (fn. 6), esp. 290–96; and idem, “Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s,” World Politics 42 (July 1990)Google Scholar. On the Soviet use of concessions, see Larson, Deborah Welch, “Crisis Prevention and the Austria State Treaty,” International Organization 41 (Winter 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹³ Posen, Barry R., “The Security Dilemma in Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35 (Spring 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kaufmann, Chaim, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20 (Spring 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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²⁰ Jervis (fh. 2), 76.

²¹ On the advantages of this usage of“capability,” see Snyder, Glenn H., “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,” Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996), 180–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²² For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the decision to buy arms. However, the logic of the security dilemma is more general, including the decision to take territory and to acquire allies to increase security. Regarding territory, an action-reaction process could be expansion into part of a buffer zone that leads one's adversary to expand into the remainder of the zone.

²³ Jervis (fn. 2), 64, says that such an action-reaction process results in reduced security because“when states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little … too lirde because others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state's security.” However, this explains only why the state's security is reduced relative to the situation following its initial buildup, but not why it should be reduced relative to the prior military status quo.

²⁴ Mearsheimer, John J., Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar, chap. 7.

²⁵ This possibility is discussed in Chaim Kaufmann and Charles Glaser,“What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?” International Security (forthcoming).

²⁶ See, for example, Schelling, Thomas C. and Halperin, Morton H., Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961)Google Scholar, esp. 1–2.

²⁷ For earlier use of game theory to explore the different motives that can lead to arms competition and cooperation, see Schelling, Thomas C., “A Framework for the Evaluation of Arms-Control Proposals,” Daedulus 104 (Summer 1975)Google Scholar. While remaining positive about the potential contribution of game-theoretic formulations, Jervis explores their shortcomings in “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics 40 (April 1988)Google Scholar.

²⁸ Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984)Google Scholar. For a focus on questions of arming, see Downs, George W., Rocke, David M., and Siverson, Randolph M., “Arms Races and Cooperation,” in Oye, Kenneth A., ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

²⁹ Jervis (fh. 1), 168–69. Although Jervis identifies this phenomenon as being separate from the security dilemma, I describe it as an integral part of the security dilemma. On the resource value of territory, see Liberman, Peter, “The Spoils of Conquest,” International Security 18 (Fall 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and idem, Dots Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).Google Scholar

³⁰ See, for example, Brown, Michael E., “The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion,” Survival 37 (Spring 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a security dilemma—based argument against nuclear superiority, see Glaser (fn. 15), chap. 5.

³¹ The adversary could also become less secure if it concludes that the state places a higher value on security or demands a higher level of security, both of which could make the state harder to deter. For simplicity, I focus on the adversary's assessment of the state's greed.

³² I use the term “greedy” because states can be motivated to expand for two fundamentally different types of reasons—security and greed—which are blurred by the more common terms “expansionist” and “aggressive.” Four types of states can be defined in terms of greed and security seeking; see Glaser (fh. 2), 501–3. In referring to states as greedy, I do not mean to imply that they do not also seek security.

³³ Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 3, esp. 62–76. See also Snyder, Glenn, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36 (July 1984), 468–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Snyder argues that firm alliance policies can generate reactions that are comparable to a spiral generated by an arms buildup.

³⁴ In addition to the passage cited in fn. 20, see, for example, Jervis (fn. 2), 62.

³⁵ On signaling, see Jems, Robert, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970)Google Scholar; and Fearon, James D., “Threats to Use Force: The Role of Costly Signals in International Crises” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992).Google Scholar

³⁶ This is an oversimplification, however, since a pure security seeker might want the capability to take territory for a variety of reasons. See fn. 57 below for qualifications.

³⁷ Although Jervis identifies the types of buildups, he does not really explain how rational states can spiral; Jervis (fn. 1), 199–201. He notes that states often cannot accurately infer motives from others' military forces and therefore they tend to assume the worst; Jervis (fn. 2), 64–65. This would clearly generate increased hostility, but the judgment is logically flawed, since without additional information states' assessments should remain unchanged. Moreover, states should not assume the worst in the face of uncertainty, since this can support policies that are too competitive/provocative.

³⁸ For discussion of related issues concerning subjective security requirements, see Jervis (fn. 1), 174–76.

³⁹ Kydd, Andrew, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” World Politics 49 (April 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kydd notes (p. 373) that Jervis explores this dynamic for the extreme cases in which bias leads the adversary to assume the state is definitely secure. For pure security seekers, however, all that is necessary to generate a spiral is for the adversary to believe there is some possibility that the state is secure. See also Downs, George W. and Rocke, David M., Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1990), chap. 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁰ Kydd (fn. 39) provides a formal treatment.

⁴¹ Glaser (fh. 5), 67–70; and idem (fh. 2), 526–33; for related points, see Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fh. 28). On reassurance more generally, see Stein (fn. 6); on the inhibiting effect of appearing weak, see Morrow, James D., “Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining,” International Studies Quarterly 36 (June 1996).Google Scholar

⁴² This approach, often referred to as GRIT, was developed by Osgood, Charles E., An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1962).Google Scholar

⁴³ Misperception receives far less discussion in “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” (but see pp. 181–83) than in Jervis (fh. 2), 67–76.

⁴⁴ On attribution theory, see Jervis (fn. 2), esp. 35—48; Larson, Deborah Welch, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), esp. 34–42Google Scholar; and Mercer, Jonathan, Refutation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For an emphasis on organizational perspectives, see Evera, Stephen Van, “Causes of War” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1984)Google Scholar, pt. 2; and Snyder (fn. 10). Snyder (fn. 11) emphasizes domestic political dynamics.

⁴⁶ Evera, Van (fn. 45), chap. 8; and idem, “Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1988).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Snyder (fn. 33), 461, emphasizes wasted resources; he argues (p. 462) that alliance formation is similar to arming, in that all states would be better off remaining outside an alliance; action and reaction nevertheless generate alliance blocks that are costly but fail to increase security.

⁴⁸ On Stag Hunt and related games, see Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Oye (fn. 28).

⁴⁹ For discussion of their impact on a Stag Hunt, see Downs, Rocke, and Siverson (fn. 28), 134–37.

⁵⁰ In addition, a type of uncertainty that is not explored in the text is also important—uncertainty about whether an adversary will become greedier. This uncertainty cannot be eliminated because leaders cannot bind themselves and their successors to current goals; see Jervis (fn. 1), 168.

⁵¹ Although my discussion focuses on competition over territory, a parallel analysis can be developed for arms competition.

⁵² If facing a greedy adversary, however, a pure security seeker would now see instrumental value in expansion, if this would increase its security. The state would then have Prisoners' Dilemma preferences instead of Stag Hunt preferences. In addition, the state would see a higher payoff for war, if war held some prospect of successful expansion or of leaving the adversary relatively weaker, which makes competition more attractive.

Some of my game-theory colleagues object to this formulation, on the grounds that payoffs should be fixed and not vary with the type of adversary. A more adequate formulation requires a multiperiod game.

⁵³ Consequently, the relative size of payoffs matters. Jervis devotes much of “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” to exploring factors that influence payoffs. Offense-defense variables are among the most important and are discussed in the following section.

⁵⁴ For related analysis, see Hoag, Malcolm W., “On Stability in Deterrent Races,” World Politics 13 (July 1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁵ On the relationship between first-strike advantages, preemption, and accidents, see Schelling and Halperin (fn. 26), 14–16.

⁵⁶ See also Quester (fh. 3), 105–6.

⁵⁷ As Jervis (fn. 1) notes, this is an overstatement (pp. 201–2). A pure security seeker might buy offense for a number of reasons: (1) if offense has a great advantage over defense; (2) if the state has extended deterrence commitments; (3) because offense may be necessary to regain territory lost at the beginning of a war; and (4) because the threat of counter offense can enhance deterrence. On extended deterrence, see Van Evera, Stephen W., “Offense, Defense and Strategy: When Is Offense Best?” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987)Google Scholar. On counter offense, see Huntington, Samuel P., “Convention Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe,” International Security 8 (Winter 1983–84)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Posen, Barry R., “Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control,” Daedulus 120 (Winter 1991)Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ The concept of differentiation is implicit in the distinction between qualitative and quantitative arms control, with the former relying on differentiation. This concept lies at the core of modern arms control theory; see, for example, Schelling, Thomas C., “What Went Wrong with Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs 64 (Winter 1985–86)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁹ Van Evera (fh. 5), chap. 5.

⁶⁰ Fearon, James D., “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49 (Summer 1995), 402–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar. And see the following papers prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 1995: Fearon, “The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648”; and Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “Inspecting the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory: Can They Bear the Weight?”

⁶¹ Van Evera (fh. 5), chaps. 5,6; and idem, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9 (Summer 1984)Google Scholar. See also Hopf, Ted, “Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War,” American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Fearon (fn. 60, February 1995), who argues that the frequency of war in broad historical periods runs counter to standard offense-defense predictions.

⁶² See also Snyder, Jack L., “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914,” in Jervis, Robert et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

⁶³ Trachtenberg, Marc, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), chap. 2, esp. 64–72Google Scholar. See also Kaiser, David, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 324Google Scholar; and idem, “Deterrence or National Interest? Reflections on the Origins of War,” Orbis 30 (Spring 1986)Google Scholar; Stevenson, David, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914,” International Security 22 (Summer 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁴ This slightly overstates the similarity, since Waltz (fn. 4,1979), for example, assumes that states seek at least security but may have other goals as well (p. 126), while Jervis's formulation assumes that states are pure security seekers. This difference is not problematic, however.

⁶⁵ Although “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” precedes Theory of International Politics by a year, much of Waltz's argument is available in “Theory of International Relations,” in Greenstein, Fred and Polsby, Nelson, eds., The Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975)Google Scholar. Waltz (fn. 4,1979) makes only passing reference to the security dilemma (pp. 186–87).

⁶⁶ See Glaser (fn. 5), which presents additional reasons for modification; and Van Evera (fn. 5).

⁶⁷ Jervis (fn. 1) does not overlook power, he is explicit that both power and offense-defense variables matter (p. 187).

⁶⁸ See, for example, Snyder (fn. 11), who uses “aggressive” instead of “offensive” (pp. 10–13); and Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Miller, Steven E., “Preface,” in Brown, Michael E., Lynn-Jones, , and Miller, , eds., The Perils of Anarchy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), xiGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁹ See Glaser (fn. 5).

⁷⁰ Another basic puzzle still exists, however why states—security seekers as well as greedy states—do not compromise instead of incurring the cost of fighting; see Fearon (fn. 60, Summer 1995).

⁷¹ For related points, see Jervis, Robert, “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War,” Political Science Quarterly 108 (Summer 1993), 244–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Randall L. Schweller argues otherwise, holding that when a greedy state exists there is no security dilemma; see Schweller, , “Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷² Schweller (fn. 71), quote at 106. Disagreement about the relative importance of greed and insecurity is long standing. For a comparison of the contending formulations offered by realists, see, for example, Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), esp. 83–84Google Scholar.

⁷³ Restraint may not be ill-advised, however, since for a greedy insecure adversary the reduction in its insecurity could still offset the reduction in the state's military capabilities. Assessing the net effect requires more specific assumptions and a detailed model of interaction. By contrast, unilateral concessions are always misguided when one is facing a secure greedy state, as described by the deterrence model.

⁷⁴ On the deterrent value of counteroffensive capabilities, see fn. 57.

⁷⁵ Although at first glance this might seem to eliminate the security dilemma, this need not be the case. A state motivated entirely by security might choose war to increase its security; consequently, the state's insecurity should lead the adversary to fear it. Thus, eliminating the security dilemma would require that the adversary know not only that the state was a pure security seeker but also that the state did not fear it. Consequently, some points in this paragraph are overstated.

⁷⁶ In this spirit, see de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno and Lalman, David, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)Google Scholar, chap. 5. A different argument is that the openness that characterizes mature democracies results in domestic debate that cannot be manipulated simply to deceive an adversary, and therefore provides valuable information about motives. See Kydd, Andrew, “Signaling and Structural Realism” (Manuscript 1996)Google Scholar; and Schultz, Kenneth A., “Domestic Political Competition and Bargaining in International Crises” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1996)Google Scholar. Schultz develops this type of argument for crisis interactions.

⁷⁷ Arguing along these lines is Fearon, James D., “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994), 587CrossRefGoogle Scholar. If, however, a democracy believes this to be the case and it is not, then we get the kind of misperception described above: the democracy believes that it doe not face a security dilemma and therefore does not moderate its building; its adversary, not confident that the democracy is a pure security seeker, then responds to the buildup; and the democracy then increases its estimate of the adversary's greediness because it believes that its adversary knew that a response was unnecessary for maintaining its security.

⁷⁸ See Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 3; and Glaser (fn. 2).

⁷⁹ Patrick Glynn focuses on Van Evera's arguments; see Glynn, , Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control and the History of the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 1992)Google Scholar, chap. 1, quote at 21. For a more nuanced but at least partially sympathetic discussion, see Trachtenberg (fn. 63), chap. 2, esp. 49–57.

⁸⁰ Gray, Colin S., Weapons Don't Make War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 174Google Scholar. A similar theme runs through idem, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Jervis (fn. 2), chap. 3. Douglas Seay reviews the debate among Soviet specialists; see Seay “What Are the Soviets' Objectives in Their Foreign, Military, and Arms Control Policies?” in Eden, Lynn and Miller, Steven E., eds., Nuclear Arguments (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

⁸² Schweller, Randall L., “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19 (Summer 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸³ Jervis (fh. 2), 112–13; Glaser (fh. 2), 505–6.

⁸⁴ Schweller (fh. 71), 117–20, quotes at 117 and 118.

⁸⁵ Jervis (fh. 2) deals with precisely this issue (pp. 75–76).

⁸⁶ Mearsheimer, John J., “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (Winter 1994–95), 11–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Other prominent structural realists reject this position; see Waltz, (fn. 4, 1979), 118,126,127Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ Mearsheimer, John J., “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15 (Summer 1990), 12CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Zakaria, Fareed, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” International Security 17 (Summer 1992), 190–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁸ Wendt, Alexander, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), quote at 407, and also 401–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and idem, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20 (Summer 1995), 77Google Scholar. For a very different constructivist critique, which focuses on the offense-defense balance, instead of the security dilemma, see Kier (fn. 10).

⁸⁹ Wendt (fn. 88,1995), 73.

⁹⁰ Wendt (fn. 88,1992), 396; see also idem (fn. 88,1995), 72.

⁹¹ This said, some realists have argued otherwise. See, for example, Grieco, Joseph M., Cooperation among Nations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990)Google Scholar. This is because they have conflated means and ends. See Glaser, Charles L., “Correspondence: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter,” International Security 21 (Spring 1997)Google Scholar. See also Powell, Robert, “Guns, Butter, and Anarchy,” American Political Science Review 87 (March 1993), 127CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹² Wendt (fn. 88,1992), 404–5.

⁹³ Ibid., 407.

⁹⁴ See especially Wendt (fn. 88,1992), 406. Wendt turns to the existence of predatory (greedy) states to explain how anarchy becomes a competitive realm (pp. 407–9). However, the weaker structural-realist assumption of uncertainty about motives, in combination with a security dilemma, is sufficient.

⁹⁵ This section draws on Kaufmann and Glaser (fn. 25), which addresses a number of additional criticisms, as does Lynn-Jones, Sean M., “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security Studies 4 (Summer 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Jack S. Levy provides some of the early criticisms; see Levy, , “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 28 (June 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁶ Mearsheimer (fn. 86), 23.

⁹⁷ For a different response, see also Lynn-Jones (fh. 95), 674–77.

⁹⁸ Huntington, Samuel P., “U.S. Defense Strategy: The Strategic Innovations of the Reagan Years,” in Kruzel, Joseph, ed., American Defense Annual, 1987–1988 (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), 36Google Scholar. See also Gray (fn. 80,1993), 28.

⁹⁹ See, for example, Levy (fn. 95), 222. For related discussion of this criticism, see Lynn-Jones (fn. 95), 677–82.

¹⁰⁰ See fn. 60 for work that has already raised this possibility.