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Why Did the Dutch Revolt Last Eighty Years?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Geoffrey Parker
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THE Dutch Revolt lasted longer than any other uprising in modern European history—from the iconoclastic fury in August 1566 to the Peace of Munster in January 1648; and it involved more continuous fighting than any other war of modern times—from April 1572 to April 1607 (with only six months' cease-fire in 1577) and from April 1621 to June 1647. Its economic, social, and political costs were enormous. The longevity of the revolt becomes even more remarkable when one remembers that the two combatants were far from equal. The areas in revolt against Spain were small in size, in natural resources, and in population—especially in the first few years. In 1574 only about twenty towns, with a combined population of 75,000, remained faithful to William of Orange; Amsterdam, the largest town in Holland, stayed loyal to the king until 1578. Against the ‘rebels’ Philip II could draw on the resources of Spain, Spanish America, Spanish Italy and, of course, the Spanish Netherlands. Although by the seventeenth century the odds had narrowed somewhat—by then there were seven ‘rebel’ provinces with a combined population of over one million—Spain could still call on vastly superior resources of men and money. There were a number of occasions in the course of the war when Spain seemed to stand on the threshold of success. In 1575, for example, the con-quest of the islands of Duiveland and Schouwen in South Holland divided the rebel heartland in two and appeared to presage the collapse of the revolt. A decade later, in 1585, Antwerp was re-captured against all predictions, leaving Holland and Zealand dispirited and prepared to discuss surrender. As late as 1625, with the reconquest of Breda in Brabant and Bahia in Brazil, Spain's final victory seemed near. But total success never came. Spain never regained the seven northern provinces of the Netherlands and by 1648 Philip IV counted himself lucky to have retained the ten southern ones.

Type
Research Article
Information
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society , Volume 26 , December 1976 , pp. 53 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © Royal Historical Society 1976

References

1 An effort has been made to quantify these costs at least for the major belligerents: Parker, G., ‘War and economic change: the economic costs of the Dutch Revolt’, in War and economic development, ed. Winter, J. M. (Cambridge, 1975), PP. 49–71Google Scholar.

2 For assessments of the population of Holland (and indeed of the Netherlands as a whole) cf. The Sources of European economic history, 1500–1800, ed. Parker, G. and Wilson, G. H. (to be published London, 1976Google Scholar), chap. 1, and Vries, J. de, The Dutch rural economy in the Golden Age, 1500–1800 (New Haven and London, 1974), pp. 74–101Google Scholar.

3 Prinsterer, G. Groen van, Archives ou correspondance iniédile de la maison d'Orange-Nassau, 1st series, iv (Leiden, 1837), PP. 2–6Google Scholar: a despairing letter from William of Orange to his brother, Count John of Nassau, written at Zwolle on 18 October 1572, announced that the prince was sailing forthwith to the only province remaining loyal to his cause, Holland, ‘pour maintenir les affaires par delà tant que possible sera, ayant delibéré de faire illecq ma sépulture.’

4 Of the 880 Netherlands Protestants recorded in the various ‘Books of Martyrs’ as having perished in the course of the sixteenth century, 617 (or 70 per cent) were Anabaptists; their total losses through Habsburg persecution must have numbered many thousands. Not surprisingly, as early as July 1572, the Anabaptists declared their support for Orange and provided money for his army. (Brandt, G., The History of the Reformation and other ecclesiastical transactions in and about the Low Countries from the beginning of the 8th century down to the famous Synod of Dort, inclusive, i (London, 1720), p. 295Google Scholar.) This was, of course, a bribe. In the 1560s Orange, like most other princes, had persecuted and even executed Anabaptists. For some of the reasons which underlay this intolerance, cf. Kirchner, W., ‘State and Anabaptists in the sixteenth century: an economic approach’, Journal of Modern History, xlvi (1974), pp. 1–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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6 Feltham, Owen, A brief character of the Low-Countries under the States. Being three weeks observation of the Vices and Vertues of the Inhabitants (London, 1652), pp. 1Google Scholarand 5.

7 Queen Elizabeth sent perhaps 1,200 men unofficially in the months of April and May 1572, but then withdrew them. The support of the Flemish and Walloon churches in England was smaller but steadier: the correspondence of the churches pullulates with details on the aid in men and money sent over to the Low Countries. Cf. Ecclesiae Londino-Batavae Archimm, ed. Hessels, J. H., ii (Cambridge, 1889Google Scholar), e.g. nos 112, 115, 123, 129; iii part i (Cambridge, 1897), e.g. nos 195, 197,257,367, 380. The Scottish government also sent substantial aid.

8 Snapper, F., Oorlogsinvloeden op de onerzeese handel van Holland, 1551–1719 (Amsterdam, 1959): 989Google Scholar Dutch ships passed out of the Sound in 1574, but only 840 in 1575 and 763 in 1576—clear evidence of the growing impact of the war.

9 Feltham, , op. cit., pp. 83–85Google Scholar.

10 The new bastions of Alkmaar appear clearly in the drawing of the siege of 1573 by Thomas Morgan, an eye-witness: All Souls College, Oxford, MS. 129, published byBaird, D. N. Galdecott, ‘Een engelse visie op het beleg van Alkmaar’, Alkmaars Jaarboekje, 1970, pp. 101–07Google Scholar.

11 A partial census of Antwerp in 1584 revealed 3,248 Protestant and 3,011 Catholic households, out of a total of 10,176 households covered by the census (perhaps 60 per cent of the city's population). Cf. the interesting and important article ofRoey, A. van, ‘De correlatie tussen het sociale-beroepsmilieu en de godsdienstkeuze te Antwerpen op het einde der XVIe eeuw’, in Sources de Histoire religieuse de la Belgique (Louvaine, 1968), pp. 239–58Google Scholar.

12 Nueva Coleccidn de Documentos Iniditospara la historia de Espana, v (Madrid, 1894), p. 368Google Scholar, Requesens to the king, 6 October 1574; Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 560 fo 33, Requesens to the king, 7 November 1574.

13 On mutiny and desertion cf. Parker, G., The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road: the logistics of Spanish victory and defeat in the Low Countries' Wars, 1567–1659 (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1975Google Scholar), chaps. 8 and 9; and‘Mutiny and discontent in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1572–1607’, Past and Present, Iviii (1973), pp. 38–52Google Scholar.

14 Quinn, D. B., ‘Some Spanish reactions to Elizabethan colonial enterprises’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, i (1951), pp. 1–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the cost of all this to Spain—the defence of Florida against the French cost 180,000 ducats i in 1565–66 alone—cf. Hoffman, P. E., ‘A study of Florida defense costs, 1565–85: a quantification of Florida history’, Florida Historical Quarterly, li (1973), pp. 401–22Google Scholar; and Andrews, K. R., Elizabethan privateering: English privateering during the Spanish war, 1585–1604 (Cambridge, 1964Google Scholar).

15 For a few examples among many: Archivo General de Simancas Estado 550 fos 115–16, ‘Parescer’ (opinion) of secretary of war Juan Delgado, 1574, ‘Flanders’ or the Mediterranean; Estado 554 fo 89, king to duke of Alva, 18 March 1573; InstituteJuan, de Valencia de Don (Madrid), envio 109Google Scholar fo 59, secretary of state Gabriel de Zayas to Don Luis de Requesens, 8 May 1575 (a copy of the same letter is at Estado 565 fo 79).

16 As early as January 1566 Orange made enquiries about raising troops in Germany(Prinsterer, Groen van, Archives, ii, pp. 23–25Google Scholar; letter to Count Louis of Nassau, 25 January 1566); in August, Count Louis signed a contract with a German military enterpriser to raise 1,000 horse for service against the king in the Netherlands (op. cit., pp. 257–58, ‘Accord’ of 30 August); and in February 1567 he actually came to the camp of the Imperial army at Gotha in Saxony and tried to recruit soldiers (Koch, M., Quellen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Maximilian II, ii (Leipzig, 1861), pp. 36–37Google Scholar, letter to the Emperor dated 19 February 1567). On Orange's efforts to persuade the Emperor and princes to intervene in the Netherlands troubles in 1566–67, cf. Groen, , op. cit., ii, pp. 27–30Google Scholar, 178–80 and 299–302, and iii, pp. 1–6, 9–10, 26–40 and so on.

17 Orange wrote to his brother John: ‘il a ainsy pleu à Dieu pour nous oster toute espérance que pouvions avoir assise sur les hommes’ (Prinsterer, Groen van, Archives, iii, pp. 501–10Google Scholar and iv, p. cii, letter of 21 September 1572).

18 Parker, G., ‘Spain, her enemies and the revolt of the Netherlands 1559–1648’, Past and Present, xlix (1970), pp. 72–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 83; Hess, A. C., ‘The Moriscos: an Ottoman Fifth Column in sixteenth-century Spain’, American Historical Review, lxxiv (1968), pp. 1–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at pp. 19–21; Parker, G., ‘The Dutch Revolt and the polarization of international polities’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, Ixxxviii (1976), no. 4Google Scholar.

19 The new fortifications, the ‘houten redoubten’, and the campaign plans of 1605–06 are described and illustrated by the eye-witnessGiustiniano, P., Delle Guerre diFiandra, libri VI (Antwerp, 1609), pp. 228–29Google Scholar and figs. 14 and 25. There is some correspondence about their construction in Algemeen Rijksarchief, the Hague, Staten-Generaal 4748. The classic account of how to construct fortifications in the cheapest way possible was by the mathematicianMarolois, Samuel, Fortification ou Architecture militaire (Amsterdam, 1615Google Scholar). Marolois was military adviser to the States 1612–19.

20 Instituto de Valencia de Don Juan, envio 51 fo 31, Mateo Vazquez to the king with holograph royal reply, 31 May 1574 (this document is cited, with others, in a n Unacceptable translation byLovett, A. W., ‘Some Spanish attitudes to the revolt of the Netherlands’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, Ixxxv (1973), pp. 17–30Google Scholar, at pp. 24–25.

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22 Orange to Counts Louis and John, 5 February 1573 (Prinsterer, Groen van, Archives, iv, pp. 49–51Google Scholar).Cf. also Orange to Marnix, 28 November 1573(Gachard, L. P., Correspondence de Guillaume le Taciturne, iii (Brussels, 1851), pp. 88–93Google Scholar). Precisely the same two demands were mad e at the peace negotiations at Breda in 1575 (cf. Kossman, E. H. and Mellink, A. F., Texts concerning the revolt of the Netherlands (Cambridge, 1975),pp. 124–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar); at St Geertruidenberg in 1577(Griffiths, G., Representative government in western Europe in the sixteenth century (Oxford, 1968), pp. 454–62Google Scholar); and at Cologne in 1579(Kossman, and Mellink, , op. cit., pp. 183–87)Google Scholar.

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24 Eysinga, W. J. M. van, De wording van het Twaalfjarige Bestand van 9 april 1609 (Amsterdam, 1963Google Scholar), chap. 1; Tex, J. den, Oldenbamevelt, i (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 199–201Google Scholar.

25 Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid)Estado 3285, unfol., voto of the CountDuke of Olivares, 1 September 1628.

26 Cf. the opinions of various Spanish ministers printed by Parker, G., The Army of Flanders (2nd edition), p. xivGoogle Scholar an d pp. 127–34. There was also an ‘ideological floodgates’ theory, which argued that if heresy were allowed to prevail in northern Europe all heretics would attack the possessions of Philip II. ‘Much… will be risked in allowing the heretics to prevail’ the king wrote in 1562: ‘For if they do, we may be certain that all their endeavours will be directed against me and my states’. (Quoted by Koenigsberger, H. G., ‘The statecraft of Philip II’, European Studies Review, i (1971), pp. 1–21Google Scholar, at p. 13.

27 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Estado 3285, ubi supra.

28 Blok, P. J., ‘De handel op Spanje en het begin der groote vaart’, Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde 5th series i (1913), pp. 102–20Google Scholar; Kernkamp, J. H., De handed op den Vijand 1573–1609, 2 vols (Utrecht, 1931Google Scholar), gives the definitive account of Dutch trade with the Iberian peninsula during the war period.

29 On English policy and profits, cf. Andrews, K. R., Elizabethan privateering: English privateering during the Spanish War 1585–1603 (Cambridge, 1964Google Scholar), passim.

30 Goslinga, C. C., The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580–1680 (Assen, 1971Google Scholar); Sluiter, E., ‘Dutch maritime power and the colonial status quo, 1585–1641’, Pacific Historical Review, xi (1942), pp. 29–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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33 Gerhard, P., Pirates on the West Coast of New Spain, 1575–1742 (Glendale, 1960), pp. 101–34Google Scholar. The first Dutch attack on the Spanish Pacific was the ‘trading mission’ of Joris van Spilsbergen, sent by the States-General in 1615. The journal of the expedition refers to the Spaniards throughout as ‘the enemy’! (An English translation appeared asThe East and West Indian Mirror, ed. Villiers, J. A. J. (Hack-luyt Society, London, 1906), pp. 11–160Google Scholar.)

34 For a general survey of the expansion of Dutch trade, cf. Boxer, C. R., The Dutch seaborne empire 1600–1800 (London, 1965Google Scholar). For the expansion of the East India trade, cf. Algemeen Rijksarchief (The Hague), Kolonialische Arckief 4389 ‘Schepen voor de Generate Vereenigde Nederlandsche Geoctroyeerde Oostindische Gompagnie nae d'Oostindies uytgevoeren’.

35 Archives Générates du Royaume (Brussels), Secrétairerie d'Etat et de Guerre 185 fo 24, King Philip III to the Archduke Albert, 4 February 1621. Later on, the Count-Duke of Olivares was to claim that the Truce had not been renewed by Spain ‘solely for the cause of religion’: this appears to be false.(Cf. thevoto of 1628 referred to in note 25 above.) On the expiry of the Trucecf. the admirable study ofPoelhekke, J. J., 't Uytgaen van den Treves. Spanje en de Nederlanden in 1621 (Groningen, 1960Google Scholar). It is interesting to note that at exactly the same time Spain's solicitude for the fate of the English Catholics diminished: Loomie, A. J., ‘Olivares, the English Catholics, and the peace of 1630’, Revue beige de philologie et d'histoire, xlvii (1969), pp. 1154–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 The basic study on Dutch Brazil is by Boxer, C. R., The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654 (Oxford, 1957Google Scholar). Pernambuco contained about 50 per cent of the population of the entire colony and produced about 60 per cent of its sugar.

37 Archivio di Stato, Venice, , Senato: dispacci Spagna 74Google Scholar, unfol., T. Contarini to the Doge and Senate, 2 October 1638. On the gains and losses accruing to Portugal from the Union with Spain, cf. Schwarz, S. B., ‘Luso-Spanish relations in Habsburg Brazil, 1580–1640’, The Americas, xxv (1968), pp. 33–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The English discerned somewhat earlier, in the 1590s, that Brazil was a weak but lush part of the empire of the Spanish Habsburgs. Cf. Andrews, K. R., Elizabethan privateering, pp. 133Google Scholarand 201–13.

38 In 1636 the Dutch wanted 5 million crowns but Spain would only offer 2 million; in 1638 Spain did offer 5 million but by then it was not enough. Waddington, A., La République des Provinces-Unies, la France et Us Pays-Bos espagnols de 1630 à 1650, i (Paris, 1895), pp. 343–46Google Scholar; Leman, A., Richelieu et Olivares: leur négociations secrètes de 1636 à 1642pour le rétablissement de lapaix (Lille, 1938), p. 55Google Scholar.

39 Leman, A., op. cit., p. 126Google Scholar; Poelhekke, J. J., De vrede van Munster (The Hague, 1948), p. 65CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As early as 1632–33 Brazil had been almost the only point at issue in the peace talks then underway: cf. Gachard, L. P., Actes des Etats-Généraux de 1632, i (Brussels, 1853), pp. 96Google Scholar, 108, 124, X59; ii (Brussels, 1866), pp. 665–68, 677–78, 680–81.

40 On the falling Indies receipts cf. Ortiz, A. Dominguez, ‘Los caudales de Indiasy la polf tica exterior de Felipe IV’, Anuario de Estudios Americanos, xiii (1956), pp. 311–89Google Scholar. There is a growing volume of evidence, as yet unsynthesized, that the critical period for the collapse of the Spanish economy was 1625–30. Cf. Alvarez, G. Anes and Flem, J.P. le, ‘Las crisis del siglo XVII: productión agricola, preciose ingresos en tierras de Segovia’, Moneday crédito, xciii (1965), pp. 3–55Google Scholar; Jago, C. J., ‘Aristocracy, war and finance in Castile, 1621–1665: the titled nobility and the house of Béjar during the reign of Philip IV’ (Cambridge University Ph.D. thesis, 1969Google Scholar), chaps. 4 and 7; Weisser, M., ‘Les marchands de Toléde dans l’économie castillane, 1565–1635’, Mélanges de la Casa de Velásquez, vii (1971), pp. 223–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Martin, F. Ruiz, ‘Un testimonio literario sobre las manufacturas de panĩos en Segovia por 1625’, in Homenaje alprofesor Alarcos, ii (Valladolid, 1967), pp. 1–21Google Scholar.

41 On the main revolts there is a clear and concise exposition (with bibliography) byElliott, J. H., ‘Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy’, in Preconditions of revolution in early modem Europe, ed. Forster, R. and Greene, J. P. (Baltimore and London, 1970), pp. 109–30Google Scholar. The ‘Green Banner’ revolts, with which Professor Elliott does not deal, are covered by Ortiz, A. Dominguez, Alteraciones andaluzas (Madrid, 1974)Google Scholar.

42 Figures from Parker, G., The Army of Flanders, p. 295Google Scholar, based on the audited accounts of the army paymaster. Slightly lower figures were put forward by the vanquished Spanish commander as an explanation for his defeat: Bibliotheque royale (Brussels), MS. 12428—29 fo 328, ‘Memorial…sobre materia de haciendá (30 September 1644) gives a receipt of 4.7 million crowns in 1640, 4.5 million in 1641, 3.4 million in 1642 and only 1–3 million in 1643.

43 Bibliothéque publique et universitaire (Geneva), MS. Favre 39 fos 88–89, Don Luis de Haro to the Marques of Velada, 17 November 1643. So few of Haro's letters have survived that this one, giving vent to his personal views, is particularly important.

44 Talks between Spain and the Dutch went on almost continuously at an informal level, but formal negotiations took place in 1621—22, 1627–29, 1632–33, 1635, 1638–39, 1640–41 and (of course) 1644–48. They are all mentioned in the first chapter of Poelhekke, J. J., De vrede van Munster (The Hague, 1948)Google Scholar. There were also semi-continuous talks about peace between France and Spain from 1636 until 1659.

45 Colección de Documentos Iniditos para la Historia de España lxxxii (Madrid, 1884), pp. 138–39Google Scholar, Count of Fuensaldana to the king, 17 September 1645; Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 2065, unfol., apostil of Philip IV to a report by the ‘junta de estado’, 3 January 1646; Correspondencia diplomdtica de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua embaixanda em Holanda, 1643–1650, ed. Prestage, E. and Azevedo, P. de, ii (Coimbra, 1926), p. 256Google Scholar.

46 Quoted by Hume, M. A. S. in Cambridge Modern History, iv (Cambridge, 1906), P. 659Google Scholar.

47 On Holland' s objections to the cost of the war in 1646—47, cf. the documents cited byPoelhekke, , Vrede van Munster, pp. 307Google Scholarff.

48 The Lord George Digby's Cabinet (London, 1648: 68Google Scholarpages of document s an d commentary) andEenighe extracten uyt verscheyde missiven gevonden in de Lord Digby's Cabinet (also London, 1646)Google Scholar. These are discussed byGeyl, P., The history of the Low Countries: Episodes and Problems (London, 1965), pp. 75 and 246Google Scholar.

49 The policy of the Prince of Orange and his family is discussed by Geyl, P., Orange and Stuart, 1641–1672 (London, 1969), chap. 1Google Scholar, and by J. J. Poelhekke, De vrede van Munster, chap. 5.

50 Cf. Poelhekke, op. cit., chap. 7 (quotation from p. 256).

51 Charnacé to Richelieu, 2 January 1634, quoted Waddington, , La république des Province-Unies, I, p. 221Google Scholar. The influence of Charnacé and the French was critical in aborting the peace-talks of 1632–33 between Spain and the Dutch: of cf. deBoer, M. G., Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in der Jahren 1632 und 1633 (Groningen, 1898)Google Scholar.

52 Cf. Jong, M. de, ‘Holland en de Portuguese restauratie van 1640’, Tijdsehrift voor Geschiendenis, Iv (1940), pp. 225–53Google Scholar; Haar, C. van de, De diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen de Republiek en Portugal, 1640–1661 (Groningen, 1961)Google Scholar; andTudela, J. Perez de, Sobre la defensa hispana de Brasil contra los Holandeses, 1624–1650 (Madrid, 1974)Google Scholar.

53 In fact Zealand was cheated: the great fleet was badly delayed by storms and arrived late at Recife with many of its soldiers dead and the rest mutinous for lack of pay. On 19 April 1648 and again on 19 February 1649 the surviving Dutch troops were routed by the Portuguese on the heights of Guararapes outside Recife. These defeats sealed the fate of Dutch Brazil, and that in turn led to the loss of Dutch Angola.Cf. Bento, C. Moreira, As batalhas dos Guararapes (Recife, 1971)Google Scholar, text and maps; Hoboken, W. J. van, ‘De West-indische Compagnie en de Vrede van Munster’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, lxx (1957), pp. 359–68Google Scholar; Hoboken, W. J. van, ‘Een troepentransport naar Brazilie in 1647’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, lxii (1949), pp. 100–09Google Scholar.

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