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Experimental Science and Mathematics in Roger Bacon's Thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2016

N. W. Fisher
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Sabetai Unguru
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Extract

It has been some years since any attempt has been made at a comprehensive re-evaluation of the work of Roger Bacon, although he is perhaps as alluring and mystifying as ever, and more or less creditable studies of various aspects of his work continue to emerge at regular intervals. For the most part, these do little to dispel the myths and countermyths that have always surrounded Bacon's work. The main source of this confusion must obviously be Bacon himself. By diligent searching in his various works and fragments of works, he can be made to say practically anything the commentator wants him to say.

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Articles
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Copyright © Fordham University Press 

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50 'Unde oportet primo credulitatem fieri, donec secundo sequitur experientia, ut tertio ratio comitetur. Si enim inexpertus magnetem trahere ferrum, nec audiens ab aliis, quod trahat, in principio debet credere his qui experti sunt, vel qui ab expertis fideliter habuerunt…’ (Opus majus [Bridges] II 202; Opus majus [Burke] I 615-616). Google Scholar

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52 ‘Et haec scientia certificat omnia naturalia et artificialia in particulari et in propria disciplina, per experientiam perfectam; non per argumenta, ut scientiae pure speculativae, nec per debiles et imperfectas experientias, ut scientiae operativae’ (Opus tertium [Brewer] 46 Emphasis supplied). There is an interesting variation on this passage in F. A. Gasquet, ‘An Unpublished Fragment of a Work by Roger Bacon,’ English Historical Review 12 (1897) 494-517 at 510: ‘Scientie omnes praeter hanc vel utuntur argumentis tantum ad probationem conclusionum suarum, ut pure speculative scientie, vel habent experientias universales et imperfectas.’ Google Scholar

53 ‘nudam veritatem sine causa’ (Opus majus [Bridges] II 168; Opus majus [Burke] II 584). Google Scholar

54 ‘Caeterum ante omnia utilitas cujuslibet rei consideranda est. Haec autem utilitas consistit in fine propter quem res est; … Nam finis est primum in intentione, et movet efficientem, ut transmutet materiam et educat formam, et totam rem in esse constituat. Sic igitur est in omnibus rebus et scientiis. Quapropter oportet quod homo consideret utilitatem scientiarum antequam aggrediatur singulas divisim prosequendo’ (Opus tertium [Brewer] 19). Google Scholar

55 ‘a vulgo studientium est penitus ignorata’ (Opus majus [Bridges] II 172; Opus majus [Burke] II 587). Google Scholar

56 ‘Caeterum propter necessitatem et utilitatem et difficultatem constituuntur scientiae… Si enim facile est quod quaeritur, non oportet scientiam constitui. Similiter etsi sit difficile, et non sit utile, non fit scientia de eo, quia labor stultus esset et inanis’ (Opus majus [Bridges] II 3; Opus majus [Burke] II 420). Google Scholar

57 ‘et ut in electis et utilibus fiat occupatio studentium, quia vita brevis est. Et ut certitudinaliter sine dubitatione, et plane sine obscuritate, tradatur sapientia, quod impossibile est fieri sine experientia’ (Compendium studii philosophiae [Brewer] 397). Google Scholar

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60 ‘Et hec scientia damnat omnem demonum invocationem, quia non solum theologia, sed philosophia docet hos vitare. Nam omnis homo sane mentis novit quod demones, qui sunt angeli mali, non possunt bene facere, nec aliquid potest agi cum illis ad utilitatem humani generis’ (Opus tertium [Little] 47). Google Scholar

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81 Ibid. 127.Google Scholar

82 Ibid. 71.Google Scholar

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84 'Nam omnis res naturalis producitur in esse per efficiens et materiam in quam operatur, nam haec duo concurrunt primo. Agens enim per suam virtutem movet et transmutat materiam, ut fiat res. Sed virtus efficientis et materiae sciri non potest sine magna mathematicae potestate, sicut nec ipsi effectus producti. Sunt ergo haec tria, efficiens, materia et effectus… Et sic potest ostendi, quod nihil in rebus sciri potest sine geometriae potestate…’ (Opus majus [Bridges] I 110-111, Emphasis supplied). Google Scholar

85 'Omne enim efficiens agit per suam virtutem quam facit in materiam subjectam, … Et haec virtus vocatur similitudo, et imago, et species et multis nominibus… Et haec species facit omnem operationem hujus mundi…’ (Opus majus [Burke] I 129-130). Google Scholar

86 Crombie, , Robert Grosseteste 144.Google Scholar

87 ‘Nec mirum si omnia sciantur per mathematicam, et omnia per hanc, quia omnes scientiae sunt connexae (ut superius dixi), licet quaelibet simul cum hac habeat suam proprietatem’ (Opus tertium [Brewer] 37). Google Scholar

88 Opus majus (Burke) I 120-126.Google Scholar

89 ‘Sed quantitas est maxime sensibilis, quia est sensibile commune… quapropter maxime potest intellectus proficere circa quantitatem’ (Opus majus [Bridges] I 107; Opus majus [Burke] I 120). Google Scholar

90 'Major vero pars praedicamenti qualitatis continet passiones et proprietates quantitatum…’ (Opus majus [Bridges] I 102; Opus majus [Burke] I 120). Google Scholar

91 ‘et ideo virtus tota logicae dependet ex mathematica’ (Opus majus [Bridges] I 103; Opus majus [Burke] I 120). Google Scholar

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93 Opus tertium (Brewer) 104.Google Scholar

94 'Sed in mathematica possumus devenire ad plenam veritatem sine errore, et ad omnium certitudinem sine dubitatione: quoniam in ea convenit haberi demonstrationem per causam propriam et necessariam… Sed in aliis scientiis excluso mathematicae beneficio… demonstratio per causam propriam et necessariam non est in eis…’ (Opus majus [Bridges] I 105-106; Opus majus [Burke] I 123-124). Google Scholar

95 'In rebus naturalibus sunt duo modi arguendi, unus per demonstrationem quae procedit per causas, et alius per demonstrationem per effectum… necesse est quod demonstratio per causam sit longe potentior, quam per effectum' (Opus majus [Bridges] I 168; Opus majus [Burke] I 190). ( MS. Digby 235, fol. 89, used by Bridges himself has ‘per', so that Bridges's text, which has ‘ad,’ is clearly wrong, as it also appears from the sense of the passage).Google Scholar

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101 Op. cit. (above note 7) 279-280.Google Scholar

102 Op. cit. (above note 6) 655.Google Scholar

103 Op. cit. (above note 7) 252.Google Scholar

104 Crombie, , Augustine to Galileo II 2324.Google Scholar

105 'Sed ad omnia scienda modus optimus requiritur. Aristoteles vero in secundo Metaphysicae vult, quod modus sciendi requiratur, antequam homo discat vel per se inquirat. Malum enim est, ut ait, simul quaerere scientiam et modum sciendi, quia primo quaerere debet modum, ut feliciter ad scientiam perveniat… Modus enim est ut priora in ordine doctrinae sciantur ante posteriora, et faciliora ante difficiliora, et communia ante propria, et minora ante majora, ut manifestum est…’ (Compendium studii philosophiae [Brewer] 397). Google Scholar

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107 Sarton, Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science (Baltimore 1927-1947) II 953.Google Scholar

108 Kuhn, Thomas S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 1962).Google Scholar