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64. We know that turnout has this type of “contagious” effect (Nickerson, David W., “Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments,” American Political Science Review 102, no. 1 [2008]: 49–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar), and that citizens’ social/discussion networks affect their voting decisions (Huckfeldt, Robert and Sprague, John, “Discussant Effects on Vote Choice: Intimacy, Structure, and Interdependence,” The Journal of Politics 53, no. 1 [1991]: 122–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

65. As a few examples, in New Jersey, unmarried, propertied women enjoyed full voting rights in the early 1800s; property rights were extended to women in Pennsylvania and New York. In 1848, the Seneca Falls Convention was held, the first women's rights convention of its kind.

66. Politicians often seek to cultivate support among those who do not now, but someday might, hold the politician's electoral fate in their hands, be they voters for a higher office (Hibbing, John R., “Ambition in the House: Behavioral Consequences of Higher Office Goals Among U.S. Representatives,” American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 3 [1986]: 651–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar), noncitizens (Varsanyi, “Getting out the Vote”), or minors (Marc Hooghe, Dietlind Stolle, and Patrick Stouthuysen, “Head Start in Politics: The Recruitment Function of Youth Organizations of Political Parties in Belgium (Flanders),” Party Politics 10, no. 2 [2004]: 193–212).

67. In the early years of the republic, women's political activity was primarily informal, if considerable (e.g., Catherine Allgor, Parlor Politics: In Which the Ladies of Washington City Help Build a City and a Government [Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002]). Still, in the view of some “[t]he right of petitioning is the only political right that women have,” Angelina Grimké pointed out in 1837.

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88. Charles Ingersoll (D-PA3)—“the idea of any majority of a sovereign people petitioning Congress, is derogatory to popular sovereignty, and contrary to the nature of our institutions. A minority or an individual may petition, I concede …” (Congressional Globe, 27th Congress, 1st Sess., 1841, 74).

89. Arnold, “The Logic of Congressional Action.”

90. Zaeske, Signatures of Citizenship, 13.

91. Our measure of state opinion, logged cumulative petitions, is correlated with two-party presidential vote share in the 1844 election (Whig) at just .45.

92. Higginson, “A Short History of the Right to Petition,” 153.

93. Congressional Globe, 28th Congress, 1st Sess., 1844, 174.

94. Congressional Globe, 24th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1837, 171.

95. Congressional Globe, 24th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1837, 190.

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103. Because the party composition of state legislative, upper and lower houses are highly correlated, we only include the upper house measures in these models.

104. See, e.g., Achen, “Measuring Representation.”

105. Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st Sess., 1850, 638.

106. Congressional Globe, 24th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1837, 190.

107. Congressional Globe, 26th Congress, 1st Sess., 1840, 108.

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114. Among the three roll calls, this vote was arguably most closely tied to slavery. Northern Whigs were concerned that going to war and potentially expanding the country's Southwest border would open the door to additional slave states. For their part, Southern states feared that the necessity of determining whether new states would be free or slave would reopen the possibility of antislavery legislation impacting the South. However, there were other factors at play, including that the Northern Whigs questioned the need for war, and were sensitive politically to the impact failing to go to war might have on the party's standing.

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120. Congressional Globe, February 11, 1837, 183.

121. Congressional Globe, 24th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1837, 171.

122. Congressional Globe, 24th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1837, 124.

123. On the other hand, the party was interregional and divided over slavery, and feared that rising opposition to slavery may lead to party breakdown.

124. Zboray and Zboray, “Whig Women, Politics, and Culture”; Varon, We Mean to be Counted; Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party.

125. Zboray and Zboray, “Whig Women, Politics, and Culture.”

126. Varon, We Mean to be Counted.

127. Higginson, “A Short History of the Right to Petition,” 163.

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130. Ibid., 108–109.

131. This was nothing new; Benton was “constantly the advocate of unpopular issues within his state and gradually out of touch with her younger politicians” (ibid., 102).

132. In his last report to his constituents, Benton said, “I have been Senator 30 years … I sometimes had to act against the preconceived opinions and first impressions of my constituents; but always with full reliance upon their intelligence to understand me and their equity to do me justice—and I have never been disappointed” (ibid., 120).

133. Another exemplar of this type in our data was Robert John Walker (D-MS). Despite his status as a former Mississippi senator, Walker supported the Union cause during the American Civil War. Walker resigned after refusing to accept the proslavery Lecompton Constitution, saying slavery would be decided by “climate, not politics.” Walker served briefly as territorial governor of a nonslave Kansas in 1857.

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137. Former Governor of Arkansas and presidential candidate Mike Huckabee has called for the repeal of the 17^th Amendment. In doing so, Huckabee joined Ted Cruz, Antonin Scalia, Jeff Flake, and Rick Perry who have all advocated for its repeal.

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