Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-wpx84 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-06T23:34:49.746Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy. Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Extract

In a series of lectures on German philosophy ‘since Kant’, the names of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel and their critical reference to Kant are, of course, a must. No less a must, though, would seem to be Wilhelm von Humboldt, a philosopher and linguist who, together with Herder and Hamann, formed the alliterating triumvirate of a romanticist critique of Kant. The response, within the discipline, to transcendental philosophy from this side was, in contrast to the idealistic mainstream, long in the coming but, in the end, rich in consequences.

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1999

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 This text formed the basis of a lecture delivered as the conclusion of a series of lectures organised by the Royal Institute of Philosophy at London, between October 1997 and March 1998.

2 Ch.Taylor, , ‘Theories of Meaning’ in Philosophical Papers, vol. I, ed. Ch. Taylor, (Cambridge, 1985) pp. 248–92.Google Scholar

3 On the influence of linguists such as J. Lohmann and L. Weisgerber on Heidegger, see Apel, K. O., ‘Der philosophische Wahrheitsbegriff als Voraussetzung einer inhaltlich orientierten Sprachwissenschaft,’ in Transformation der Philosophie, vol. I, ed. Apel, K. O. (Frankfurt, 1973), pp. 106–37Google Scholar

4 See my reply to Taylor, Charles in Kommunikatives Handeln, (eds) Honneth, A., Joas, H., (Frankfurt, 1986), pp. 328–37.Google Scholar

5 Apel, K. O., ‘Wittgenstein und Heidegger’, in Der Löwe spricht ⃛ und wir kbönnen ihn nicht, verstehen, (eds) McGuiness, B., Habermas, J. et al. , (Frankfurt, 1991), pp. 2768.Google Scholar

6 W. v. Humboltd, ‘Über den Nationalcharakter der Sprachen’, in Werke, III, ed. A. Flitner and K. Giel, p. 77.

7 Humboldt, ‘Über den Einfluss des verschiedenen Charakters der Sprachen auf Literatur und Geistesbildung’, Werke, III, p. 26.

8 Humboldt, ‘Über die Verschiedenheiten der menschlichen Sprachbaus’, Werke, III, pp. 224f.

9 Ibid., p. 196.

10 Humboldt, , ‘Über den Nationalcharakter’, Werke, III, p. 68.Google Scholar

11 Humboldt, , ‘Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlects’, Werke, III, p. 438.Google Scholar

12 Sprachcharakter und Literatur’, Werke, III, p. 30.Google Scholar

13 This is supposed to be true also for the representation of perceivable objects: ‘The expressions for sensual objects are equivalent insofar as the same object is thought of in all of them, but since they express the specific way of representing it, their meaning, too, diverges in this respect.’ Werke, III, p. 21.

14 For the following, see Lafont, C., Sprache und Welterschließung, (Frankfurt, 1994), Einleitung, pp 113–28.Google Scholar

15 Hamann, J. G., ‘Metakritik. Über den Purismus der Vernunft’ (1784), in Schriften zur Sprache, ed. Hamann, J. G. (Frankfurt 1967), p. 226.Google Scholar

16 Humboldt, , ‘Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium’, Werke, III, pp. 20f: ‘For what remains to be conquered is, essentially, always what is objective, and if man approaches it on the subjective path of a peculiar language, his second effort is to re-isolate what is subjective, if only by exchanging one linguistic subjectivity for another, and to re-abstract from it what is objective in as pure a state as possible’.Google Scholar

17 Werke, III, p. 81.

18 Humboldt, W. V., ‘Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium’, Werke, III, p. 12.Google Scholar

19 Humboldt, , ‘Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus’, Werke, III, p. 156.Google Scholar

20 This is why C. Lafont (1994), in her discussion of Heidegger, emphasises the problematic of reference.

21 Ibid., p. 201; also see Humboldt, ‘Über den Dualis’, Werke, III, p. 139: ‘Nor can language achieve reality by the efforts of the individual, it can do so only socially, only by a new attempt following the attempt that was hazarded. The world, therefore, must attain its essence and language its enlargement, in someone who is listening and responding.’

22 Ibid., pp. 138f.

23 Humboldt, , ‘Über die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaus’, Werke, III, pp. 147f.Google Scholar

24 Habermas, J., Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. I (Frankfurt, 1981) pp. 182229.Google Scholar

25 Humboldt, , Werke, III, pp. 202fGoogle Scholar

26 Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus logico-philosophicus (London, 1974), pp. 4042.Google Scholar

27 Dummett, M., Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1988) chapter 4, pp. 3244.Google Scholar

28 Tractatus 5.4711.

29 This is meant by Dummett when he claims that the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, in contrast to Frege and Wittgenstein, were not interested in a philosophy of language ‘for its own sake’, but because this ‘arsenal’ could furnish weapons ‘for their battle in other domains of philosophy’: Dummett, M., ’Ist analytische Philosophic systematisch?, Wahrheit, ed. Dummett, M. (Stuttgart, 1982), p. 195.Google Scholar

30 Wittgenstein, , Philosophische Untersuchungen, vol. I, p. 356Google Scholar; see the interpretations of part II of the P. U. in Wittgenstein über die Seele, Savigny, E. v., Scholz, O. R., eds, (Frankfurt 1995).Google Scholar

31 Heidegger, M., Being and Time (Oxford, 1980), p. 194.Google Scholar

32 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 61.

33 Husserl, E., Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg, 1948)Google Scholar, §§6–10, §15ff.

34 See C. Lafont, Sprache und Welterschliessung, first part.

35 For Heidegger's critique of Humboldt, see C. Lafont, The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutics, (forthcoming), Chapter III.

36 Heidegger, M., On the Way to Language (New York, 1982), pp. 126f.Google Scholar

37 Wittgenstein, L., On Certainty (Oxford, 1974), p. 16 (para. 105)Google Scholar,

38 Habermas, J., ‘Coping with contingencies’, Debating the State of Philosophy, eds. Niznik, J., Sanders, J. T. (eds) (Westport, 1996), pp. 124.Google Scholar

39 Davidson, D., Wahrheit und Interpretation (Frankfurt, 1990).Google Scholar

40 Davidson, D., ‘Eine hübsche Unordnung von Epitaphen’ Die Wahrheit der Interpretation, ed. Picard, G.; and Schulte, J. (Frankfurt, 1990), pp. 203227Google Scholar; for a critical comment, see Dummett, M., Ursprünge, pp 248–78Google Scholar

41 Rorty, R., Der Spiegel der Natur (Frankfurt, 1981), p. 287.Google Scholar

42 Brandom, R., Making it Explicit (Cambridge MA., 1994), p. 5Google Scholar: ‘We are the ones on whom reasons are binding, who are subject to the peculiar force of the better reason’.

43 Apel, K. O., Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico (Bonn, 1963), p. 27.Google Scholar

44 Ibid. p. 38.

45 Dummett, M., ‘Language and Communication’, The Seas of Language, ed. Dummett, M. (Oxford, 1993), p. 182.Google Scholar

46 K. O Apel, ‘Die Entfaltung der sprachanalytischen’ Philosophic und das Problem der “Geisteswissenschaften”, in Apel (1964), vol. II, pp. 28–95.

47 Apel, K. O., ‘Wittgenstein und Heidegger’ (1962)Google Scholar, in Apel (1973), pp. 225–275.

48 H. G. Gadamer, Washrheit und Methode, Tübingen 1960, Part Three

49 K. O. Apel (1973), vol. I, p. 49.

50 Apel (1973), vol. II, p. 352: ‘Die Möglichkeit einer Vorprägung des subjektiven Sinnverständnisses impliziert die umgekehrte Möglichkeit einer Umstrukturierung der semantischen Komponente lebender' Sprachen durch die pragmatisch erfolgreiche Sinnverständigung in der Ebene der Sprachverwendung.' Since I share and support this critique of the hypostization of world-disclosure from the very start, I disagree with the tenor of the second chapter of C. Lafont, The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutics. The problem of reference that we indeed neglected provides just one of those many objection that I actually have been putting foreward; cf. J. Habermas, Nach Metaphysisthes Denken, Ffu, 1988, 50ff., 55f., 103f., 175ff.; idem, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, Ffm. 1986, 240ff.

51 Martens, E. and Schnädelbach, H., Philosophie (Hamburg, 1985), p. 32.Google Scholar

52 Habermas, J., Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (1967), (Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 271305Google Scholar. Apel, K. O. et al. , Hemeneutik und Ideologiekritik (Frankfurt, 1971)Google Scholar. Subsequent to the work, published at the same time, of von Wright, G. H., Explanation and Understanding (London, 1971)Google Scholar, the controversy was continued and extended to analytic contributions: Apel, K. O., Mannichen, J., Tuomela, R., eds., Neue Versuche über Erklären und Verstehen (Frankfurt, 1978)Google Scholar

53 Apel, K. O., ‘Szientistik, Hermeneutik, Ideologiekritik’ (1968), in Apel (1973), vol. II, pp. 96127Google Scholar; Habermas, J., Erkenntnis and Interesse (Frankfurt, 1968).Google Scholar

54 Habermas, J., ‘Nachwort’, Erkenntnis und Interesse, ed. Habermas, J. (Frankfurt, 1973), pp. 382401.Google Scholar

55 Habermas, J., ‘Wahrheitstheorien’ (1972), in Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Habermas, J., (Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 127–83.Google Scholar

56 Apel, (1973), 333.

57 K. O. Apel, ‘Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgesellschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik’, in K. O. Apel (1973), vol. II. pp. 358–436; Apel, K. O., Diskurs und Verantwortung (Frankfurt, 1988).Google Scholar

58 Habermas, J., Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1981).Google Scholar

59 See my introduction to the new edition of Habermas, J., Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 711.Google Scholar

60 Searle, J. R., Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Searle, J. R., Expression and Meaning (Cambridge 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a critique of Searle's intentionalism, see Apel, K. O., ‘Is Intentionality more than Linguist Meaning?’ in John Searle and his Critics, Lepore, E., von Gulick, R. eds, (Oxford, 1991), pp. 3156Google Scholar; J. Habermas, ‘Comments on J. Searle: Meaning, Communication, and Representation’, pp. 17–30.

61 M. Dummett, ‘What is a Theory of Meaning? II,’ in Dummett (1993), pp. 34–93.

62 J. Habermas, vol. I (1983), pp. 369–452; vol. 2 (1983) pp. 182–205.

63 M. Dummett, ‘Language and Truth’, in Dummett (1993), p. 142: ‘What we have been considering are two alternative ways of explaining the meanings of sentences of a language: in terms of how we establish them as true; and in terms of what is involved in accepting them as true … they are complementary in that both are needed to give an account of the practice of speaking the language.’

64 See the theory of language of R. Brandom (1994), based on the complementary relation of inferential semantics and formal pragmatics.

65 Habermas (1981), vol. 1, pp. 44–71.

66 Habermas, J., ‘Rortys pragmatische Wende’, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1996) pp. 715741.Google Scholar

67 See the protest of Michael Dummett (1988), pp 7f.

68 Wittgenstein, L., Vermischte Bemerkungen (Frankfurt, 1977).Google Scholar

69 Habermas, J., ‘Individuierung durch Vergesellschaftung’, in Nachmetaphysisches Denken, Habermas, J., (Frankfurt, 1988), pp. 187.Google Scholar

70 Humboldt, W. v., Über die Verschiedenheiten des menschliechen Sprachbaus, Werke, vol. III, pp. 160f.Google Scholar

71 Habermas (1981), vol. 1, pp. 485–8.