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Agreement, Objectivity and the Sentiment of Humanity in Morals
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
Extract
Fairly recently, I came upon the following passage in a review of a book by Colin M. Turnbull, called The Mountain People:
A child dumped on the ground is seized and eaten by a leopard. The mother is delighted; for not only does she no longer have to carry the child about and feed it, but it follows that there is likely to be a gorged leopard near by, a sleepy animal which can easily be killed and eaten. An old woman who has been abandoned falls down the mountainside because she is blind, so a crowd gathers to laugh at the spectacle of her distress. A man about to die of gunshot wounds makes a last request for tea. As he feebly raises it to his lips, it is snatched from him by his sister, who runs away delighted. A child develops intestinal obstruction; so his father calls in the neighbours to enjoy the joke of his distended belly.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1974
References
1 The reviewer was Anthony Storr, writing in the Observer.
2 See, for instance, Melden's Rights and Right Conduct; and the discussion by Phillips and Mounce in their book Moral Practices.
3 There are parallels between this suggestion and the view, to which some sceptics have almost eagerly committed themselves, that knowledge of others and knowledge of self are so related – or unrelated – that it makes sense to suppose that the absence – in this case, an irremediable absence – of the first should in no way affect the extent and range of the second. One parallel that cannot however be drawn is this, that while Kant has shown the senselessness of the second view he has done nothing to rebut the first suggestion.
4 It is again significant, however, that even on this plane we are inclined to say of such people that they could recognise moral outrage if only they could be bothered.
5 British Academy Henriette Hertz lecture, 1962. See p. 209.
6 At any rate, that brand to be found in Chapter VI (especially on pp. 66–8) of his book Contemporary Moral Philosophy. I have written elsewhere about a number of problems connected with the sort of account given by, e.g., Warnock of the relationship between facts and values and so I shall be brief.
7 Op. cit., p. 68.
8 Despite my plea about Hume, I should of course acknowledge immediately one or two of the several ways in which Hume formulates what I take to be the crucial question and answer in any discussion of the ‘achievement of moral consciousness’.
Question:
‘What is that to me? There are few occasions when this question is not pertinent …’ (Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Section V, Part I; Liberal Arts, p. 45.)
Answer (which I glean):
‘… reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and beneficial.’ (Op. cit., Appendix I, p. 105.)
‘… there is some benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for humankind; some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and serpent… these generous sentiments must still direct the determinations of our mind and, where everything else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind above what is pernicious and dangerous.’ (Op. cit., Section IX, Part I, p. 92.)
‘The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind … It also implies some sentiment so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure … These two requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of humanity….’ (Op. cit., Section IX, Part I, p. 93.)
9 Op. cit, Section IX, Part I, p. 93.
10 Loc. cit.
11 The Listener, 4 02 1971, pp. 136–40Google Scholar, repr. in Magee, B., Modern British Philosophy (Seeker & Warburg, 1975), ch. 9.Google Scholar
12 I think, incidentally, that the principal task facing the reader of Hume's second Enquiry is that of deciding which of these several senses Hume intends at particular points – when, that is, he does not complicate matters even further by inventing some additional and sui generis moral sentiment which he calls ‘humanity’.
13 We should recognise that a number of philosophical lines converge here: those followed by Natural Law theorists, Wittgenstein and (more erratically) Hume.
14 See footnote 2 to Part II, Section V of An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.