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William E. Connolly's Politics of Complexity: A Critique
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 January 2017
Abstract
In recent years, William E. Connolly has argued that the phenomenon of complexity in the physical sciences carries radical implications for political theory: namely, that political theorists should now be revising their concepts of agency, responsibility, and freedom. This very recent project of Connolly's has not (yet) attracted much opposition. Here I offer a critique of Connolly's argument which focuses on three key areas: (1) how he interprets and deploys “evidence” from physical science; (2) his theory of “creative freedom”; and (3) the impact that his recent philosophy has on the idea of the intellect. I argue that Connolly's scientific evidence is not what he claims it is; that the theory of “creative freedom” he offers fails; and that his critique of the intellect fails in theory, and would be highly damaging in practice.
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References
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13 Fragility, 29.
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40 World, 41, 135–47.
41 Ibid.
42 Fragility, 136–37.
43 Fragility, 38; see also 182.
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45 Fragility, 40, see particularly 130–37; and World, 41.
46 World, 57.
47 Neuropolitics, 106; World, 41.
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49 World, 12, emphasis added. The witness Connolly calls most often in connection with this necessity is Stuart A. Kauffman: see World, 12, 20–21, 23–24, 26, 28–31, 37, 165, 173; and Fragility, 29–30, 83, 161, 163, 218n8, 221, 222n22.
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72 World, 27.
73 World, 21–22, emphasis added.
74 World, 22.
75 Fragility, 14.
76 World, 25.
77 See, however, Hayward, “Ethics.” Ruth Leys's critique (“The Turn to Affect”) is aimed chiefly at Brian Massumi, though Connolly is also discussed (459–63).
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82 Respectively: World, 144; 11, 145; 144; Fragility, 38–39; World, 145; 146; 26; Fragility, 167; World, 15–16.
83 The term “macropolitical” is Connolly's own: Ethos, xxvi.
84 For a neat explanation of the role of James in Connolly's “deep pluralist” project, see Chambers and Carver, William E. Connolly, 85–104.
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94 See Leys, “Turn to Affect,” 469.
95 Ibid., 450.
96 Ibid., 443.
97 Ibid., 436.
98 Ibid., 458.
99 Ibid., 443.
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108 Connolly probably ought to have been extra aware of this. He writes of René Girard: “Girard claims that his readings vindicate his theory of desire; but it must also be said that his theory of desire gives shape to those readings. It may be impossible to avoid such a (hermeneutic) circularity, but the dogmatism with which Girard presents his interpretations of myth and desire alike does belie the problematical standing such circles bestow upon them” (Ethos, 51).
109 Leys, “Turn to Affect,” 452–59.
110 See Neuropolitics, 33, 83; and World, 46, 49, 50, 58, 82, 151.
111 Neuropolitics, 2; see also 7, 9; World, 12, 43; and Fragility, 161.
112 World, 45.
113 World, 48.
114 Neuropolitics, 7.
115 Neuropolitics, 61.
116 Ibid.; see also Fragility, 118–19.
117 Neuropolitics, xiii; World, 12.
118 Neuropolitics, xiii.
119 World, 24.
120 Ibid.; for Connolly's similar use of yeast see 28.
121 Neuropolitics, 33.
122 See Neuropolitics, 34–35.
123 Neuropolitics, 36.
124 Ibid.
125 Neuropolitics, 76.
126 Neuropolitics, 91.
127 Neuropolitics, 90.
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134 Fragility, 74; see also 79.
135 Fragility, 78–79.
136 Fragility, 75; for a note on the “Nietzschean” origin of this side of Connolly's recent work see 174; and also Dumm, “Connolly's Voice,” 77.
137 Fragility, 75.
138 Fragility, 77–78.
139 Fragility, 76.
140 World, 75.
141 Fragility, 145.
142 World, 75; see also 27.
143 Fragility, 79.
144 World, 21; see also 27; and Fragility, 160, 163, 167.
145 World, 41, 58, 91; Fragility, 71–72.
146 World, 113.
147 Fragility, 148.
148 World, 28.
149 Fragility, 146.
150 Fragility, 181; see also 46.
151 Fragility, 181.
152 See Ethos, 49–62; and Fragility, 135.
153 Ethos, 49–62.
154 World, 27.
155 World, 22, 82.
156 World, 123; see also 97.
157 “Becoming Plural” was the title of a 2007 conference on Connolly's political thought hosted by the Department of Politics and International Relations at Swansea University, UK. See Political Theory 35, no. 2 (2007): 239Google Scholar.
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159 See World, 21–22, 25.
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161 World, 29.
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169 Neuropolitics, 10, 36, 59.
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171 Neuropolitics, 94; see also World, 31, 39–40, 64; and Fragility, 99–120.
172 World, 31.
173 World, 39.
174 Neuropolitics, 10, 23, 77, 94.
175 Ethos, 65–74; World, 4, 46–51, 55.
176 Neuropolitics, 20, 13, 65, 98; World, 54, 64; Fragility, 86.
177 Neuropolitics, 27, 83.
178 Neuropolitics, 58; World, 6.
179 Fragility, 77; see also 39.
180 Collingwood, The New Leviathan, 99.
181 Connolly in fact mentions the individual's capacity to “decide” in passing. His discussion of what this involves, however, is relegated to an endnote, and deflects the question: see World, 26, 182n12.
182 World, 148.
183 See World, 23.
184 Capitalism, 105–8.
185 See Ethos, xv–xix.
186 Fragility, 179.
187 Fragility, 39.
188 Capitalism, 94.
189 See World, 15.
190 World, 8. For specific names see Connolly's “Acknowledgments” sections: World, 178–79; Fragility, 197–99.