1. For example, both the content and footnotes of both Morgenthau's Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946)Google Scholar and Carr's, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Harper & Row, 1946)CrossRefGoogle Scholar are explicit in their debt to Niebuhr

2. Waltz, Kenneth, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics,” Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Keohane, Robert, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 341.Google Scholar This influence of Niebuhr on Waltz exists despite the fact that neorealists reject the classical realist emphasis on human nature as the most important determinant of political outcomes, a view for which Niebuhr was one of the most forceful proponents.

3. The following list is a small sampling of American politicians and political advisors who have claimed to be, in varying degrees, disciples of Niebuhr and thus presumably have grounded policy decisions upon his thought: Bill Clinton, Jimmy Carter, McGeorge Bundy, Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Schlesinger, Hubert Humphrey, David Stockman, Ernest Lefever, and Paul Ramsey. I do not mean to imply that these individuals have misinterpreted or misused Niebuhr's thought in order to justify particular policies. I only hope to show that because there are many self-proclaimed disciples of Niebuhr operating in the political realm, the need to have a correct understanding of his thought is a necessity.

4. Quoted in Ronald Stone: Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians (New York: Abingdon Press, 1972), p. 11,Google Scholar as determined by an interview by the author with Niebuhr.

5. Little, David, “The Recovery of Liberalism: Moral Man and Immoral Society Sixty Years Later,” Ethics & International Affairs 7 (1993): 197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also: Childress, James, “Niebuhr's Realistic-Pragmatic Approach to War and the Nuclear Dilemma,” in Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues of Our Time, ed. Harris, Richard, (London: Mowbray, 1986), p. 137;Google ScholarDiggins, John Patrick, “Power and Suspicion: The Perspectives of Reinhold Niebuhr,” Ethics and International Affairs 6 (1992): 142,156;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMcKeogh, Colm, The Political Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr, A Pragmatic Approach to Just War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 103, 104, 111, 120,127, 151, 152, 173;CrossRefGoogle ScholarLittle, , “The Recovery of Liberalism,” p. 183;Google ScholarSmith, Michael Joseph, “The Prophetic Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr,” in Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1986), p. 133.Google Scholar

6. Childress, , “Niebuhr's Realistic-Pragmatic Approach to War and the Nuclear Dilemma,” p. 137;Google ScholarLittle, , “The Recovery of Liberalism,” p. 183;Google ScholarDiggins, , “Power and Suspicion,” p. 156;Google ScholarStone, , Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians, pp. 76, 158.Google Scholar

7. Indeed, Niebuhr described his ethical theory as one of “Christian pragmatism ” (quoted in Lovin, Robin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995], p. 48CrossRefGoogle Scholar). It is from this description that the title of this essay is derived. Elsewhere he would state: “I am a pragmatist who tries to be guided in pragmatic judgments by the general principles of justice,” in which prudence is only a “procedural standard” used to guide the application of these principles. (These quotations are from the following sources, respectively: Niebuhr, Reinhold, “Response,” in Reinhold Niebuhr: A Prophetic voice in Our Time, ed. Landon, Harold, [Greenwich, CT: Seabury Press, 1962], p. 122;Google Scholar and Good, Robert, “National Interest and Moral Theory: The ‘Debate’ among Contemporary Political Realists, ” in Foreign Policy in the Sixties: The Issues and Instruments, eds. Hilsman, Roger and Good, Robert, [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965], p. 279,Google Scholar as determined by an interview by the author with Niebuhr.)

8. Niebuhr, Reinhold, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), p. 175.Google Scholar

9. Niebuhr, Reinhold, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 215.Google Scholar

10. Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Children of Light, the Children of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 8.Google Scholar

11. See, for example, Gilkey, Langdon, “Reinhold Niebuhr's Theology of History,” Journal of Religion 54 (10 1974);CrossRefGoogle ScholarGilkey, Langdon, “Reinhold Niebuhr as Political Theologian,” in Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues of Our Time, ed. Harris, Richard, (London: Mowbray, 1986);Google ScholarMcCann, Dennis, Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, Practical Theologies in Creative Conflict (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981);Google ScholarMcCann, Dennis, “The Christian Element in Christian Realism,” in The Bible in American Law, Politics, and Political Rhetoric, ed. Johnson, James Turner, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 153–172;Google Scholar Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism.

12. Niebuhr, perhaps because he was not an academic theologian, never presented his theory of ethics as formally as I present it here. Nevertheless, I believe that the theory articulated in this essay represents a very reasonable deduction from the logic of his thought, as revealed throughout his writings, that is consonant with his philosophical vision and beliefs.

13. Frankena, William, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 14.Google Scholar

14. Ibid., p. 15.

15. This brief description, of course, obscures the differences among consequentialist theories. This type of analysis, however, is not critical to this essay because I am only interested in the type of consequentialist theory attributed most frequently to Niebuhr's theory of ethics. His theory is most often described in classical utilitarian terms which ranks preferences solely according to ends and thus without consideration of the means by which the ends should be brought about. For an examination of the differences among consequentialist theories, see Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982)Google Scholar and Lyons, David, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16. Frankena, , Ethics, p. 15.Google Scholar

17. Niebuhr, Reinhold, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1963), p. 3.Google Scholar To Niebuhr, there are at most three religions that should be classified as “prophetic.” Christianity and Judaism definitely belong in this category, and Zoroastrianism possibly does. For further explication of the terms upon which this classification is based, see: ibid., p. 13.

18. Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), vol. 1, p. 203.Google Scholar

19. To Niebuhr, the transcendent standards by which man's actions are judged are God's law (i.e., the Ten Commandments) and its final form as the law of love as revealed by Christ (i.e., “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind. And you shall love your neighbor as yourself “). These two terms will be used interchangeably throughout this essay.

20. I borrow the term “dispositional ethic” from Dennis McCann because it is a particularly good one to describe the framework established by Niebuhr's conception of prophetic religion. See McCann, , Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, p. 80.Google Scholar

21. McCann, , Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, p. 85.Google Scholar

22. Niebuhr, , An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 28.Google Scholar

23. McCann, , Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, p. 93Google Scholar

24. Ibid., p. 85. Cf. Niebuhr, , The Nature and Destiny of Man, 1:220.Google Scholar

25. Niebuhr, , The Nature and Destiny of Man, 2:27;Google Scholar cf. ibid., 1:300.

26. ibid., 2:254. My purpose is not to examine Niebuhr's conception of the relationship between love and justice (for such an examination, see McCann, , Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, pp. 87–93;Google Scholar Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, chap. 5; Robertson, D.B., ed., Love and Justice, Selections from the Shorter Writings of Reinhold Niebuhr (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1957),Google Scholar but simply to point out that Niebuhr believed the universality of sin had profound implications for the type of principles that could and should be applied to history. The critical point for our purposes is that despite the fact that sin necessitates we shift our goals from those of love to justice, both sets of principles are deontologically derived.

27. Niebuhr, , The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, p. 254.Google Scholar

28. As Niebuhr put it, “As the ideal of love must relate itself to the problems of a world in which its perfect realization is not possible, the most logical modification and application of the ideal in a world in which life is in conflict with life is the principle of equality which strives for an equilibrium in the conflict” (Niebuhr, , An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 91).Google Scholar

29. The presence of a governmental structure implies, however, the presence of a hierarchical, and therefore unequal, relationship within the polity. Thus while government may attempt to promote equality in the civic arena, a hierarchical arrangement will be maintained in state-society relations.

30. Niebuhr, , An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 66.Google Scholar

31. Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Structure of Nations and Empires, pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

32. Lovin, , Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 196.Google Scholar

33. ibid.

34. Significantly, Niebuhr's understanding of sin meant that not only those who consciously intend evil must be restrained but also those who genuinely desire to pursue the good of others. Through the processes of rationalization and self-justification, people are able to delude themselves into believing that their actions and intentions are devoid of selfishness, when in actuality they are highly exploitative. In order to express this idea, Niebuhr was fond of quoting John Adams in a letter to Thomas Jefferson: “Power always thinks it has a great soul and vast views beyond the comprehension of the weak; and that it is doing God's service when it is violating all His laws” (Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Irony of American History [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952], p. 21Google Scholar)

35. Niebuhr, Reinhold, Christianity and Power Politics, p. 104.Google Scholar

36. Cf. McCann, , Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, pp. 93–98.Google Scholar

37. In short, the test of tolerance is simply a restatement of the assertion discussed earlier that all of human history falls short of what God's law requires. Individuals and groups are “graded” on this “test” by how well they remember that they, just like their adversaries, cannot rightfully claim to have solved the moral and political problems of man. Of course Niebuhr was aware that toleration, if taken to an extreme, would lead to apathy and moral relativism. Consequently, his “test of tolerance,” in addition to fostering the “capacity to preserve the spirit of forgiveness toward those who offend us by holding convictions which seem untrue to us” also included the need “to hold vital convictions which lead to action” (quoted in McCann, , Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, p. 97,Google Scholar from Niebuhr, , The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2:219Google Scholar). Niebuhr, however, always considered the position of moral relativism a lesser danger than fanaticism for the simple reason that men and groups will invariably contend over visions of truth. A sustained position of moral relativism Niebuhr thus thought unlikely, making balances of power stabilized by dispositions of humility perennial needs in history.

38. It is important to realize that a sense of humility and contrition does not obviate the need for a balance of power as a precondition for justice, however, because even the humble will seek their own interests.

39. McCann, , Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, p. 210Google Scholar

40. By “myth” Niebuhr does not mean that these symbols are “untrue,” but only that the insights that they reveal cannot be expressed in rational form. According to McCann: “Just as the theologian is like a portrait artist who ‘falsifies some of the physical details in order to arrive at a symbolic expression of the total character of his subject’ (Niebuhr, , “The Truth in Myths,” in Faith and Politics, ed. Stone, Ronald [New York: George Braziller, 1968], p. 27Google Scholar), so the Bible's permanent insights can only be expressed in forms of indirect communication, ‘which contain a certain degree of provisional and superficial deception’ (Niebuhr, , Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation of History [New York: Scribner], p. 3Google Scholar)” in McCann, , “The Christian Element of Christian Realism,” p. 156.Google Scholar In other words, Niebuhr believed that only the category of myth could articulate the paradoxical nature of both the ideal's relationship to history as both transcendent and immanent, judge and lure, and of man as both finite and infinite, free and bound. In expressing his theology in mythical terms, Niebuhr hoped to distance himself from both fundamentalist and liberal theologians. Against both of these positions, Niebuhr advocated that the meaning of the myths of the Bible be taken “seriously but not literally. “ For a much more thorough analysis of Niebuhr's use of the mythical method, see McCann, , Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, pp. 37–51.Google Scholar

41. Niebuhr, , An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 16.Google Scholar

42. Niebuhr, , The Nature and Destiny of Man, 1:269;Google Scholar also ibid., p. 272.

43. Ibid., p. 265.

44. The final myth in this cycle, that of the Atonement, will be briefly discussed in a subseque section.

45. Robin Lovin confirms this interpretation of Niebuhr's thought when he states that to Niebuhr, “the reality of God means that love, and not prudence, is the law of life” (Lovin, , Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 67Google Scholar). Lovin, for clarity's sake, might have added that the reality of God in history is what makes love, and not prudence, the standard by which our conduct is judged and toward which we should set our goals. For, as stated, even if one believes in a transcendent standard that relativizes all actions and sets limits on human aspirations, without the additional belief that the ideal is present in history this conception of the transcendent may allow prudence to be the highest political virtue. (For essays that assert that two of Niebuhr's fellow political realists, Morgenthau and Kennan, adopt precisely this position, see Good, “National Interest and Moral Theory” and McCann, “The Christian Element of Christian Realism”).

46. To my knowledge, Niebuhr did not specifically attack deontological thinkers as he did liberals, but a critique of such thinking is implicit in his writings.

47. Cf. Niebuhr, , An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, pp. 100–101,120.Google Scholar

48. Indeed, because of the perverse outcomes that frequently occur by following the principles of love in a sinful world is a primary reason why Niebuhr shifted his theory of obligation from love to justice. For in a world of sin, when “[love] is substituted for justice it degenerates into sentimentality and may become the accomplice of tyranny” (Niebuhr, , “The Christian Faith and the World Crisis,” in Love and justice, p. 283Google Scholar)

49. For examples illustrating this dimension of Niebuhr's thought, see “Airplanes are Not Enough,” in ibid., p. 190; “The Will of God and the Van Zeeland Report,” in ibid., p. 170; “A Negotiated Peace,” in ibid., p. 174; and “A Critique of Pacifism,” in ibid., p. 241.

50. And to Niebuhr, “the essence of immorality is the evasion or denial of moral responsibility” (“Repeal the Neutrality Act!,” in ibid., p. 177).

51. Niebuhr, , Christianity and Power Politics, p. 175Google Scholar

52. Lovin stresses the difference between these two positions when he states: “Without the ‘impossible ideal’ of Jesus’ ethics, we have only variations on the utilitarian and prudential schemes which from the Christian perspective scarcely deserve to be called ‘ethics’ at all” (Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 92Google Scholar). To Niebuhr, prudential schemes, if elevated to a normative status, were both dangerous and immoral because they invariably are “forced to give sanction to the conflict of egoistic individuals and groups as the very essence of human character” (An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 23Google Scholar).

53. Diggins, , “Power and Suspicion' pp. 160,159.Google Scholar

54. Cf. Niebuhr, , “The Conflict between Nations and Nations and between Nations and God,” in Love and justice, pp. 161–62.Google Scholar

55. Niebuhr, , An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 47.Google Scholar Niebuhr's understanding of the relationship between ends and means and the concept of justification is thus similar to the one elucidated by Michael Walzer in his essay “Political Action, the Problem of Dirty Hands.” To Walzer, necessity may require violations of moral standards, yet the fact of necessity in no way justifies one's immorality. According to him, “a particular act…may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong” (Walzer, Michael, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 [Winter, 1973]:161Google Scholar). In other words, moral rules may be “overridden” because of “supreme emergency” (i.e., the survival of the nation or state), but these commandments are not “set aside, canceled or annulled.” They still apply, thus men are morally culpable for their immoral deeds, even though they are necessary in order to realize critical historical goals. To Walzer, , we may “forget” (p. 180)Google Scholar a person's immorality according to the exigencies of the time (Niebuhr, of course, would most likely couch this sentiment in terms of Divine forgiveness, not individual or collective forgetfulness), but this person still needs to be forgiven for the immoral acts he has performed.

56. Frankena, , Ethics, p. 15,Google Scholar emphasis added.

57. Niebuhr, Reinhold, “American Power and World Responsibility,” in Love and Justice, p. 205.Google Scholar It is important to realize, however, that while Niebuhr believed that feelings of guilt are necessary in order both to restrain the sin of man and to lay the foundation for repentance, they are also potentially paralyzing. In an effort to avoid them, both individuals and groups may try to retreat into isolationist and irresponsible behavior. It is to avoid this problem that the Atonement is so important to Niebuhr (see McCann, , Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, pp. 43–45Google Scholar), for it allows man to act in history despite the ambiguity of his means and the impurity of his goals. In short, guilt, though inevitable because of the role of love as judge, must also be redeemed. Cf. Niebuhr, , Christianity and Power Politics, p. 30.Google Scholar

58. Because of the limitations of space, I am obviously precluded from examining the great detail and nuance that Niebuhr devoted to these two issues. Nevertheless, the critical differences between Niebuhr's theory of ethics and either pure deontological or consequentialist theories should be clear. The tenets of these other theories simply do not allow their proponents to provide the prescriptions that Niebuhr's theory generates.

59. Niebuhr, , The Irony of American History, p. 173.Google Scholar See also, ibid., p. 174 and Niebuhr, , The Structure of Nations and Empires, p. 285.Google Scholar

60. This did not mean that Niebuhr ignored relative distinctions between the U.S. and USSR. Indeed, to equate the two powers to Niebuhr “obscured the difference between the comparatively ordinate and normal lust for power of a great traditional nation and the noxious demonry of [a] world wide secular religion” (“Why is Communism So Evil?” in Christian Realism and Political Problems [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953] p. 34)Google Scholar. But Niebuhr did hope to blunt the pretentious claims in the absolute superiority of the West, a belief that he felt would inevitably lead to an ideological crusade.

61. Cf. Niebuhr, , The Structure of Nations and Empires, pp. 279,286;Google ScholarNiebuhr, , “The Hydrogen Bomb,” in Love and Justice, p. 23.Google Scholar

62. “The Problem of a Protestant Social Ethic,” quoted in Childress, Niebuhr's Realistic-Pragmatic Approach to War and ‘the Nuclear Dilemma’ “ p. 126.

63. Cf. Frankena, , Ethics, pp. 45–48.Google Scholar

64. Niebuhr, , “The Hydrogen Bomb,” in Love and Justice, p. 237.Google Scholar

65. Ibid., p. 235.

66. Ibid., p. 237, emphasis added. By emphasizing the moral damage that the use of nuclear weapons would cause—damage that was caused by the violation of an independent ethical standard—Niebuhr differentiated himself from those who believed that nuclear war was to be avoided primarily on consequentialist grounds based on the enormous physical costs such a war would entail.

67. Niebuhr, Reinhold, “Our Faith and Concrete Political Decisions,” in Love and Justice, p. 58.Google Scholar

68. Niebuhr, , The Structure of Nations and Empires, p. 293.Google Scholar

69. Niebuhr, Reinhold, “Socialized Medicine in Britain,” in Love and Justice, p. 85.Google Scholar

70. Ibid., p. 86.

71. Frankena supports this interpretation of Niebuhr's philosophy, although he does so in a roundabout manner. In his attempt to label various philosophies as deontological or teleological, he finds one important exception to his schema: that of Niebuhr. According to Frankena: “As for Reinhold Niebuhr, he appears to me to suggest, in one place or another, almost every one of the positions I have described; whether this spells richness or confusion of mind, I shall leave for others to judge” (quoted in Lovin, , Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 72Google Scholar). Hopefully, this essay has illumi-nated the fruitfulness of the synthesis of deontological and consequentialist insights that Niebuhr's theory offers. Significantly, even Frankena felt compelled to adopt a similar view when he articulated his own theory of ethics (see his “mixed deontological” theory in Frankena, , Ethics, pp. 43–45Google Scholar). For another example of a philosopher who has seen the need to combine the insights of consequentialist and deontological theories, see Scheffler's “hybrid” conception as articulated throughout his book, The Rejection of Consequentialism. Similarly, thoughhis dominant interpretation onNiebuhr's philosophy is consequentialist, Colm McKeogh at times admits that the best description of Niebuhr's theory of ethics is “deontological-consequentialist” (McKeogh, , The Political Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr, pp. 112,116,117Google Scholar).