¹ See Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Lect. VI, 1192Google Scholar. It is significant that in Plato's Apology of Socrates, which offers a justification of the philosophic life in terms of its contribution to the political community, Socrates is careful to disassociate himself from Anaxagoras. On “political philosophy” as the political or popular treatment of philosophy as well as the philosophic treatment of politics, see Strauss, Leo, “On Classical Political Philosophy”, in What Is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, III., 1959), pp. 91–94Google Scholar.

² See Lobkowicz, Nicholas, Theory and Practice (Notre Dame, 1967), pp. 6–7Google Scholar.

³ Rhetoric 1354^b30–1355^a3, 1358^a36–1359^a5.

⁴ See Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 6.

⁵ Martin Heidegger has emphasized that Aristotle's Rhetoric reports the appearances of the things of common life in an unscientific but veridical way (Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie, John and Robinson, Edward [New York, 1971], p. 178)Google Scholar.

⁶ Rhetoric 1359^a30–1359^bl.

⁷ See “The Whole Art of Rhetoric” in English Works, ed. SirMolesworth, William (Scientia Aalen, 1962), VI: 427Google Scholar.

⁸ Rhetoric 1359^bl-1360^a37, 1365^b22–1366^a23.

⁹ Rhetoric 1366^a4–6 (Oxford trans. W. Rhys Roberts).

¹⁰ Rhetoric 1366^a13–16.

¹¹ Rhetoric 1358^a36-^b29.

¹² Rhetoric 1360^a4–13; Nicomachean Ethics, 1112^a19–1115^a6.

¹³ Nicomachean Ethics 1040^b4–6; cf. 1141^b8–10.

¹⁴ Nicomachean Ethics 1140^a-^b30.

¹⁵ Nicomachean Ethics 1141^b23–31.

¹⁶ This question leads to the issue of which way of life is ultimately best for man, the political life or a private life. The theoretical life is an essentially private life. If a private or theoretical life is ultimately best, then the prudence which selects and sustains it would be higher than civic prudence or the political skill.

¹⁷ Nicomachean Ethics 1141^b24–28.

¹⁸ Rhetoric 1354^b5–12.

¹⁹ Nicomachean Ethics 1180^b13–28.

²⁰ Metaphysics 980^b25–981^b10.

²¹ Nicomachean Ethics 1179^a33–1181^b24.

²² See Nicomachean Ethics 1094^b10–11.

²³ Nicomachean Ethics 1179^a32–1180^a25.

²⁴ See Rhetoric 1354^a1–12, 1355^b25–36, 1356^a30–35; opinions about happiness and about the good, noble and just things are reviewed at 1360^b3–1363^b4, 1366^a23–1367^a32, 1373^b1–1375^a21.

²⁵ Rhetoric 1366^a17–23; cf. 1360^a35–37.

²⁶ Politics 1288^b10–1289^a25.

²⁷ See Rhetoric 1360^a18–37, 1365^b22-1366^a23. Aristotle does not discuss the rhetoric that legislators or founders would need in order to gain acceptance for their work. This legislative rhetoric is discussed, for example, in Plato's Republic, bks. 3–8, and in Rousseau's Social Contract, bk. 2, chap. 7, bk. 4, chap. 8.

²⁸ See Strauss, Leo, Xenophon's Socrates (Ithaca, 1972), p. 8Google Scholar.

²⁹ Metaphysics 987^a29-^b4, 1078^b7–33.

³⁰ On the differences between classical and modern conceptions of theory, see Jonas, Hans, “The Practical Uses of Theory”, in The Phenomenon of Life (New York, 1966), pp. 188–210Google Scholar.

³¹ See Reid, Thomas, Works, ed. SirHamilton, William (Edinburgh, 1862), pp. 201–211Google Scholar.

³² Rosen, Stanley, “Thought and Touch: A Note on Aristotle's De Anima”, Phronesis, 6 (1961), 127CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Fraser, Alexander Campbell (New York, 1959), II: 4–5Google Scholar. For a perceptive examination of these issues from the standpoint of phenomenology, see Edie, James M., “Expression and Metaphor,” Philosophy and Pkenomenological Research, 23 (1962–1963), 538–561CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³³ Metaphysics 98O^a21–28; for a discussion of perception as discrimination, see Efron, Robert, “What Is Perception?” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, IV: 143–147Google Scholar. Perception, according to Efron, is the direct, immediateawareness of discriminated existents: “If we do not perceive discriminated existents, we are not perceiving” (p. 146).

³⁴ “Taste” is often used metaphorically, of course,, for the mind's discernment and enjoyment of beauty. Thomas Reid accounts for this metaphorical usage as follows: “Like the taste of the palate, it relishes some things, is disgusted with others; with regard to many, is indifferent or dubious; and is considerably influenced by habit, by associations, and by opinion. These obvious analogies between external and internal taste, have led men, in all ages, and in all or most polished languages, to give the name of the external sense to this power of discerning what is beautiful with pleasure, and what is ugly and faulty in its kind with disgust” (Works, p. 490). “Smell” is used less frequently as a cognitive metaphor, but Nietzsche employs it in passages such as the following: “I have a subtler sense of smell for the signs of ascent and decline than any other human being before me…” (On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Kaufmann, Walter [New York, 1967], p. 222; cf. p. 233)Google Scholar.

³⁵ De Sensu 437^a4–17. For an interesting comparison of hearing with the other senses, see Caton, Hiram, “Speech and Writing as Artifacts,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, 2 (Winter, 1969), 19–36Google Scholar.

³⁶ De Anima 414^a3, 434^b9–23. In comparing touch with sight, Hans Jonas writes: “Touch brings the reality of its object within the experience of sense in virtue of that by which it exceeds mere sense, viz., the force-component in its original make-up. The percipient on his part can magnify this component by his voluntary counteraction against the affecting object. For this reason touch is the true test of reality: I can dispel every suspicion of illusion by grasping the doubtful object and trying its reality in terms of the resistance it offers to my efforts to displace it” (“The Nobility of Sight,” in The Phenomenon of Life, p. 148).

³⁷ Be Anima 432^a1–3.

³⁸ See Robert Efron's account of his experimental findings regarding a man who developed a severe cognitive disturbance after an accidental overexposure to carbon monoxide. The man was unable to name any common object at which he looked, despite the fact that he had a visual acuity of at least 20/100 and could isolate and name the attributes (color, brightness, or size) of objects. He was able to name objects, however, if they were placed in his hand so that he could feel them. After extensive experimentation, Efron concluded that the man's inability to identify and name objects by sight was due to an impairment of his ability to perceive the shapes of objects visually (see “What Is Perception?” pp. 137–173).

³⁸ Works, p. 133.

⁴⁰ Jonas, , “The Nobility of Sight”, p. 144Google Scholar.

⁴¹ These observations about seeing are drawn in part from Jonas's essay “The Nobility of Sight”.

⁴² See Jonas, , “The Nobility of Sight”, p. 152Google Scholar. The only point about Jonas's essay that strikes me as questionable is his conclusion that the experience of sight suggests an “idea of infinity”. Would there not be an inherent contradiction in such an “idea”, as there would be in a “formless form” or a “shapeless shape”? In other words, definition or finitude would seem to be requisite to the knowability of something as an “idea”. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 3: “Whatsoever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite”.

⁴³ Thus the man studied by Efron could locate an object if it were moved before his eyes, but when “he finally locates the object in question, he is unable to say what it is despite intense and prolonged scrutiny” (“What Is Perception?” p. 156). This inability to say what things are is explained by Efron as follows: “The various tasks which Mr. S. cannot perform are the identification of objects, geometrical figures, letters, numbers and people. Is there one attribute of these various existents which must be perceived for their identification? The answer is inescapable: They are all identified by their attribute of shape. The perceptual capacity to make discriminations between shapes is, therefore, a pre-condition for their recognition and identification. Letters, geometrical figures, and numbers are identifiable only by shape. Most common objects, with very few exceptions, are identified by their shape; their color, size and brightness are non-essential attributes for the purposes of identification. People are identified by the shapes of their features, and only to a very minor degree by skin color and size” (ibid., p. 160, italics in the original).

⁴⁴ On the impossibility of understanding the perception of shape or whatness as mere sense perception, see Rosen, Stanley, Nihilism (New Haven, 1969), pp. 147–156Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Aristotle mentions Pericles' reputation for prudence in Nicomachean Ethics 1140^b8.

⁴⁶ Memorabilia I.2.38–46 (cf. Strauss, , Xenophon's Socrates, pp. 10–18)Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ See Strauss, , Xenophon's Socrates, p. 115Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ On the indispensability of dialectical reasoning in the philosophical sciences, see Aristotle, , Topics, bk. 1 and Owens, Joseph, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics 2nd ed. rev. (Toronto, 1963), pp. 205–207Google Scholar. An examination of Aristotle's Ethics and Politics in light of the Topics would establish that his political philosophy proceeds dialectically.

⁴⁹ This essay was delivered to the Conference on Reason, Values and Political Principle at Pomona College, March, 1977. I wish to thank Liberty Fund, Inc.,, sponsors of the conference, as well as J. Charles King and Tibor Machan, codirectors of the conference, for the opportunity to develop these thoughts in their present form.