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The Limits of Post-War Planning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Extract

Ideologically, this war could be termed “post-war war.” When it began, political thought was still concerned with the problems which we inherited from the other catastrophe. After the beginning of hostilities the political intellectuals began to busy themselves almost exclusively with the problems of the coming peace, alas, so far away. According to the peace-planners nothing is more important than the formation of post-war blue-prints. Some people even go so far as to assert that the very outcome of this struggle depends largely upon the proclamation of attractive peace aims (or war aims). That side is going to win, it is held, which offers the most seductive plan for a brave new world, formulated so as to be comprehensible to the simplest minds. The most curious part of all this is that nobody has been able hitherto to formulate the ideal war aims. Those war aims which have been proclaimed so far could not even arouse the enthusiasm of their own sponsors. They all taste like brackish water and all of them can be traced back at least to the time of the Enlightenment. The most rabid among the peace-planners now begin to realize that those aims or slogans, which up to a short time ago still made an impression upon the masses, have lost their appeal. This is a difficulty which Mr. Laski wants to overcome by finding “another word”. Without denying that the fertile minds of people like Laski certainly can find other words, it can be doubted whether they will be able to find a more convincing formula than Johann Nestroy's: “It is much better to be wealthy and happy than to be poor and sick”.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1943

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References

1 No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy … The commander is compelled during the whole campaign to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted. All consecutive acts of war are, therefore, not executions of a premeditated plan, but spontaneous actions, directed by military tact. The problem is to grasp in innumerable special cases the actual situation which is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements, to reach a decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully and relentlessly … It is obvious that theoretical knowledge will not suffice, but that here the qualities of mind and character come to a free, practical and artistic expression, although schooled by military training and led by experiences from military history or from life itself.” Moltke.

2 “Peace is not firm” says Péquy, “unless the preceding war has been firm.… Only bitter battles leave the field clear for healthy work”.