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Fraternity and Citizenship: Two Ethics of Mutuality in Christian Thomasius

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Frederick M. Barnard
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Extract

Political jurist, philosopher, and publicist, Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), in seeking to set apart the ordering principle of political society from that of the religious community, in effect put forth two distinct ethics of mutuality, an “intrinsic” ethic of inherent purpose and an “extrinsic” ethic of instrumentality, the former characterized by disinterested love, in need of no further justification, the latter characterized by prudential reciprocity, in demand of a rational grounding. Unity in the former is viewed as consensual and necessary, whereas it is seen as plural and contingent in the latter, thus designating politics as the domain of instrumentality, plurality, and contingency. Similarly, citizenship is sharply contrasted with the idea of fraternity. Its defining quality is identified with decorum, which, though it entails elements of moral and legal accountability, is held to be neither strictly moral nor strictly legal. Its effective operation is, however, posited on the possibility of an unfalsified consciousness. In exploring the category of decorum as an ethic of mutuality, reference is made to contemporary discussions on liberal and communitarian theory and on the conditions of rational debate in politics.

Type
Religion and Politics
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , Fall 1988 , pp. 582 - 602
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1988

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References

Notes

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30. His first legal training Thomasius received at the university of Leipzig, his native city. During his graduate studies at Frankfurt-on-the-Oder he came under the influence of one of the most famous jurists of the period, Samuel Stryk, and, by the time he took his doctorate in law, in 1678 (at the age of 23), Thomasius had become one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Pufendorf, who, together with Grotius, was out of favor at Leipzig at that time. After a brief sojourn in Holland, Thomasius settled down in Leipzig to become a practicing lawyer. Yet, in spite of his success as an attorney, he soon tired of the protracted mode of litigation. By 1686 he decided to follow in his father's footsteps and join the faculty of law and philosophy at his Alma Mater. His “heretical” approach, however, soon brought him into conflict with orthodox theologians and his more conservative colleagues. Estrangement was followed by hostility and open persecution. In 1690, with the help of Pufendorf and the Prussian court, Thomasius was invited to Halle, then in process of becoming a new university. And it was above all at Halle that Thomasius published his most outspoken critiques of contemporary legal practices.

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32. EV, pp. 261–62.Google Scholar

33. EV, p. 262.Google Scholar

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35. ES, p. 89 (emphasis is Thomasius's).Google Scholar

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39. For an extended discussion of the distinction between community and society, see ES, pp. 299–310, 356–69Google Scholar; AS, pp. 10–13Google Scholar. Among the intrinsic purposes of a religious community Thomasius includes communality of ownership. Property in political society, on the other hand, is typically private, and its protection constitutes, Thomasius points out, one of the principal “public objects” of political society, albeit at the cost of government rule (Herrschaft).

40. For the original exposition of this condition, see Habermas, Jürgen and Luhmann, Niklas, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971)Google Scholar, and for a recent elaboration, Habermas, , “Aspects of the Rationality of Action,” in Rationality Today, ed. Geracts, Theodore F. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979), pp. 195–97.Google Scholar

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43. EV, pp. 76–77, 285–304Google Scholar; AS, pp. 14–17.Google Scholar

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48. EV, pp. 227–29, 293–308Google Scholar; AS, p. 15.Google Scholar

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50. There is, Thomasius declared, one law for the rich and another for the poor. “It is hard to see,” he wrote, “what Christian ethics are involved in the verdicts of our learned judges or, indeed, in the attitudes of our Christian pastors. A poor simple soul that allowed herself to be seduced into pregnancy is not one thousandth part as depraved (verhurt) as many a ‘respectable’ lady who for years has led an adulterous or whore-like existence. Yet the former is publicly pilloried as a whore and required to do church penance as well, while the latter is rewarded with grand titles, and occupies the most coveted pews in church. A poor soldier who has been press-ganged into war service, and who upon his release is driven by poverty or bad company into highway robbery is not one thousandth part as villainous as many a ‘gentleman’ who by skillful graft and doubtful dealings not only succeeds in our times and society in lining his pockets handsomely, but also in acquiring fame and respect to boot” (AS, pp. 541–42).Google Scholar

51. AV, p. 174Google Scholar; AS, pp. 514–15Google Scholar; and Thomasius, , Versuch vom Wesen des Geistes (Halle: Salfeld, 1699), pp. 183–84.Google Scholar

52. AS, pp. 526–27Google Scholar; EV, pp. 101–102Google Scholar; AV, pp. 163–76, 181–82, 194–96.Google Scholar

53. Schneiders, Werner, Die wahre Aufklärung: Zum Selbstverständnis der deutschen Aufklärung (Freiburg and Munich: K. Albert, 1974).Google Scholar

54. For a critical examination of these communitarian views, see Gutmann, Amy, “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1985), pp. 308–22.Google Scholar

55. ES, pp. 358, 360Google Scholar. Thomasius has no use for the idea that philosophers or philosopher-kings could or should resolve dissensus in politics, or prevent it from arising in the first place, since they have no privileged knowledge in the practical affairs of men and sooner do harm than good. He takes therefore Plato to task for having launched this “nonsensical” idea (Kurtzer Entwurff, pp. 169–70Google Scholar; Erinnerung wegen Zweyer Collegiorum über den Andern Theil seiner Grund-Lehren [Halle: Salfeld, 1702], p. 34Google Scholar); also EV, p. 229Google Scholar. For a contrasting contemporary approach to dissensus politics, see Hutter, Horst, Politics as Friendship (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1978)Google Scholar and, at greater depth, Mansbridge, Jane J., Beyond Adversary Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1980)Google Scholar. What the latter calls “unitary” democracy — because it is “like friendship”— distinguished by consensus, is favorably compared with “adversary” democracy, the model of democracy that “most Americans had grown up with.” As the crucially decisive basis for consensual unitary democracy Mansbridge advocates “common interests,” by which she presumably means “purposes” rather than “objects.” Thomasius by no means advocates dissensus or disputation for its own sake, nor is he blind to the dangers of ruthless and ill-willed disputation, but, on balance, he prefers open disagreement to its suppression (AV, pp. 95–99, 267–69, 293–94).Google Scholar