Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-wxhwt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-11T09:27:05.066Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Sources of Hitler's Power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Extract

Are the Germans really behind the Nazi Government? Despite— or because of?—the steadily rising flood of books dealing with the Third Reich this question is answered in most different ways. There is no agreement concerning the relations between the German people and the National Socialist regime. But one's attitude towards the conduct of the war and the post-war problems is, to a large extent, determined by the opinion that one holds about these relations. Therefore, some remarks about the different answers which are given to the question: What are the sources of Hitler's power in Germany? may be of general interest.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1942

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For the latest statement of his views cf. his article in The Nineteenth Century, London, 1942Google Scholar.

2 H. Rauschning describes the Nazis as Foerster the Prussians. But he does not connect Nazi Nihilism with Prussianism. On the Prussian Myth cf. Borkenau, F.. Political Quarterly, London, 1942Google Scholar.

3 Particularly valuable as critiques of this myth are Fried: The Guilt of the German Army (New York, Macmillan, 1942)Google Scholar and Hagen, P.: Will Germany Crack? (New York, Harper, 1942)Google Scholar.

4 Such determinism can assume social-economic or nationalistic-racial forms. In the latter case bad or good decisions and actions of a people and its leaders are ascribed to its unchangeable bad or good nature. Universal human virtues (or vices) are nationalized. Freedom of choice disappears completely from history. The famous German historian Hampe has with much wisdom criticized this attitude, which e.g. tries to identify loyalty (Treue) and German nature (Deutsches Wesen) with the statement: “That loyalty was peculiar to the Germans” “from the earliest times” “is in my opinion at least a strong exaggeration. How far the specific German loyalty has to be considered as a historical fact or as legend would deserve an investigation.” (Hisiorische Zeitschrift, vol. 146, 1932, p. 453)Google Scholar.

5 What follows does not pretend to give a complete account of the National Socialist rise into power. I have not attempted to discuss the intellectual background of Hitler's movement as e.g., O'Butler, and Mayer, Carl have done (cf. The Review of Politics,07, 1942, p. 350f).Google Scholar Nor do I analyze the role of faulty political institutional devices whose importance has been emphasized by Brecht, Arnold (Social Research, 09, 1942, p. 411).Google Scholar The particular concern of this study centers around the relations of different political elites in Germany.

6 I am unable to contribute to the speculations about the background of Brauchitsch's discharge, 1941 — Hitler remained on top in any case.

7 It has to be noted too, that the conservatives who first despised Hitler, believing in him only as a necessary instrument for mass propaganda, began to admire him as his successes increased. He dared what they themselves no longer dared.

8 On the role of the Anti-Versailles propaganda cf. Palyi, , Economic Foundations of the German Totalitarian State, American Journal of Sociology, 1941Google Scholar.

9 Cf. Simon, Yves: The Road to Vichy,New York, Sheed and Ward, 1942Google Scholar.

10 I find in The American Journal of Sociology, 11, 1942, an article by Garber, William, “Propaganda Analysis,” which clearly states: The “proper way to understand the phenonom of propaganda is not primarily through the study of rhetorics and psychological tricks employed but rather by an analysis of the total social context …” (p. 245)Google Scholar.