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A Return to Classical Political Philosophy and the Understanding of the American Founding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Extract

What is the significance for the understanding of the American Founding of Leo Strauss's efforts toward the recovery of classical political philosophy? That this is a legitimate question to address to Strauss's work is suggested by the claims which he made in the introductions to a number of his most famous books (among other things). He opened his study on Natural Right and History, for example, by raising the question whether our nation “in its maturity still cherish[es] the faith in which it was conceived and raised,” that is, whether it still holds the fundamental proposition of the Declaration of Independence to be true. In doing so, he gave warrant to the expectation that that study, which may be said to culminate in a treatment of classical natural right and make a case for its superiority to all alternatives, would contribute to the strengthening or restoration of our Founding faith.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1991

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References

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