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P. R. and Municipal Reform
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Extract
Treatises on political machines in the United States too often suffer from a lack of historical perspective. Machine government is due to factors peculiar to certain periods in American history, and it is doomed to disappear when its historical basis disintegrates. Since the details of this matter have been discussed previously, let us only review the important phases of the struggle for reform. Between the Civil War and the 1890s political machines—some of which had begun to develop early in the Nineteenth Century—reached the peak of their power; these were “the dark ages of city government”. During the 1890s the reform forces began to wrestle with the “bosses” on even terms; they developed organizations and adopted techniques which helped them to overcome the isolation and the haphazard character of their early efforts. During the 1920s and the 1930s the victories of reform became accentuated; resounding defeats of individual machines recurred, and it looked like the beginning of a rout of the institution. To mention but a few: the Cox-Hynicka machine in Cincinnati fell in 1924; the Maschke machine in Cleveland received blows in the 1920s to which it finally succumbed in the 1930s; in New York, Tammany went down in 1933, and whereas the five reform administrations which New York had witnessed since 1871 all enjoyed only one two-year term each, La Guardia was elected to three four-year terms in succession.
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- Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1943
References
1 “Exit the Boss,” Review of Politics, October 1940.
2 Alexander, Jack. “Thai's How They Got Nucky Johnsin,” Reader's Digest, 05 1942Google Scholar.
3 In many ways the Crump machine seems to differ from the liaditional pattern. See Daniels, Jonathan, “He Suits Memphis,” Saturday Evening Post, 06 10, 1939Google Scholar.
4 “The Promotion of the City Manager Plan,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1941. p. 577–8Google Scholar.
5 Editorial entitled “Still Plumping for P. R.,” October 29, 1940.
6 Hallett, G. H. Jr, Proportional Representation, The Key to Democracy. Washington, 1937, pp. 1–3Google Scholar.
7 Issue of June 4, 1939, front page editorial.
8 High, Stanley, “Kansas City Has Its Chin Up”, National Municipal Review, 10 1941Google Scholar.
9 Hermens, F. A., Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representatation, Notre Dame, Ind., Review of Politics, 1941, pp. 361–3Google Scholar.
10 Mr. Maurice Farly in a Letter to the present writer, dated August 20, 1942.
11 “State Lawmakers Warned by Mayor”, New York Times, August 24, 1938.
12 “P. R. Invites Factional Strife, Baker Declares”, Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 25, 1925.
13 Figures from “Proportional Representation for the State Legislature,” contained in the Report of the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, appointed by Governor Herbert H. Lehman to collate factual data for the use of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1938, pp. 268–9.
14 For examples, see ibid., pp. 270–2. “Racial voting” may, of course, be fully intentional, but in this case it is open to criticism as being liable to increase racial antagonisms.
15 For an expression of the Fusion point of view see Democracy or Anarchy? p. 400, note 10.
16 Issue of November 19, 1942. The author is Mr. André J. de Bethune.
17 For the figures see Report to the Constitutional Convention, op. cit., p. 254Google Scholar.
18 Mr. Hallett has pointed out that Mr. James A. Burke was elected, although “he ran with no designation whatever after his name.” Actually Mr. Burke was not an Independent but one of the leaders of a dissident faction of the Democratic party in Queens. He later made his peace with the other leaders of his party and was elected Borough President of Queens as the official Democratic candidate. The votes cast for him are not included in the 27% cast for Independents.
19 For further details on this matter see my remarks in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1942, pp. 245–7.
20 Other estimates were higher. For example, a campaign leaflet issued by the “Citizens Non-Partisan Committee”, headed by Thomas D. Thacher, put the figure at $500,000 and continued: “This is a half-million dollar yearly subsidy to the political machine of the dominant political party, with no benefit to the public that pays the bill.”
21 What represented the true wishes of the voters on that day, their two to one decision to consolidate the county offices or the election of a P. R. Council which was almost two to one opposed to that reform? Does not this discrepancy alone serve to prove indeed, as Councilman Cohen put it, that P. R. is neither “proportional” nor “representative?”
22 The reduction was the result of two factors: A considerable decline in the number of Council candidates, which necessitated a much smaller number of counts, and experience gained in conducting the count. The figures are taken from the annual Reports of the Board of Elections in the City of New York.
23 For the elections of 1939 see Democracy or Anarchy? pp. 410–14.
24 This interpretation of the term “representation” is entirely different from the “classical” concept of representation, according to which representatives represent the entire country rather than a fraction of it. (See Democracy or Anarchv? pp. 5–6.)
25 “P. R. and the Council,” op. cit., Nov. 14, 1941.
26 “Abolition of P. R. Sought by Cohen,” Next York Times, November 25, 1941.
27 It seems though that “racial voting” was one of the factors involved. As Mr. Lambert Fairchild put it: “A. Clayton Powell, the Negro, got thousands of votes from the politically ignorant who naturally supposed that they were voting for an Ango-Saxon, and Peter Cacchione, the Communist, got thousands of votes from Italian Americans whose first thought was racial rather than American.” (The Political World, December 1941, p. 7).
28 Editorial entitled “How P. R. Worked,” November 14, 1941.
29 Mimeographed press release, p. 3.
30 Issue of November 25, 1941.
31 Moses, R., Theory and Practice in Politics, Cambridge 1939, p. 39Google Scholar.
32 Editorial entitled “P. R. in Brooklyn,” November 29, 1941.
33 In his analysis of the 1937 elections (P. R. Department, National Municipal Review, 01 1938Google Scholar) Mr. Halleii just about gives his case away when he says: “… it seems pretty clear from the first choice votes that a small majority of this Democratic city would have liked this lime to give the non-partisan Mayor a friendly council.” He adds that Fusion obtained 905,144 first choice votes and Tammany 619,232.
34 In the arrangement suggesled by the author the division would be 3:2, (15:10 in the case of a large city like New York, Cleveland or Chicago: 6:4 in smaller cities). The reason for this is that many city charters accord special powers to a two-thirds majority of the City Council. The rationale of such a provision must be the assumption that a two-thirds majority must express the agreement of more than any everyday partisan majority. This assumption is often not warranted in fact, but the arrangement proposed would guarantee that this be the case.
35 “P. R. and the Council,” editorial, November 14, 1941.
36 In an editorial entitled “Solid Practical Contributions of P. R.”
37 The Searchlight, October 1939, p. 15. The survey is headed: “The First P. R. Council; An Elxperiment in Democracy.” One wonders just what kind of democracy it is when the first application results in a stalemate!
38 It is said that at any rate the new Council produced ample discussion. So it did, and sometimes, as the saying goes, “it was a riot”—literally as well as figuratively speaking. Now, as Professor Friedrich has rightly emphasized (Constitutional Covernment and Democracy, Boston 1941, p. 363Google Scholar), democratic deliberation should never be thought of as independent of action, its purpose being to make sure that action is based upon proper instruction. In this regard the P. R. Councilmen were utterly deficient; all they produced was aimless oratory, often bitter, and at times vulgar. If Fusion expected that such “debates”—which at first were broadcast with several speakers sometimes shouting into the microphone at the same moment—would “show up Tammany” and increase the popularity of reform with the electorate, the two-thirds and near two-thirds majorities of Tammany in the following Councils provide a clear enough reply to such expectations.
39 The drawbacks which New York has shown on these points would, of course, only be magnified if P. R. were applied for Congressional elections, as demanded by the American P. R. leaders—including those who now work through the medium of the National Municipal League and the Citizens Union of New York –and as proposed by Representative Henry G. Teigan. 75th Congress, 34th Session, H. R. No. 9947.
40 A recent occurrence in New York State throws some light on the amount of sympathy which supporters of P. R. have for the manager plan if it dees not serve as a vehicle for the promotion of their own interests. On May 14, 1942, Governor Lehman of New York vetoed a bill making it possible to put new city charters on the ballot by petition. He was in full sympathy with the purpose of the bill, but desired that if P. R. were included in such charters, it should, for the sake of clarity, bs placed on the ballot as a separate provision. The purpose of the veto, therefore, was only to make it possible for the voter to make a clear decision as to whether he wanted to combine P. R. with the manager plan or not. The editor of the P. R. Department of the National Municipal Review (issue of 06, 1942Google Scholar) takes exception to this and says: “… Under some political conditions a reform group may want the city manager plan only if it can also be sure of proportional representation in the election of the council which is to select and control the manager.”
41 They admittedly won on the strength of the fallacious “Kansas City argument”; see Democracy or Anarchy? p. 385.
42 For some details See Demoeracy or Anarchy? pp. 380 ff.
43 He was the last man to bs defeated—which means that his party was left “holding the bag,” since his votes could not be transferred to any one else. This is one of the major elements of chance involved in the Hare system of P. R. (See Democracy or Annrchv? p. 413.)
44 In cities with a Large colored vote it is, of course, natural that the qualified colored candidates should be elected. The danger to avoid is, howevwe, the Promotion of “racial voting” and the consequent accentuation of racial differences. In Cincinnati jesses ocker was elected as a member of one of our major parties, and the fact that a considerable number of white voters suppored him serves to counteract any possible Mr.A.Claytom Powell, Jr. was elected practically as an Independent, though with a belated endorsement ofthe American Labor and city Fusion parties. About his personal qualifications there seems to be some doubt and future developments will have to show whether or not his election will result in the formation of something amounting to a negro party. If this should be the case, another unwelcome chapter in the history of P.R. in New York City would have been opened.
45 Editorial entitled “Republican Majorityt”, November 7 1941.
46 Editorial entitled “Under the G.O.P. Flag,” November 7, 1941.
47 In the 1941 elections there'were 10,131 invalid votes, equal to 6.5 per cent of the total, which is higher than in all previous elections and shows that with P. R. practice does not “make perfect,” In addition there were 14,409 “ineffective votes”.
48 New P. R.elections have also been held in Hamilton, Toledo, Boulder, Yonkers and Cambridge. They, and the problems connected with them, will be discussed in a supplement to Democracy or Anarch?, which will be published in pamphlet form under the title, P. R., Democracy ami Cood Covermenl, and should be available by the end of January 1943,
49 For the details see Democracy or Anarchy?, pp. 367 ff; 376–8.
50 So far as the direct financial superiority is concerned which the supporters of P. R. have “as a rule,” let us cnly mention the Cincinnati campaign in 1939, when the officially declare expenses of the Charter group were $1 1,551.34, those of the Democrats who were allied with them, $2,590, and those of the Republicans $3,479. The Charter group may contend that the Republicans spent more than they declared, but as far as the present writer has been able to learn this was not the case.