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Energy Issues in the Context of the Regime Transition of Post-Soviet Eurasia: National and International Dimension
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2010
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In political science, democracy is generally associated with high levels of economic development. However, some scholars note that this is true only as long as economic development is not based on possession of rich energy resources. Many resource-rich states are nondemocratic regimes. This is sometimes called the “resource curse.” This means that “natural resource abundance may stimulate rent-seeking behavior that, together with highly concentrated bureaucratic power, induces corruption in the economy and hence lowers the quality of institutions.” It also means that “resource wealth itself may harm a country's prospects for development” and that “oil and mineral wealth tends to make states less democratic.”
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- Copyright © University of Notre Dame 2010
References
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12 Ibid., 180. In another region of Russia, Tatarstan, a different model of fusion between economic and political elites is developed: presidential patronage. The model does not allow economic actors from outside to enter into the regional market.
13 Daniel Goler, “Russia's Northern Periphery in Transition: Regional Fragmentation of the Far North,” in Politics in the Russian Regions, ed. Gill, 188.
14 Ibid.
15 The double-headed eagle was adopted as the state symbol of Russia in the fifteenth century by the Grand Prince of All Russia Ivan III. Initially, the double-headed eagle was the official state symbol of the late Byzantine Empire, looking at both East and West. It has had various interpretations over the centuries: the East (Constantinople) and the West (Rome), the unity of the state and the church, etc. Apart from other interpretations, the double-headed eagle also symbolizes the geopolitical importance of the location between Europe and Asia.
16 On the role of geopolitics and Europeanization in Russia, see Anastassia Obydenkova, “Democratization, Europeanization and Regionalization beyond the European Union: Search for Empirical Evidence,” in European Integration online Papers 10, no. 1 (2006).
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21 Pirani, Russian and CIS Gas Markets and Their Impact on Europe, 453.
22 Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” 357.
23 Edward Chow, “Policy on Oil and Gas,” in The Russia Balance Sheet, ed. Åslund and Kuchins, 68.
24 Pirani, Russian and CIS Gas Markets and Their Impact on Europe.