In this article, I respond to Stephen Law's evil god challenge (EGC) to traditional theism. I argue that while there are credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good, there are no credible a priori grounds for believing that the first cause is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-evil. Because of this, theists have a reason for explaining away the a posteriori evidence against theism. The hypothetical evilist, on the other hand, does not. Thus, while the problem of the good makes it absurd to believe in evilism, the problem of evil does not make it absurd to believe in theism.

I argue that we should not model the Trinity using the concept of constitution, and reply to William Hasker's recent defence of the constitutionalist position, also developing my own views in some respects.

In her impressive Atonement, Eleonore Stump claims that her novel Marian theory of the atonement meets a desideratum for a successful theory that Aquinas's theory does not, namely, showing that Christ's passion and death are essential to the solution to the problem of human sin. Here I suggest reasons to side with Aquinas, who says that Christ's suffering and death are not necessary, but merely a fitting way of solving the problem. If the fittingness of Christ's passion and death is a good enough justification for it, we lose a motivation for adopting the Marian theory over the Thomistic one.

Eleonore Stump's Atonement marks a significant advance in atonement theory, especially in its nuanced approach to ethical and relational complexities, but tends to treat sin as social only insofar as one individual's sin can harm or shame another. I argue that that social sin requires social redemption and that exemplarism would provide a solution. Christ's pursuit of love and justice, in the midst of oppression, temptation, and struggle, offers a distinctive model of virtue, towards collective restoration of the world. While we cannot redeem ourselves, in calling us to effect justice and union with one another, God may also call us closer to Godself.

Brian Leftow continues to argue against my use of the constitution relation in explaining the Trinity. I consider his arguments, and have a bit more to say about Leftow's own formulation of trinitarian doctrine.

In this article, I respond to articles by Faith Pawl, Anne Jeffrey, and Kathryn Pogin that raise issues related to my book Atonement. The topics covered include the suffering of beasts, the necessity of Christ's atonement, the relationship of my interpretation of the doctrine of the atonement and that of Thomas Aquinas, and social and communal guilt and shame.