¹ I came to these conclusions in Faith After Foundationalism. Routledge 1988, Part Two. The present paper is a summary and further elaboration of those conclusions. My views are based on Rorty's observations in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and ‘Solidarity or Objectivity?’ These works raise issues which merit attention irrespective of any later modifications of them by Rorty.Google Scholar

² Tom, Sorell, ‘The World from its Own Point of View’ in Reading Rorty, Alan, Malachowski (ed.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 18.Google Scholar

³ Peter, Winch, ‘Language, Belief and Relativism’ in Trying To Make Sense (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).Google Scholar

⁴ Bernard, Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 138–139.Google Scholar Quoted by Rorty, in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge University Press, 1991).Google Scholar

⁵ Bernard Williams, ‘Auto-da-Fe: Consequences of Pragmatism’ in Reading Rorty. p. 27.Google Scholar

⁶ Richard, Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press, 1980), 361.Google Scholar

⁷ Op. cit., 19.

⁸ This remark would have to be modified if by ‘philosophy’ one meant traditions radically different from those Rorty has in mind. There, ‘philosophy’ and ‘argument’ might be something very different.

⁹ See Charles Taylor, ‘Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition’ in Reading Rorty 258.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 379.

¹¹ Ibid., 157.

¹² Faith After Foundationalism, 144.Google Scholar

¹³ Charles Taylor, op. cit., 257.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Flannery, O'Conner, The Habit of Being Sally, Fitzgerald (ed.), (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1980), 456.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For further discussion see ‘What should we expect from ethics?’ in my Interventions in Ethics (Macmillan, 1992).Google Scholar

¹⁶ For a discussion of such cases see Timothy Tessin, 'Talking About I Trees,' Philosophical Investigations, Jan 1992. lGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Charles Taylor, Op. cit., p. 258.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See my paper, ‘On Morality's Having a Point’ (with H. O. Mounce) in Interventions in Ethics.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Rush Rhees, ‘What are Moral Statements Like?’ in Without Answers, Routledge l969, p. 105.Google Scholar

²⁰ For an example of my mistaken acceptance of such a challenge on its own terms see 'In Search of the Moral ‘Must’ in Interventions in Ethics. For my self-criticism see my Introduction, p. xi f.

²¹ Tom Sorell is tempted to think this. See op. cit.Google Scholar

²² Rush Rhees, ‘Natural Law’ and ‘Reasons in Ethics,’ op. cit., p. 96.Google Scholar

²³ Rush Rhees, ‘What are Moral Statements Like?’Google Scholar, Ibid., pp. 106–107.

²⁴ Richard, Rorty, The Consequences of Pragmatism. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1982), p. xliii.Google Scholar

²⁵ Rush Rhees, ‘What are Moral Statements Like?’, Op. cit., pp. 103–104.Google Scholar

²⁶ Ludwig, Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, von Wright, G. H. (ed.), trans by Peter Winch. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p. 77e.Google Scholar

²⁷ Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, p. 23.Google Scholar

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., p. 26.

³³ For a fruitful disagreement on these issues see Alasdair, Maclntyre, ‘Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing?’ in Faith and the Philosophers, J., Hick (ed.), (London: Macmillan, 1964)Google Scholar and Winch, P., ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ in Ethics and Action, (London: Routledge, 1972).Google Scholar

³⁴ Richard Rorty, ‘Solidarity or Objectivity?’ Op. cit., 29.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid., 29.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Rush Rhees, ‘Politics and Justification,’ Op. cit., 84–85.Google Scholar