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Our Present Outlook in Speculative Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Extract

Speculative Philosophy, or Pure Metaphysic, stands at the present time in a very interesting position. There is perhaps some degree of slackening in the construction of elaborate systems, though, with the recent examples of McTaggart and Professor Alexander before us, this may be open to some question. But at least we probably realize, more fully than was possible in previous generations, the exact nature of the problems with which pure metaphysic is concerned. Its work has been more and more clearly marked off from that of the empirical sciences (including even the more detailed aspects of psychology), and from that of the mathematical sciences (including even the quasi-mathematical aspects of formal logic); and its province can now be definitely confined to the general theory of knowledge and the light that is thrown by this upon the structure of reality. It is my object in this paper to indicate briefly the chief problems that appear to fall within its scope and the chief directions in which we may look for light upon them. It is well to admit, however, that metaphysical problems are difficult, and that any statements that are made about them, unless expressed in language of a somewhat technical character, are very liable to be misunderstood. I must try to avoid both the Scylla of obscurity and the Charybdis of superficiality.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1930

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References

page 17 note 1 The statements about this, as well as on much else, in Mr. Johnson's Logic, Part II, may be referred to with great advantage.

page 18 note 1 In Part II of his Logic, pp. 161 seq. He has not, however, referred definitely to Hegel’s view.

Page 19 Note1 The late Dr. McTaggart was perhaps the most conspicuous and the most distinguished example of this (especially in his book on The Nature of Existence, vol. ii).

page 18 note 2 I have tried to deal with it more fully in the new edition of Outlines of Metaphysics, and I am hoping to give some further consideration to it shortly. The problem of Contingency is probably the most difficult in the whole range of speculative philosophy.

page 21 note 1 It must be admitted, I think, that the transition from the Absolute Idea to the contingency of Nature is not very clearly explained by Hegel. Nor is the precise sense in which ‘creation’ is to be understood.

page 21 note 2 Professor A. E. Taylor—undoubtedly a great authority—has expressed such doubts. But reference may be made to the criticism of his book by Professor G. C. Field in the January number of Mind.

page 22 note 1 Professor W. M. Urban is, I think, the writer who has most satisfactorily brought out the significance of the idea of value for modern thought.

page 22 note 2 The general significance of the term may be illustrated by the lines, “Winds blow and waters roll Health to the brave and power and deity, Yet in themselves are nothing.”