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On a Supposed Contradiction in Hume

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2007

Sophie Botros
Institute of Philosophy, University of London


One of the most powerful arguments in meta-ethics today is that of Treatise, Book 3, in which Hume seeks to show that morality's practical influence precludes its being based on reason. H.O. Mounce, in his review1 of my Hume, Reason and Morality: A Legacy of Contradiction,2 rejects my central contention that this argument contains a contradiction. This review is however flawed on several counts.

Research Article
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2007

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1 Mounce, H.O. (2006) Philosophy, Vol. 81 Issue 04, 682–5Google Scholar.

2 (London: Routledge, 2006).

3 Harrison, J. (1976) Hume's Moral Epistemology, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 10Google Scholar.

4 Dancy, J. (1993) Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell) 2Google Scholar.

5 Penelhum, T. (1975) Hume (London: MacMillan) 129CrossRefGoogle Scholar.