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Beliefs, Desires and Moral Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2006

Daniel Goldstick
Affiliation:
University of Toronto

Abstract

An argument against the claim that moral realism cannot be sustained because moral beliefs, being affective-conative states, cannot themselves be true or false. In fact moral claims can fail both in terms of a failure of the standard it expresses to be realised by a given agent and also in terms of whatever it commends to be good or bad, right or wrong, in actual fact.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2006

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