1. The problem. The concept of confirmation of an hypothesis by empirical evidence is of fundamental importance in the methodology of empirical science. For, first of all, a sentence cannot even be considered as expressing an empirical hypothesis at all unless it is theoretically capable of confirmation or disconfirmation, i.e. unless the kind of evidence can be characterized whose occurrence would confirm, or disconfirm, the sentence in question. And secondly, the acceptance or rejection of a sentence which does represent an empirical hypothesis is determined, in scientific procedure, by the degree to which it is confirmed by relevant evidence.

In this paper a theory relating to the causal factors operative in the origin of living systems is presented.

Let us consider living forms as material systems exhibiting, in addition to those properties held in common with all matter, systemic properties of a specific nature. If, then, the matter of the earth is classified from this standpoint, it is found that these systems are distributed only over the surface of the earth or in a shallow upper layer. This fact indicates that the special properties of these systems are related in some manner to factors introduced at the surface and not operative elsewhere.

The philosopher who is interested in developments of modern physics may turn with some profit to an argument that has recently evolved between the late George Birkhoff and Hermann Weyl. Birkhoff and his associates have constructed a theory of relativity differing in various ways from Einstein's general theory. Weyl (1) has offered a critical analysis of the Birkhoff theory along with a defense of the Einstein theory; and Birkhoff (2) has presented his rebuttal to Weyl.

1. Introduction: the three parts of the essay: (I) reply to criticism of attempts at esthetic measure, (II) a glance at the pioneers, and (III) the development of a new approach.

In the article referred to in the title of this note, Winthrop quotes a paragraph from a recent article by me with italics inserted by him, and then proceeds to “translate” it into the language of an economic theory. Winthrop thoughtfully adds in a following paragraph the phrase, “… if I have not mistranslated him [Hull] into marginal terms.” The purpose of the present note is to correct what appears to have been a fundamental misunderstanding of the meaning of the passage, rather than an error of translation; at all events, it is only with the original meaning of the passage that this note is concerned. The paragraph as it originally appeared is as follows (p. 135) :

“Economic value in one of its more obvious and primitive aspects involves the exchange of an amount of commodity X possessed by person No. 1 for an amount of commodity Y possessed by person No. 2. This type of behavior can come about voluntarily and continuously only on the condition that person No. 1 has a striving potential for Y which is greater than would be his striving potential for X when he no longer has X; and when person No. 2 has a striving potential for X which is greater than would be that for Y when he no longer has Y. Thus the total striving potential of both persons is reduced by the transaction.”

Positivists since the time of Comte have defined objectivity in science in terms of the absence of prejudice on the part of the scientist towards the phenomena with which he deals. It has been assumed that if the observer would contemplate the facts himself, this objectivity—an absence of bias—could be attained. However, social psychologists, notably C. H. Cooley and G. H. Mead, have shown that this is not necessarily the case. In the study of culture, an outstanding positivist, W. G. Sumner, in his discussion of folkways and mores, has shown that this objectivity is impossible to attain. These men have described the process through which objects arise in one's experience, and come to be defined in terms of that experience, so that the same object may mean different things to different people. This seems to be the case with certain areas of social theory.

Laski has been and remains one of the most erudite and influential of the English liberals—indeed, regardless of which of his books the liberal reads, he finishes it with the feeling that Laski is a force for good in political life. However, for the kind of philosopher who is accustomed to make distinctions between morality, ethics, ideology, and descriptive science, there are certain confusions in Laski's writings that give grounds for criticism of both a theoretical and practical nature.

In recent issues of the Journal of Philosophy John Dewey and Arthur Bentley have been making an attack on certain logical positivists and other logicians on the ground, of all things, that they display amazing contempt for clear and consistent definition of the terms they use. That logicians, whose business it is to define consistency, should themselves be inconsistent in the use of their basic terms is not really so surprising. It may merely prove them to be human, the victims of a simple failure to practice what they preach. If this were the case, the situation would not be so bad, for who better than a drunkard knows the evils of drink? And yet it is equally human to require preacher to be practitioner as well. So that the spankings which Bentley and Dewey are currently administering to Carnap, Cohen, Nagel, Ducasse, Lewis and Morris are quite in order. In fact in the case of the logical positivists they are long overdue. Carnap, particularly, has long outraged patience as well as common sense with rambling verbal analysis of the meaning of terms used in the exposition of logical positivism.

The literature of economic theory, like that of philosophy, abounds in prefaces and prolegomena. Methodology and analysis of concepts take an important place in a science which has not found the sure path of development. But there is no sure path for methodology either. The selfconscious methodology of social science has been largely a borrowing from that of physical science, where procedures have developed to a stage of considerable maturity. But the analogy falls down where guidance is most needed, at the points where social science is most likely to develop new concepts and new types of structure. Philosophers have not been lacking, indeed, to belittle the entire enterprise, and to deny the possibility of anything that could strictly be called social science.