To date, both sides in the conventionality of simultaneity debate grant that transformations from “standard” to “nonstandard” coordinates are possible without any empirically significant effects. However, it is argued here that the very possibility of defining nonstandard coordinates vanishes if one represents special relativity, not by real four-vectors (as has been the case so far in the debate), but by complex spinors as used in the representation of half-integer spin. Thus, in the topologically simplest representation of the Lorentz group, the transformation over which the debate has been fought does not exist and one of the most basic foundations of the conventionalist thesis is challenged.

This paper proposes an explanation in terms of three kinds of freedom, first for the special efficacy of science in general and then for why such efficacy has been more impressive in the natural than the social sciences. This explanation thus complements “post-positivist” interpretations of science which argue that science's effectiveness cannot be accounted for by fundamental epistemic differences from other kinds of discourse. My explanation tries to say what is responsible for science's effectiveness, in purely nonepistemic, sociological terms. All of the three kinds of freedom have so far been denied to most other forums, including in particular nations' populations taken overall. And one of these freedoms, while now allowed to the natural sciences, is still denied to the social sciences.

The underdetermination of theory by evidence must be distinguished from holism. The latter is a doctrine about the testing of scientific hypotheses; the former is a thesis about empirically adequate logically incompatible global theories or “systems of the world”. The distinction is crucial for an adequate assessment of the underdetermination thesis. The paper shows how some treatments of underdetermination are vitiated by failure to observe this distinction, and identifies some necessary conditions for the existence of multiple empirically equivalent global theories. We consider how empiricists should respond to the possibility of such systems of the world.

In Kvart (1991a), I discussed the analysis of causal relevance presented in A Theory of Counterfactuals (1986) (and first in 1975). I explained there in what respect the notion captured by the analysis of Kvart (1986) is a mere approximation to the requisite notion of causal relevance. In this paper I present another analysis of causal relevance, devoid of the shortcoming of its predecessor.

The present analysis of causal relevance is, again, grounded in a chancelike notion of objective probability. The correlative notion of causal independence is analyzed as holding in case there is a so-called causal impact series, which is defined here. The basic notions used for this analysis are the notion of a differentiator, which upsets an equiprobability case, and that of a blocker, which restores it.

In a series of important papers, A. Fine has developed and defended the view that the proper reading of scientific practice is neither realist nor antirealist. Instead, he argues that realism and antirealism both add something extra to a core position which is neither. In this discussion I reexamine his claim in the light of some criticisms. Fine's position contains an important insight, but to draw that point out requires shifting the way in which Fine poses the argument. I do so by examining an argument by H. Stein.

The distinction between analog and digital representation is reexamined; it emerges that a more fundamental distinction is that between symbolic and analog simulation. Analog simulation is analyzed in terms of a (near) isomorphism of causal structures between a simulating and a simulated process. It is then argued that a core concept, naturalistic analog simulation, may play a role in a bottom-up theory of adaptive behavior which provides an alternative to representational analyses. The appendix discusses some formal conditions for naturalistic analog simulation.

This paper explores a new reason for preferring a model-theoretic approach to understanding the nature of scientific theories. Identifying the models in philosophers' model-theoretic accounts of theories with the concepts in cognitive scientists' accounts of categorization suggests a structure to families of models far richer than has commonly been assumed. Using classical mechanics as an example, it is argued that families of models may be “mapped” as an array with “horizontal” graded structures, multiply hierarchical “vertical” structures, and local “radial” structures. These structures promise important implications for how scientific theories are learned and used in actual scientific practice.

Duhem's and Quine's holistic theses, when properly understood, allow methodologically responsible ways of resolving a conflict between a theoretical system and experience; they only deny the possibility of doing it in an epistemically persuasive way. By developing a “string” model of scientific tests I argue that the pattern of interaction between the elements of a theoretical system arising in response to multiple adverse data can be helpful in locating a “weak spot” in it. Combining this model with antiholistic arguments of Popper, Greenwood, and Lakatos significantly reinforces their joint power.

This paper presents a drastically revised version of the theory of causality, based on analyses of causal processes and causal interactions, advocated in Salmon (1984). Relying heavily on modified versions of proposals by P. Dowe, this article answers penetrating objections by Dowe and P. Kitcher to the earlier theory. It shows how the new theory circumvents a host of difficulties that have been raised in the literature. The result is, I hope, a more satisfactory analysis of physical causality.

The general context of this paper is the locality problem in quantum theory. In a recent issue of this journal, Rédei (1991) offered a proof of the proposition that algebraic Lorentz-covariant quantum field theory is past stochastic Einstein local. We show that Rédei's proof is either spurious or circular, and that it contains two deductive fallacies. Furthermore, we prove that the mentioned theory meets the stronger condition of stochastic Haag locality.

Explanations of the growth of scientific knowledge can be characterized in terms of logical, cognitive, and social schemas. But cognitive and social schemas are complementary rather than competitive, and purely social explanations of scientific change are as inadequate as purely cognitive explanations. For example, cognitive explanations of the chemical revolution must be supplemented by and combined with social explanations, and social explanations of the rise of the mechanical worldview must be supplemented by and combined with cognitive explanations. Rational appraisal of cognitive and social strategies for improving knowledge should appreciate the interdependence of mind and society.

This article examines the best contemporary arguments for a feminist epistemology of scientific knowledge as found in recent works by S. Harding. I argue that no feminist epistemology of science is worthy of the name, because such an epistemology fails to escape well-known vicissitudes of epistemic relativism. But feminist epistemology merits attention from philosophers of science because it is part of a larger relativist turn in the social sciences and humanities that now aims to extend its critique to science, and Harding's “standpoint feminism” is the best-developed case. She attempts to make new use of discredited philosophical ideas concerning underdetermination, Planck's Hypothesis, and the role of counterfactuals in historical studies of science.

Sober (1992) has recently evaluated Brandon's (1982, 1990; see also 1985, 1988) use of Salmon's (1971) concept of screening-off in the philosophy of biology. He critiques three particular issues, each of which will be considered in this discussion.

Owens (1993) argues that a tension exists between our commonsense view of mental states and the scientific view that psychological explanations not contradict supervenience. He suggests that one cannot accept the anti-individualistic conclusions of Twin-Earth thought experiments and continue to use folk psychological states to explain behavior. I argue that his conclusions are based on individuating content widely and causal powers narrowly, and that such individuation violates consistency assumptions about the terms of his discussion. Thus, I argue, the tension he points to evaporates when we adopt either a consistently wide view or a consistently narrow view.