Science has become independent of its possible applications and misapplications to human welfare. In so far as the practical application of his theories has created, and is creating instruments of war more devastating than man has ever known, the scientist might perhaps feel responsible for the fate of our world. However, this pernicious application of science is purely incidental—just as incidental as the beneficial uses to which science can be put. Science and the pursuit of theoretical truth should be unaffected by world events even of the most catastrophic nature. Yet this conviction, however natural we may deem it, is not unchallenged. On the contrary, this war is being waged between two groups of powers, one of which frankly declares science to be solely in the service of the race and the state, while the other group still holds to a science for truth's sake.

The primary purpose of the system of linear notation is to make the logic of the syllogism more convenient to use by eliminating many of the operations required by its traditional forms. Except for its employment of the distinction between symmetric and nonsymmetric relations and the distinction between transitive and nontransitive relations, linear notation introduces no new principles into syllogistic logic. It is new only as a system of notation. As a system of notation it radically simplifies the application of the principles of syllogistic logic to the analysis of arguments.

The use of linear notation enables us to state subject-predicate propositions in such a way that their formal relations with each other are revealed directly without the necessity of performing any of the separate operations required by the traditional methods of syllogistic logic. Very complex arguments, involving any number of related premises, can be stated in such form that all possible conclusions that are obtainable by any combination of syllogistic operations may be read directly from the premises.

For some while now it has been the fashion to write about Cézanne. Numerous exhibitions of his paintings have been held and a flood of criticism in notices and books has poured forth; yet much remains to be seen and said. The reason for this is that his peculiar approach to art was of the kind which continues to excite interest in the medium itself. We get from him not only an esthetic enjoyment but an imagination stimulated to dwell upon the possibilities of painting. No derogation of other painters, whose more conventional mastery of their craft has been responsible for canvases of great truth and beauty, is implied by the impetus given to the study of esthetics by Cézanne. It simply happens that at the turn of the century a high suggestiveness was imparted to painting at Aix.

In a recent article in Philosophy of Science P. C. Jones discusses the relation between idealism and science. He presents in a very clear way the essentials of the causal theory of perception—the theory which lies at the foundation of the scientific method of research, for the scientist who does not believe that we have a direct knowledge of the external world. He summarizes this causal theory as follows: “An incompletely conceived idealism pictures objects in space and time, and admits only that we have no direct knowledge of them—that what we know of them we merely infer from sensory impulses.”

Psychological investigations are supposed to deal with the behavior of animals, including of course, the human being. They are supposed to deal with the broad, general problem of how and why we behave the way we do.

Most psychologists however, are still dealing with their particular science from the strictly biological point of view, and overlooking by and large, the ever gradual development of psychology into a social rather than biological science. Nevertheless, important methodological contributions are being made. These contributions show a progressive awareness of the societal influences to which Psychology is particularly susceptible. The problems dealt with and the way in which they are handled, reflect conditions in the everyday world. Even the experimenter in an ivory laboratory but reflects the current and wholly erroneous viewpoint fostered by interested groups, that science must be impartial and oblivious to human suffering and human welfare.

The problem of synthesis in biology may have reference to the evolutionary origin of living organisms in past time, a process not directly observable but conceivably reconstructible in broad outline: thus to the biochemist this evolution may appear as the evolution of the special biological compounds, to the psychologist as the evolution of “mind”—or at least of types of behavior. Or the problem may refer to the synthesis of the individual animal or plant, a process of construction which typically starts from a detached portion of a parent organism, such as an egg or seed; this is the problem of individual development or ontogeny and is not essentially different from the general problem of growth. But it is clear that the processes of phyletic evolution and of ontogeny must be considered together, since evolutionary history is in reality the history of a succession of individual organisms, each developing from its germ, i.e. of ontogenies; and the ontogenetic process, so faithfully repeated in each individual as it comes into existence, is itself a product of evolution, having originated (apparently by slow and tentative efforts) in the remote past. The succession of individuals has undergone progressive diversification, culminating in the present condition. We may describe our problem, then, as the problem of the factors underlying the synthesis of a highly special process, that by which the diffusely distributed nonliving materials and energies of nature are brought together in a special kind of unification and transformed into a living organism.

In his presidential address on “Symbols, Signs, and Signals,” given before the Association for Symbolic Logic, December 28, 1938, Professor C. J. Ducasse made and important distinction between what he there called the indicative and the quiddative symbol. He remarked in passing that he thought it possible to show that: 1) “The same entity may function both as indicative and as quiddative symbol: or one part of a complex symbol may be quiddative and another indicative”; and 2) “the difference between the two roles is irreducible: the indicative is not a species of the quiddative nor vice versa.” An indicative symbol is defined as “one of which the distinctive property is to orient our attention to some place in an order system …”; and a quiddative symbol as “one of which the distinctive property is to make us conceive a certain kind of thing—a certain ‘what'—no matter where in any order system it may or may not be existing.”

This paper does not purport to present a fully developed argument. Rather, it intends to delineate, in broad strokes and in a synoptic manner, the total frame of reference of Scientific Empiricism as far as it is necessary for an integration of the several contributory clarifications of the complex, usually referred to as the psychophysical problem. Several considerations seem to justify such an attempt. It is desirable, from time to time, to free the results of logical and methodological analysis from their specialized contexts. Only thus can they be presented in a way which brings to the fore their continuity with more traditionally worded epistemological thought. By doing this such a presentation should also help to dissolve the current objections of formalism, scientism, and philosophical irrelevance so frequently based on misunderstanding. It is only fair to admit, however, that these misunderstandings have been facilitated by the preoccupation with the technical, and the brevity with regard to the nontechnical, which characterize the modern analysts.

The world is beginning to look askance at Science. Or, rather, not beginning but intensifying an attitude of suspicion if not of downright hostility. We scientists are, of course, partly to blame; for we have so loudly proclaimed our virtues as the creators of radios and airplanes that, now these instruments are being abused as agents of mass propaganda and mass destruction, we are the obvious targets for the rising wrath of men. This is serious, for science is inseparably a part of the society and culture in which it is embedded, and it does not suffice to deny impatiently ourguilt and shrug away our responsibility to our fellows.

The present paper purports partly to reexamine and partly to summarize several points which occupied and still occupy a central position in more recent discussions among empiricist philosophers. As such discussions are essentially attempts at the clarification of terms, it might also be said that this essay intends to contribute to the analysis of certain very general and highly ambiguous expressions. The words in question are, first and mainly, ‘hypothetical’ and, more incidentally or by the way of exposition, ‘atomic', ‘elementaristic', and ‘extensional.’ In general, it is an attempt to show the impact of some of the ideas developed in the work of Carnap; within a prevailingly logical frame of reference in The Logical Syntax of Language and, in a more epistemological setting, in Testability and Meaning. In particular, it wants to eliminate some ambiguities which could arise from an oversimplified reading of certain passages in TM, as for instance: “If by verification is meant definitive and final establishment of truth, then no (synthetic) sentence is ever verifiable” (p. 420). If this passage is understood to assert that every synthetic sentence is hypothetical, then it is either false or several meanings of ‘hypothetical’ are to be distinguished. This distinction, implicit in TM, will upon closer examination prove to be related to the fundamental distinction between statements within and statements about a linguistic structure.

Certain traditional philosophic contradictions, pertaining to a postulated duality between mind and body, which at the same time is used to explain their functional unity, have been translated in contemporary thought into terms of certain contradictions, pertaining to a postulated duality between psychological worlds and the physical world, which at the same time is used to explain how one or the other somehow constitutes its contrary. Nevertheless, however unsuccessful hitherto, the more modern formulation of these connections at least provides a field within which progressive logical operations towards a non-contradictory synthesis are possible. Recently such an approach was developed in J. T. Culbertson's article, “A Physical Theory of Sensation”, which appeared in the technical scientific section of this Journal, vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 197-226. The present discussion concerns some of the problems suggested by that theory, which was so stated that it could very easily be converted into a statement concerning the structure of relations between any given psychological world and the physical world.