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Volume 58 - September 1991

Contents

Page 3 of 4

Book Review

Discussion

  • Goldstick and O'Neill on “Truer Than”

  • Ilkka Niiniluoto
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 April 2022, pp. 491-495

  • In a recent article, Goldstick and O'Neill propose a definition for the comparative “truer than” relation between rival propositions. This definition is studied here in a context where the concept of “convexity” is well defined for propositions. It turns out that the Goldstick-O'Neill definition gives a reasonable but very restricted sufficient condition for the “truer than” relation, but fails as a necessary condition.

Book Reviews

Other

Discussion

  • The Neurobiology of Observation

  • Daniel Gilman
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 April 2022, pp. 496-502

  • Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue that his neurological evidence is inadequate to his philosophical goals, both by itself and taken in concert with his psychological evidence.

Book Reviews

Correction

  • Correction

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 April 2022, p. 502
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Front matter

  • PSA volume 58 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 April 2022, pp. f1-f3
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Other

Book Reviews

Front matter

  • PSA volume 58 issue 4 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 April 2022, pp. f1-f6
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Back matter

  • PSA volume 58 issue 4 Cover and Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 April 2022, pp. b1-b5
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Book Reviews

Other

Book Reviews

Front matter

  • PSA volume 58 issue 1 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 April 2022, pp. f1-f5
    • Article
      • You have access
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Page 3 of 4