¹ Zippel's account is the only attempt to treat the subject as a whole; but, though still indispensable, it is now in many respects out of date.

² Rome, passim.

³ Our main sources are Polybius (II 2–12), Dio (fr. 49) and Zonaras (VIII 19), and Appian (Ill. 7). For discussions of them, v. especially Zippel, pp. 46 f., Holleaux, Rome, p. 98, n. 2; Vulić, pp. 23; f.; Fluss, cc. 1140 f. Zippel was inclined to prefer Dio to Polybius, and this unfortunately influenced De Sanctis (iii 1, pp. 295 f.). Holleaux gives reasons for rejecting Dio and following Polybius. Appian, though his source seems to have been well informed on the Illyrian side, is full of annalistic inventions and has added his own confusions. Vulić's attempt to trace Appian and Dio to one common source is unconvincing. Dio derives from an annalistic account plus Polybius (or an account based on his); Appian may be ultimately based on the former. The importance of the war was recognised by Polybius (II 2, 2: .

⁴ For the family tree of the royal house, as far as we can trace it, v. Lenschau, cc. 237–8.

⁵ Polybius ignores Pinnes, probably because he can never have framed policy. The information comes from Dio and Appian and is confirmed by Livy (cf. n. 76).

⁶ Polybius (II 4–15) describes all this as a series of accidents, making the Illyrians intent only on plunder. He often refuses to credit these barbarians with any ability for planning or using reason, where we can see from his facts that his judgment is mistaken (cf. nn. 18 and 53 below), and modern scholars have often been misled by this (e.g. Holleaux, , CAH vii p. 830Google Scholar; Fluss, c. 1145). In this case, the despatch of Scerdilaidas and the co-ordination between the two forces, as well as the treaty finally made, show the seriousness of the plan.

⁷ For Atintania, v. Holleaux, Rome, p. 110, n. 1 (with summary of earlier views and conclusive argumentation).

⁸ Holleaux, Rome, pp. 98 f., with references to earlier views; also CAH vii, pp. 831 f. Cf. Pol. II 8, 12.

⁹ E.g. by Carcopino, pp. 50 f. Cf. also Walek's debate with Holleaux in Rev. Phil. 1925–6.

¹⁰ Pol. I 83, 7 (Mercenary War in Africa). For a similar view of this case, v. Walek, pp. 32 f. (not refuted by Holleaux). Holleaux's insistence, against the ‘imperialist’ theory, on the fact that ‘l'occasion de châtier les Illyriens s'offrait depuis longtemps et chaque jour aux Romains’ (Rome, p. 98, n. 3) only throws into greater relief the weakness of his own explanation for the sudden change in attitude.

¹¹ Holleaux again echoes Polybius' judgments instead of using his facts. Thus he describes Teuta's reply as ‘d'une insolence calculée, qui rend vaine toute négotiation’ and states that after Coruncanius' speech ‘son orgueil de femme s'exaspere’ (Rome, pp. 100–1). This phrase comes almost straight out of Polybius, and much Illyrian (and some Hellenistic) history has been obscured by such reflection of his prejudices.

¹² We cannot regard this as based merely on an apologia for the Senate, as we know that by the time the fleet got under weigh (the army was even later) the next campaigning season was well advanced. (V. below.)

¹³ Pol. II 8, 3. In view of their position Holleaux's insistence that ‘les paroles prononcées par le légat [Pol. II 8, 10–1] gardent un caractère privé’ (Rome, p. 101, n. 1) is pointless.

¹⁴ Rome, p. 99.

¹⁵ Pol. II 6, 7–8; cf. 12, 6.

¹⁶ Pol. II 11, 1 and 7; Rome, p. 102, n. 3. To the Romans Macedon was a distant kingdom (cf. Fine, , ‘The Problem of Macedonian Holdings…’, Trans. Am. Phil. Ass. lxiii, 1932, pp. 126 f.Google Scholar), causing no concern. The Illyrian peril, however, seems throughout Greece to have assumed the proportions of the earlier Gallic peril: Polybius calls it; and the Romans cannot have been ignorant of this feeling, which was probably even shared by their Italian informants.

¹⁷ For the chronology, v. Holleaux, in REG xliii, 1930, pp. 243 f.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; though it is probably better to put the death of Demetrius a little later than he would do, and there is no need to think that it had anything to do with the Achaeo-Aetolian decision to send a force to Corcyra (rightly Vulić, pp. 232 f.).

¹⁸ The story is told graphically, but without any understanding for the Illyrian plan, in Pol. II 9–10. To what extent the Polybian view has imposed itself upon modern scholars is shown by Holleaux's account (Rome, p. 101; CAH vii, p. 833), according to which the Illyrian operations of 229 are ‘une expédition de piraterie plus ample et plus hardie que les précédentes’ and are used as evidence that Teuta did not believe in a Roman invasion! For a more reasonable (but still over-complicated) view, v. Treves, 1934, p. 391. We cannot easily conceive of a plan that would have given Teuta as good a chance of fore stalling the Roman invasion as the one she adopted might have done.

¹⁹ Treves (1934, pp. 389–90) believes that Demetrius had first contacted the Coruncanii at Issa, since Polybius describes him, at the time of his final treason, as (II 11, 4). But such a view is contrary to what Polybius actually says, since he makes the διαβολαί the cause and not the effect of Demetrius' contacting the Romans. It is much more probable that Demetrius (perhaps with the help of Pinnes' mother) was even at that time intriguing for the guardianship of die boy king, which he later obtained (cf. below).

²⁰ Pol. II 11–2. On the topography, v. map; cf. Zippel, pp. 50 f.; Holleaux, , CAH vii, p. 836Google Scholar and map 14 (facing p. 825). On the Parthini, v. Polaschek in R-E, s.v. The Roman forces did not penetrate inland. On the questions of which consul returned to Italy in 229 and why only-Fulvius triumphed (Inscr. It. xiii 1, pp. 78–9 and 549–50) certainty cannot be attained. The tale that Issa surrendered to the Romans and that this was the cause, or one of the causes, of the war is unfortunately accepted by De Sanctis (like so much that comes from Dio), but Holleaux has shown that it may be dismissed (Rome, p. 23, n. 6). That Issa received a foedus aequum is a pointless conjecture based on this and meant to explain the omission of the city in Philip's treaty with Hannibal; as Holleaux points out (Rome, p. 106, n. 3), it fails to do so and ought never to have been considered.

²¹ This was pointed out by Beloch (Griech. Gesch. iv ²1, p. 666, n. 1Google Scholar); but the instalment payable in 217 is probably not part of this indemnity, but belongs to a new one imposed in 219: the Romans by this time never bore the cost of their victorious wars.

²² This ‘protectorate’ is described as ‘about 120 miles in length and from 20 to 40 miles in width’ (Walbank, p. 12); cf. Zippel, pp. 53 f.; Holleaux, Rome, pp. 105 f. and CAH vii, p. 836 and map 14; Treves, 1934, p. 392; and others.

²³ p. 51. It is, for a Greek, the region ‘inside Illyria proper’.

²⁴ II 11, 11: .

²⁵ CAH vii, p. 836 and map 14; cf. also map by Fluss.

²⁶ The townships of the Ardiaeans north of Epidamnus taken by the Romans (v. n. 23 and text) may have been assigned to the Parthini or to Demetrius' personal δυναστεία and thus remained within the protectorate. On Oricum, v. Appendix.

²⁷ Thus Zippel, pp. 53 f.; De Sanctis iii 1, p. 302; Holleaux, Rome, p. 105 and CAH vii, p. 836; and others.

²⁸ For the terms, v. Täubler, p. 77, where the conclusion is stated as a matter of fact.

²⁹ Ill. 8.

³⁰ iii 1, p. 302 and n. 98.

³¹ Rome, p. 105; CAH vii, p. 835. There is no evidence on the subject, and it hardly matters.

³² Dio. fr. 53. His control over the kingdom is shown by events.

³³ V. Fluss, cc. 1140–1.

³⁴ Zippel (p. 55) believes that the Romans divided the regency between Teuta and Demetrius without destroying the unity of the kingdom; but this far-fetched hypothesis, far from combining our sources, is contrary to all of them. None of our sources says that Teuta continued to rule the Illyrian kingdom after the peace, while Dio states (and Polybius implies) that she did not.

³⁵ Holleaux, Rome, p. 109. None of the various attempts to find formal marks of Roman domination has been convincing. On the ἂρχων ὁ ἐν Κερκύρᾳ (Pol. XXI 32, 6), v. Zippel, p. 94. Even if he is a Roman, he is only a wartime commander. On the Corcyraean coins with the legend ROMA (Grueber ii, pp. 196–7) no final conclusion has been reached; but the magistrate's initials show that they are coins struck by Corcyra on behalf (i.e. probably at the request) of Rome, and not coins struck by Rome at the Corcyraean mint. They were probably struck to pay Roman troops in the East.—On the victoriate coinage, v. Mattingly, H., ‘The first age of Roman coinage’, JRS xxxv, 1945, p. 71Google Scholar; Milne, J. G., ‘The problem of early Roman coinage’, JRS xxxvi, 1946, p. 91Google Scholar and note 1. The victoriate was not an official Roman coin, and there seems to be no good reason for doubting Pliny's statement that it was first struck in Illyria and thence introduced to Italy (H.N. XXXIII 3, 46). (Was the victory that over Teuta? Thus Grueber in vol. i, p. xlix.)

³⁶ Holleaux, , CAH vii, p. 836Google Scholar; cf. Rome, p. 106, n. 3 (with references to earlier views).

³⁷ Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der röm. Aussenpolitik in rep. Zeit (Klio, Beih. 31, 1933)Google Scholar.

³⁸ Thus Zippel, p. 89. Libertas is attested for Corcyra by App. Ill. 8; Strabo VII, fr. 8 (which must belong in this context); Pliny, H.N. IV 12, 52Google Scholar; for Apollonia by App. Ill. 8. That Issa had no treaty is made all but certain byLivy XLV 26, 13.

³⁹ The subject cannot be developed here, but a few indications may be given. Cic. 2 Verr. III 13 gives the list of ciuitates liberae in Sicily in his day; their status, as we see from the Verrines, had deteriorated considerably. Segesta, about which we know most (though the case of Centuripa seems to have been similar), was always treated with special consideration on account of her cognatio with Rome, and it seems that she never revolted (ibid. V 83 and 125). There is no reason to think that her status was originally considered inferior to that of the Mamertine foederati (on which v. Cic. 2 Verr. V 50 f.), or that she could not have had the burden of a treaty with formal commitments if she had preferred it. It can be shown that even in the second century friendship without a treaty was considered by the Greeks a status much preferable to a treaty not on equal terms.

⁴⁰ This is the inference from Polybius' account (v. n. 24 above and text). Cf. Appendix.

⁴¹ Cf. Holleaux, , CAH vii, p. 837Google Scholar.

⁴² For the extra-legal nature of clientela, v. Kaser, M., ‘Gesch. d. Patronatsgewalt über Freigelassene’, Zeitschr. d. Savigny-St., Röm. Abt., lviii, 1938, pp. 88 f.Google Scholar; for the social and political importance of the concept, Gelzer, M., Die Nobilität d. röm. Republik, Leipzig, 1912Google Scholar. Sherwin-White rightly protests against Täubler's misuse of the term clientela for a treaty relationship (p. 162); its elusiveness to legal analysis is of its essence in the foreign as in the domestic sphere.

⁴³ This is worth stressing because (as a consequence of the general lack of interest in Illyria) it is often forgotten, with the result that the development of Roman foreign policy is misunderstood. Thus, e.g., Sherwin-White writes (p. 150): ‘The practice of declaring a community to be “free” … is one that Rome first learned from the Greeks’; and he describes the settlement of Greece as ‘her first experiment’. Täubler (p. 436), followed by many other historians, derives Flamininus' policy from that of Artaxerxes and Polyperchon.

⁴⁴ That this act of courtesy had no important consequences is shown by Holleaux (Rome, pp. 113 f.). Yet it was Rome's first diplomatic contact with the Greeks (Pol. II 12, 4–8).—The failure to send envoys to Pella should not be made a sign of anti-Macedonian scheming (rightly Holleaux, l.c.): it would have been odd to send an embassy to announce to the King of Macedon that the scourge of Greece, his Illyrian ally, had been defeated, and it could only have been regarded as a public announcement of hostility. In the circumstances it is the absence of any interest in Macedon that shows Rome's peaceful intentions. If even the outline of our analysis is accepted, it should be clear that at no stage of the war did Rome show any fear of, hostility towards, or indeed interest in, Macedon; and the final step confirms this view.

⁴⁵ Holleaux, , CAH vii, p. 837Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ The sources are again Polybius (III 16, 18–9), Appian (Ill. 8) and Dio (fr. 53) — Zonaras (VIII 20 fin.). Polybius' is the only account of any value, though again there seems to be a good source somewhere at the back of Appian. Polybius, as we shall see, is not as good as on the First Illyrian War; his source is generally thought to be Fabius (and indeed, no one else can plausibly be suggested), who gave the official Roman version as shaped by later events; while Polybius' own bias against Demetrius made him unable to show any critical spirit.

⁴⁷ We cannot know much about conditions inside Illyria, but it is reasonable to suppose that the power of the King, who was only one dynast among many (cf. Pol. XXI 21, 3), had been seriously weakened by the events of 229–8. Though Demetrius was the King's guardian, strong dynasts (e.g. Scerdilaidas) were his equals and had to be conciliated; this was no doubt the price of their remaining quiet and allowing Demetrius to strengthen the hold of the central authority in the South, which he must have done before devoting his attention to the Parthini and Atintanes (v. below). These two tribes will have occupied his attention for some time, as the coup d'état of 219 presupposes long preparation (v. below).—Scerdilaidas in a similar position found the dynasts formidable (Pol. V 4, 3; cf. n. 79 below).

⁴⁸ Holleaux, Rome, pp. 131–2, puts this as early as 225, basing his view on Pol. III 16, 2. Cf. below.

⁴⁹ On Doson's fear of Rome, v. Holleaux, Rome, pp. 119 f. and CAH vii, pp. 839 f., and (with considerable exaggeration) Treves' paper in Athenaeum.

⁵⁰ Pol. II 65, 4; 66, 5 f.; cf. Tarn's evaluation, pp. 760–2. For the date of Sellasia we accept 222 (v. Tarn, pp. 863–4, and—using new evidence—Treves, 1935, pp. 54 f., and Walbank, p. 296, n. 5).

⁵¹ III 16.

⁵² The perfects seem decisive for the chronology. (Contra Holleaux, Rome, p. 134, n. 4.)

⁵³ Rome, p. 133 f. He has to turn Demetrius practically into a madman (p. 135).

⁵⁴ Holleaux, Rome, p. 132.

⁵⁵ Holleaux's desperate attempts to motivate Demetrius' actions are well illustrated by the following (CAH vii, p. 849): ‘If, as is probable, the Pharian received prompt advices regarding the news from Spain, he must have drawn favourable auguries from it.’

⁵⁶ The exact date of his accession is doubtful, but it was almost certainly some time during 221. On its effects v. Pol. IV 3, 2 f.; 5, 3; 22, 5. By autumn 220, at the latest, the Social War had begun. (V. Pol. IV 13,6, and cf. Walbank, p. 32.) Yet this is just the time when Demetrius is said to have made Roman action inevitable by attacking the Roman protectorate. That Demetrius did not receive any encouragement from Philip is shown by Fine (‘Macedon’).

⁵⁷ Thus Holleaux, Rome, pp. 134 f.; De Sanctis iii 1, p. 324.

⁵⁸ Livy (Per. 20) and the Livian tradition. Appian (Ill. 8) accuses Demetrius of instigating this war—a further development of annalistic apologia. Holleaux (p. 134, n. 1) recognises the effect such an expedition must have had in ‘recalling Demetrius to prudence’ (i.e. making him aware of Roman power and interest) and for that reason alone rejects the campaign as apocryphal. But a Histrian campaign was a natural consequence of the Cisalpine campaigns (as we see in the second century) and we have no reason for rejecting its authenticity—it is Holleaux's premiss (Demetrius' rebellion) that must go.

⁵⁹ Pol. IV 16, 6 f. Note τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τῇ Πύλῳ προσμίξαντες (s. 7).

⁶⁰ Modern historians tend without question to quote the Polybian passages as conclusive; e.g. Zippel p. 54; Holleaux, Rome, p. 105, n. 3.

⁶¹ II 12, 3.

⁶² Pol. IV 16, 6 f. Note that in III 16 (the version from Roman sources) all mention of Scerdilaidas is omitted.

⁶³ Dio, fr. 53 = Zon. VIII 20, fin.

⁶⁴ Dio, l.c.

⁶⁵ Pol. III 18, 1.

⁶⁶ V. App. Ill. 8 for the latter, and cf. p. 79 above. There is no mention of ‘attacks’ on the Greek cities.

⁶⁷ He describes him as (III 16, 2) gives it as the Romans' intention to secure their position (ibid., s. 4).

⁶⁸ Pol. III 16, 4. Cf. Holleaux, Rome, p. 136.

⁶⁹ Holleaux, Rome, p. 136, paints a vivid picture of Roman fears, which must not be uncritically accepted.

⁷⁰ This is shown by Polybius' wording (III 18, 1): .

⁷¹ Nutria (Pol. II 11, 13).

⁷² On the situation of this town, v. Zippel, p. 56; Holleaux, Rome, p. 135, n. 1. Holleaux is probably right in placing it inland, but wrong in putting it ‘dans le pays des Parthini’: though associated with them in our sources, it is named alongside of them (v. especially Pol. VII 9, 13) and was probably just outside the tribal territory. Further than this we cannot go. We do not know when Dimale came into Demetrius' power: he may have held it ever since 229–8; he may have brought it under his control at any time after; or he may have seized it as a strong place—it was reputed impregnable (Pol. III 18, 3)—to hold against the Roman attack. There is no evidence to enable us to decide.

⁷³ Pol. III 18, 1. The cities, as we have tried to argue, must be those not yet under his control, and they were probably those of the Parthini : the Illyrians did not usually dwell in πόλεις (v. Zippel, pp. 86 f., for the sources), but the Parthini are known to have had ‘urbes’ (Livy XLIII 23, 6).

⁷⁴ Polybius consistently omits Livius, but Zonaras mentions him; and the story about his condemnation after the war is so well attested that it must be accepted (v. Münzer, cc. 892 f.). In the circumstances we cannot discover what action is to be attributed to each of them and whether Livius also triumphed. Why Polybius ignores him is a difficult question; but we have seen that on this war he is not a very good source. Münzer thinks he has done it on purpose in order to flatter the Aemilii Paulli. But, though Polybius is not above some ‘interpreting’ for such a purpose (cf. his treatment of the great L. Paullus' massacre in Epirus—Livy XLV 34; Plut. Paull. 29—which has even misled moderns into attributing the responsibility to the hero's political opponents), we should not lightly accuse him of deliberate falsification of facts. The latter may well be due to his source Fabius, as the Fabii were hostile to Livius (cf. Münzer, c. 895).

⁷⁵ Polybius' account is rather sketchy: the Atintanes are not mentioned, but (with the Parthini again friends of Rome) they no doubt returned to their previous status; the Greek cities, it seems, were never deemed to have revolted. For the extent of the protectorate after 219, v. (not quite accurately) Pol. VII 9, 13. Polybius' phrase (III 19, 12) probably means that the Romans had the Illyrian king at their mercy.—De Sanctis (iii 1, p. 325, n. 150) rejects Polybius' statement that Pharus was razed. But as it was apparently taken by assault, there is no reason why it should not have been. It was probably resettled after, For Demetrius' , V. Pol. VII 9, 14 (Philip's treaty with Hannibal).

⁷⁶ App. Ill. 8, fin. Cf. Livy XXII 33, 5. The Parthini and Atintanes no doubt could not pay much and there was no one else from whom the cost of the war could be collected.

⁷⁷ Pol. IV 29, 2 f. For the chronology, v. Holleaux, Rome, p. 142, n. 3. That Philip had no hostile intentions towards Rome is shown by Fine (‘Macedon’); but those who make Roman fear of Macedon the main motive for the war cannot regard the Romans as believing this.

⁷⁸ Cf. Walbank, p. 42. ‘The first round had gone to Aetolia’, as Tarn puts it (p. 766). This was by the autumn of 219, just when the Roman army was returning home (Pol. III 19, 12).

⁷⁹ On Scerdilaidas, v. Fiehn. Zippel (p. 59) thinks that the Romans made him guardian of Pinnes! This is rightly rejected by De Sanctis (iii 1, p. 325, n. 152). After 217 (v. n. 76 and text above) Scerdilaidas appears as king. He had probably seized the guardianship after Demetrius' flight, and this was perhaps responsible for the (Pol. V 4, 3), which prevented him from sending more than fifteen lembi to assist Philip before Cephallenia in 218 (wrongly put in 217 by Fiehn, c. 978). We do not know where Scerdi-laidas' δυναοτεία was, but it may have been round Scodra (cf. De Sanctis iii 1, p. 322) and Lissus. Scodra, which is not mentioned before, later appears as Genthius' capital (e.g. Livy XLIV 31, 2), while Lissus, which in spite of its strategic importance we do not find connected with either Teuta or Demetrius, is also mentioned as a residence of Genthius (Pol. XXVIII 8, 4; Livy XLIV 30, 6; cf. May, pp. 53 f., for the parallel histories of the two cities). Neither city surrendered to Rome in time to receive favourable treatment (cf. Livy XLV 26, 13 f.). If these two cities were indeed the hereditary δυναστεία of the line of Scerdilaidas, this also furnishes an additional motive for Philip's attack on Lissus (Pol. VIII 13–4; v. p. 90 below).

⁸⁰ Thus Holleaux (Rome, pp. 139 f.; CAH vii, pp. 851 f.) is inclined to blame the Romans for failing to carry out their purpose properly. On his (and Polybius') premisses their action is indeed absurd.

⁸¹ Note that in Philip's alliance with Hannibal the Romans are called κύριοι of the places and tribes concerned (Pol. VII 9, 13).

⁸² Livy XXII 33, 5.

⁸³ Pol. V 4, 3. This is duly stigmatised by Holleaux as another flagrant breach of the treaty of 228 (CAH vii, pp. 851–2), and as it comes so soon after the Roman campaign against Demetrius, he is at a loss to explain it. Surely it shows that neither the Romans nor Scerdilaidas (nor, probably, Philip, who at the time was not yet planning to attack Rome) considered the dynast's action a breach of the treaty—any more than his joint operation with Demetrius had been.

⁸⁴ Scerdilaidas' contingent is not mentioned after the attack on Cephallenia, which had to be abandoned (Pol. V 4, 13).

⁸⁵ Pol. V 95, 1 f.; 101, 1 f.; 108, 1 f. His alliance with Philip had been brought about by the Aetolians' failure to pay him (Pol. IV 29, 5 f.).

⁸⁶ E.g. Holleaux, Rome, pp. 165 f.; CAH vii, pp. 854 f.; doubtfully De Sanctis iii 2, p. 398; Walbank, p. 68. Holleaux's chief argument is the statement that Scerdi-laidas would not have undertaken military action in the vicinity of the Roman protectorate without Roman permission!

⁸⁷ Pol. V 101, 6 f. Cf. Walbank, pp. 64 f.

⁸⁸ Pol. V 108, 8—not a satisfactory account. Cf. Zippel, pp. 60 f.; De Sanctis iii 2, pp. 405 f.; Holleaux, Rome pp. 167 f.; CAH vii, p. 855; Walbank, pp. 68 f.

⁸⁹ On these events, v. Pol. V 109–10. Cf. Holleaux, Rome, pp. 175 f.; CAH viii, pp. 117 f.; Walbank, pp.69 f.—both perhaps too prone to accept Polybius' account, especially of Philip's intentions. It is unlikely that he hoped to occupy the whole Illyrian coast and cross to Italy, at a time when he was not yet the ally of Carthage.—That the Roman squadron ever entered Apollonia (thus Holleaux, Rome, p. 179) is unlikely; it probably remained at Brundisium or even Tarentum and was the kernel of Laevinus' force (cf. below).

⁹⁰ Livy XXIII 32, 17; 38, 7 f. There is no reason to reject the substance of this annalistic account, though the wording (as so often) is probably that of Livy or an annalist. (E.g. ‘primo quoque tempore in Macedoniam transmitteret’ is belied by the facts.) Owing to a slip by Livy or a copyist the number of ships cannot be determined.

⁹¹ Livy XXIV 20, 9 f.; 40. It is generally asserted (e.g. Holleaux, Rome, p. 189, n. 1; Walbank, p. 75, n. 4) that Philip's move is subsequent to Hannibal's. There is no authority for this in Livy (who says ‘eadem aestate’ and implies late summer for both); Philip's action, reasonable on the obvious hypothesis of concerted action with his ally against a very weak point of the Roman defensive system, is without this hypothesis turned into an act of reckless gambling. (Thus, e.g., Walbank, p. 77. Walbank, who admits the principle of concerted action, is misled by his chronology into failing to see its application.)

⁹² Livy, ll.cc. (last note). It is likely that Laevinus only heard of the attack on Apollonia after crossing to Oricum.

⁹³ V. Holleaux, Rome, p. 193, n. 2.

⁹⁴ Pol. VIII 13–14b (Lissus, Dassaretae, ‘Hyscana’— i.e. Uscana, north of Lake Lychnidus); Livy XXIX 12, 3 and 13 (Dimale, Parthini, Atintanes—for the latter, cf. XXVII 30, 13). The ‘Ardiaeans’ (Livy XXVII 30, 13) are those north of Epidamnus (cf. Pol. II 11, 10; 12, 2). Zippel's view that Philip penetrated beyond the Naro is untenable and has found little support: we do not even know whether he took Scodra (cf. May, pp. 49 f.). On Lissus, v. n. 79 above.

⁹⁵ Cf. Walbank, pp. 81 f., rightly refusing to believe that Philip was hoping to invade Italy.

⁹⁶ For the Aetolian treaty, v. Livy XXVI 24 f. The war is discussed in all the standard works.

⁹⁷ Livy XXIX 12.

⁹⁸ Livy, l.c. (Cf. XXVI 24, 9, where ‘Thracum’ can hardly be right.) Cf. May, pp. 49 f. On Pleuratus, v. Lenschau, c. 237.

⁹⁹ This is shown by Holleaux, Rome, pp. 284 f., and CAH viii, pp. 136 f., although not all his arguments are sound.

¹⁰⁰ The most recent discussion is Petzold's; cf. also McDonald and Walbank, ‘The origins of the Second Macedonian War’ (JRS xxvii, 1937, pp. 280 f.Google Scholar), with references to earlier views.

¹⁰¹ Livy XXX 26, 2 f. and 42, 2 f., gives the annalistic account. Cf. Petzold's study (which must be used with caution). We shall confine our attention to what concerns Illyria.

¹⁰² XVIII 1, 14: Flamininus in 197 demands of Philip ; which Livy (XXXII 33, 3) translates: ‘restituenda … loca quae post pacem in Epiro factam occupasset’. This was challenged by Zippel, mainly on the grounds that Philip could not have occupied Roman territory (‘römisches Gebiet’) without its being explicitly mentioned in our sources (pp. 73 f.); and he suggested that Polybius means ‘the territories … he had acquired after and in accordance with [‘nach … und gemass’] the Peace …’ (e.g. Atintania). This suggestion has been generally followed (e.g. Holleaux, Rome, p. 278, n. 1; Walbank, p. 103, n. 4; but not De Sanctis iii 2, p. 435, n. 2—unfortunately without discussion). Yet not only is it doubtful whether the Greek as cited can mean this: if we look at the context, it is at once clear that Zippel's interpretation cannot stand. Polybius (l.c.) continues: . The parallelism, already sufficiently obvious, is stressed by όμοίως and as veri cannot mean anything but ‘after ( = since) the death of…’, must mean ‘after ( = since) the peace…’. There was no ‘römisches Gebiet’ in Illyria.

¹⁰³ Cf. Petzold, passim. The account (Livy, Il. cc., n. 101) is sometimes rejected (e.g. Holleaux, Rome, p. 278, n. 1). But the names of the envoys are those of historical persons and (though in the state of our knowledge this is not decisive) nothing we know about those persons makes their participation in this mission impossible. Nor is Cotta, who is the hero of the story, the sort of figure around which legends are spun. The mission is accepted in the relevant biographies in R-E (s.vv. Aurelius 103, Mamilius 5, Terentius 83); Broughton, (Magistrates of the Roman Republic i, pp. 313 and 315Google Scholar) is inclined to accept it as based on archival material. It is worth noting that ‘ne socii … ad regem deficerent’ (Livy XXX 42, 5), besides giving us valuable information on Philip's methods, is a naïve admission of Roman motives quite unlike the tendentiousness of annalistic fiction, in which Rome appears as the unselfish champion of the wronged.

¹⁰⁴ Pol. XVIII 47, 12. Zippel's attempt to query this (pp. 77 f.) is unconvincing.