When we met last year, the situation in the Soviet Union, although fluid, was still hopeful. One year later, things seem to have become immeasurably worse. Some will, perhaps, dispute this assessment and argue that the situation is even more hopeful than it was in the past. Such arguments remind me of socialists who think that now is the time to build socialism in Eastern Europe. Clearly, the situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan is out of control. I need not remind you of the Lithuanian “events,” to use that memorable Soviet term, the miners' strikes in mid-1989, and last, but not least, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, which is the decisive event of that year and, perhaps, of the second half of the twentieth century. Communism's demise obviously casts a totally different light on the nationality question in general and on the dynamics of the Soviet empire in particular.

The big news is no news. I mean the new constitution that, presumably, is going to define the official relationship between the federal structure and the republic structure. It is being drafted by a constitutional drafting committee consisting of some very distinguished persons. But so far they have not been able to produce a draft, at least not a draft that has been published for the rest of the world to see. They probably have one in their own office.

On the economic scene, 1990 has brought several new developments. There is a new law regulating center-periphery economic relations published on April 10, 1990. Unfortunately, it does not fit well with the notion of a loose confederation in the Soviet Union. Thus, there will be some interesting questions regarding the fit between the new union treaty and this new law on center-republic economic relations.

It was more than evident last year that the ideology of the Brezhnev period—that coherent world view, that set of concepts that structured Soviet reality—was on its last legs. Significantly, that particular ideology is now quite dead. It is no longer on its last legs; it is no longer dying; it has been eliminated from political discourse within the Soviet Union. One may go so far as to say that Marxism-Leninism is virtually absent from Soviet discourse as well. One example is this year's May Day slogans. They could have been found at any peace demonstration in the United States. They have nothing to do with that which we knew as communism in the Soviet Union.

The human rights situation has continued to improve as glasnost matures and as Gorbachev's plan to establish a law-based society unfolds. The loosening of restraints, which has been linked to the process of democratization, has had a dramatic impact on human rights. At the same time, the nature of the human rights issue in the Soviet Union has shifted from what it was even last year. Large-scale demonstrations are now mundane events, as is the right to speak one's thoughts freely or to go to church. What has changed is that the process of enforcing or guaranteeing rights is now being generated from below, whereas in the beginning this process started from above. The reform process now has a life of its own among the people, who are demanding all sorts of things.

My topic is foreign relations. I would like to look at the implications of the nationality problem for Moscow, for some of the union republics, for the United States, and for other Western countries. It is always difficult to draw a line between foreign policy and domestic policy, but, when one considers the implications of the nationality problem for foreign policy, it becomes especially hard to pull them apart.

These have been very stimulating presentations. The conclusion we can draw from all of them is somewhat bleak—that the Soviet system is in something of a life-threatening crisis. A major part of the problem is economic. Indeed, each of the presentations provides evidence for the view that there are important economic aspects to the problems addressed by the speakers.

It is an established tradition of this conference to exchange views on subjects related to political, economic, and other developments in the Soviet Union, and I very much welcome the invitation extended to us to take part in the discussion. I really appreciate this opportunity to listen to your views and to be able to share our opinions. What is the sacrosanct formula American diplomats usually use?—“My views do not necessarily reflect those of my government.”

First of all, is it true that the issue Professor Salitan talked about—that of indigenous rights of self-determination versus individual rights (sometimes called indigenous versus human rights, but I think this is a mistake in terminology)—is being exploited by centrists against the movements for independence?

With regard to the two legal approaches, I would say that such an awareness exists. There used to be a fundamental difference in approaches because everything that was not allowed was forbidden. The evolution of current legislation leads us to the second model. For instance, the new economic laws are based on the other concept: everything that is not expressly prohibited is permitted.

I would like to discuss the subject of the ethnic dimension of cadre policies. The basis of cadre policy came from Stalin, and the Stalinist approach to cadres remains basically unchanged. True, this approach may not be working in some areas of the Soviet Union today; still, the basic approach has never been changed.

Last year's conference ended with a general sense that national minority movements, still somewhat embryonic at the time, were seizing the initiative. This session opens with the consensus that these embryonic movements are far more mature, have aggressively taken center stage, and, in various degrees, have mounted a direct challenge to the center.

Last year I was accused of being a kazennyi optimist for having reflected the view of the administrations of various academic institutes in the Soviet Union. Today, I am happy to start with the words of my Viennese grandmother, “Ich sehe schwarz.” But as I am sitting next to the Institute's professional doomsayer, Professor Motyl, I will still look somewhat optimistic, I am sure.

My argument is that one can determine the kinds of conflicts that are likely to occur by looking at the way in which ethnic groups are placed within the work force. There is a large literature on ethnic competition that suggests that conflict is probable when groups come to compete in the same labor, housing, marriage, or other kinds of markets. This literature indicates that four conditions facilitate ethnic conflict.

As elsewhere in the world, most societal problems in the USSR, including nationalism, have a demographic and geographic dimension. My purpose today is to investigate some of the more prominent changes in the ethnic composition of the USSR that occurred between 1979 and 1989. The effect of changing ethnic composition depends on the geographic scale because overall changes have less effect than regional changes. Thus, I will consider various geographic scales of analysis.

Today the Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted the same sort of declaration that was made by the Estonian Supreme Soviet. The Latvian declaration is somewhat different from the Lithuanian one. I will try to give you a view of the different situations in the republics, as well as to address the question of why the declarations have been a bit different and how things may possibly evolve.

Perhaps mine is a strictly emotional opposition to the apocalyptic mood of our workshop. When everybody is a pessimist, I am tempted to be an optimist and vice-versa. I was an extreme pessimist last year when you all enjoyed perestroika and predicted nice things.

I would like to thank you for this invitation. I share Professor Sadomskaya's views about the revolution that is definitely going on in the Soviet Union. But I would like to mention that revolutions are not accomplished overnight. Usually, they are a long and painful process. Perhaps there can be an overnight revolution in politics or in economics, but not in the minds of people.