¹ Poirier, Richard, Poetry and Pragmatism (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 11Google Scholar; The Renewal of Literature: Emersonian Reflections (New Haven, 1988), 47–49; Levin, Jonathan, The Poetics of Transition: Emerson, Pragmatism, & American Literary History (Durham, NC, 1999)Google Scholar; West, Cornel, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison, WI, 1989), 28CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 36. See also Goodman, Russell B., American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition (New York, 1990)Google Scholar; Robinson, David M., Emerson and the Conduct of Life: Pragmatism and Ethical Purpose in the Later Work (Cambridge, 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Richardson, Joan, A Natural History of Pragmatism (Cambridge, 2007)Google Scholar.

² Cavell, Stanley, “What's the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?”, in Dickstein, Morris, ed., The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Law, and Culture (Durham, NC, 1998), 73, 79Google Scholar; Dolan, Neal, Emerson's Liberalism (Madison, WI, 2009), 9, 150–51Google Scholar. For descriptions of pragmatism as antifoundationalist see Rorty, Richard, The Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, 1982)Google Scholar, xxx–xxxi; and Kloppenberg, James T., Reading Obama: Dreams, Hope, and the American Political Tradition (Princeton, 2010), 78–9Google Scholar, 152.

³ Of course, one can misread such stylistic contrasts. As Charles Capper points out, Santayana thought the core of transcendentalism was “luminously modern” and quite scientific. Santayana, George, “‘A Little Beyond’: The Problem of the Transcendentalist Movement in American History,” Journal of American History 85 (1998), 502–39, 511–13Google Scholar.

⁴ Menand, Louis, The Metaphysical Club (New York, 2001), x, 59, 370Google Scholar.

⁵ See, for example, Gilmore, Michael T., The War on Words: Slavery, Race, and Free Speech in American Literature (Chicago, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Emerson, , Essays and Lectures (New York, 1983), 193Google Scholar (this volume is hereafter cited as EL); James, William, Pragmatism, in James, Writings: 1902–1910 (New York, 1987), 490–91Google Scholar (this volume is hereafter cited as W: 1902–1910, and this work is hereafter cited as Pragmatism).

⁷ “Spiritual Laws,” EL, 335; Pragmatism, 491–2.

⁸ “The American Scholar,” EL, 63; The Varieties of Religious Experience, W: 1902–1910, 333 (hereafter cited as Varieties).

⁹ “The American Scholar,” EL, 60; A Pluralistic Universe, W: 1902–1910, 739 (hereafter cited as Pluralistic Universe).

¹⁰ James's library included the following copies of Emerson's writings, which are now a part of the James, WilliamCollection at Harvard's Houghton Library: Miscellanies; Embracing Nature, Addresses, and Lectures (Boston, 1868)Google Scholar; Essays: First Series (Boston, 1869); and from Emerson's Complete Works (new and rev. edns) published in Boston by Houghton, Mifflin and Company on dates as follows: vol. 3, Essays: Second Series (1889); vol. 4, Representative Men: Seven Lectures (1895); vol. 6, The Conduct of Life (1889); vol. 8, Letters and Social Aims (1883); vol. 10, Lectures and Biographical Sketches (1884); vol. 12, Natural History of the Intellect and Other Papers (1893); and from The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson (centenary edn), Essays: Second Series (Boston, 1904).

¹¹ Richardson, Robert D., William James: In the Maelstrom of American Modernism (Boston, 2006), 154Google Scholar; Bense, James, “At Odds with ‘De-transcendentalizing Emerson’: The Case of William James,” New England Quarterly 79 (2006), 355–86, 360–67Google Scholar; Carpenter, Frederic Ives, “William James and Emerson,” American Literature 11 (1939), 39–57, 54–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Carpenter, , Emerson Handbook (New York, 1967), 169Google Scholar.

¹² As James Bense has also noted, Carpenter's errant interpretation of these annotations has influenced many later works, including Matthiessen, F. O., American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman (New York, 1941), 53–4Google Scholar n. 10; Mitchell, Charles E., Individualism and Its Discontents: Appropriations of Emerson, 1880–1950 (Amherst, MA, 1997), 74, 82Google Scholar; Albrecht, James M., “What's the Use of Reading Emerson Pragmatically? The Example of William James,” Nineteenth-Century Prose 30 (2003), 388–432, 397Google Scholar. Bense, “The Case of William James,” 361.

¹³ Essays, First Series, 129, 287 (Call no AC85 J2376 Zz869e); Pragmatism, 591–2.

¹⁴ Essays, Second Series (Boston, 1904), 228–9, 236–7 (Call no AC85 J2376 Zz904e).

¹⁵ Nature, Miscellanies, 57 (Call no WJ 424.25.12).

¹⁶ “The American Scholar,” Miscellanies, 87–8 (Call no WJ 424.25.12).

¹⁷ Ibid., 81.

¹⁸ Ibid., at 100.

¹⁹ Carpenter, “James and Emerson,” 54–7; and Carpenter, Emerson Handbook, 169. The following pieces variously subscribe to the “two Emersons” thesis: Rev. Julius H. Ward, “Emerson in New England Thought,” Andover Review (1887), 380–95, 393; Matthiessen, American Renaissance, 53–54 n.10; Frank Lentricchia, “On the Ideologies of Poetic Modernism,” in Bercovitch, Sacvan, ed., Reconstructing American Literary History (Cambridge, MA, 1986), 238Google Scholar; Lasch, Christopher, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York, 1991), 282Google Scholar; Bense, “The Case of William James,” 360.

²⁰ A passage from a 1905 notebook indicates that James did, at least on occasion, think of Emerson in a bifurcated fashion, noting “two tendencies in Emerson, one towards absolute Monism; the other towards radical individualism. They sound contradictory enough; but he held to each of them in its extremist form.” James, William, “Emerson 1905,” in The Works of William James: Manuscript Essays and Notes, ed. Burkhardt, Frederick H.et al. (Cambridge, MA, 1988), 318Google Scholar.

²¹ “James and Emerson,” 54–5.

²² “Self-Reliance,” Essays, First Series, 60 (Call no. AC85 J2376 Zz869e). On blank pages at the end of this volume, James has written out an “index” of key passages, including the following: “tasteless water of souls (Blood) 60” and “Anaesthetic revelation, 60.” He has also drawn a vertical line in the margin next to the passage from “Self-Reliance” on page 60.

²³ “James and Emerson,” 55.

²⁴ Emerson Handbook, 171.

²⁵ See Matthiessen, American Renaissance, 53–54 n. 10; and Lentricchia, “On the Ideologies of Poetic Modernism,” 238 (Lentricchia echoes Carpenter's interpretation of the “tasteless water of souls” inscription without citation of the earlier scholarship). While he does not focus on intuition, James Bense, “The Case of William James,” 360–7, has usefully noted other errors in Carpenter's reading of James's annotations of Emerson.

²⁶ James, “Centenary of Ralph Waldo Emerson,” W: 1902–1910, 1121; “The Sentiment of Rationality,” W: 1878–1899, 515.

²⁷ Varieties, 15.

²⁸ The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge, MA, 1981), 914 (hereafter cited as Principles).

²⁹ Varieties, 349–50.

³⁰ “A Pluralistic Mystic,” W: 1902–1910, 1295, 1306–7, 1313, original emphasis; Whitman, Walt, Leaves of Grass: The First (1855) Edition (New York, 1961), 41Google Scholar.

³¹ Historians, such as James T. Kloppenberg, characterize intuition as part and parcel of a previous era's romantic outlook left behind by the pragmatists. Like the Scottish realists’ confidence in common sense, the idealists’ belief in Geist, and positivists’ faith in science, the romantic embrace of intuition aspired, says Kloppenberg, to an “Archimedean point” of epistemological and metaphysical certainty, a quest rejected by the pragmatists. Describing how evolutionary science “staggered” the Romantics’ belief in intuition, Kloppenberg's narrative puts James on the other side of a divide epitomized by the advent of Darwin. Kloppenberg, James T., Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870–1920 (New York, 1986), 19–20Google Scholar, 23, 26. Alan Ryan's biographical study of Dewey, John, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1995), 50–51Google Scholar, 55–56, casts the history of nineteenth-century American philosophy in a similar light, remarking how, in moving toward pragmatism, Dewey came to reject the intuitionalist certainties of such predecessors as James McCosh and H. A. P. Torrey. Philosophers, such as Richard J. Bernstein, define the pragmatists’ antifoundational “ethos” of uncertainty in such a way as to exclude intuition. See e.g. Bernstein, Richard J., “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Healing of Old Wounds,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (1989), 5–18, 7Google Scholar. This is precisely the type of characterization of pragmatism leading Neal Dolan to object that Emerson's commitment to “intimations of a metaphysically subsistent moral law” cannot be squared with the later thinker's relativism. Emerson's Liberalism, 150–51. However, such accounts are overbroad and fail to allow for the fact that James (and Dewey, for that matter) could be critical of the “intuitionalism” of their day and yet remain open to the idea of intuition. As I will demonstrate in this essay, in distinction to such historical and philosophical accounts, the published and unpublished writings of James reveal numerous passages in which he subscribes to intuition and allows for the possibility that it can open the door to transcendental truths. And I will also show that, as James's and Emerson's versions of intuition remain open to change and doubt, their references to this mode of awareness do not entail a larger claim of “Archimedean” certainty.

³² While tracing the contours and conceptual facets of the particular version of intuition shared and developed by Emerson and James, it is useful to bear in mind the range of meanings associated with the term. Derived from the Latin verb intueri, meaning to “look upon,” “intuition” and “intuitive” have been used both positively and negatively to indicate a variety of mental processes and capacities, such as analytically careless thinking; uncanny or supernatural modes of insight; spontaneous and hence unquestioned perceptions (such as my awareness that I have a pair of hands); a Platonic ability to perceive the realm of ideal forms; a nonrational form of judgment (e.g. a gambler's hunch), an unusually sensitive type of personality; a form of knowledge produced by experience (such as the craftsman's superior understanding and awareness of material); and the type of innate moral feeling discussed by the Scottish common-sense philosophers, such as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, Henry Home (Lord Kames), and Dugald Stewart. For a useful summary of the history of the concept from the ancient world to the present, see Noddings, Nel and Shore, Paul J., Awakening the Inner Eye: Intuition in Education (New York, 1984), 3–42Google Scholar. And for recent commentary on intuition as a psychological and philsosophical concept see Bastick, Tony, Intuition: How We Think and Act (Chichester, 1982)Google Scholar; Davis-Ford, Robbie and Arvidson, P. Sven, eds., Intuition: The Inside Story (New York: Routledge, 1997)Google Scholar; DePaul, Michael and Ramsey, William, eds. Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Lanham, MD, 1998)Google Scholar.

³³ Many scholars have noted Emerson's acceptance of flux and uncertainty (see e.g. Poirier, The Renewal of Literature, 47–9), but such acknowledgments tend to come at the cost of his transcendentalism. Certain scholars have noted the intuitional aspect of James's thought. For instance, , Judith Shklar's fine essay “Bergson and the Politics of Intuition,” Review of Politics 20 (October 1958) 634–56, 637Google Scholar, describes how, for James, a “Bergsonian” “[i]ntuitive sympathy with a thing” constitutes the sole “way to really know it.” Similarly, Gale, Richard M., “Pragmatism versus Mysticism: The Divided Self of William James,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), 241–86, 277CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 242, argues that James's “backyard mysticism” entails a Martin Buber-like I/Thou intuition (curiously, in my view, Gale does not consider how this form of intuition might bridge the split between the promethean pragmatist and mystic sides of James's “divided self”). But Shklar and Gale, like others, leave unexplored the connection between James's and Emerson's views of intuition (Gale mentions Emerson parenthetically). Robert D. Richardson, William James, 434, is one of the few who have noted both James's belief in intuition and its derivation from Emerson's work.

³⁴ Searle, John R., Mind: A Brief Introduction (New York, 2005), 48, 126Google Scholar.

³⁵ The phrase “the problem of modernity,” calls to mind such familiar terms as “alienation,” “anomie,” and “estrangement” and such phrases as “the center cannot hold” and “[t]he mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation.” In a recent essay, Akeel Bilgrami reformulates this problem as the challenge of locating a source of meaning outside the self in a “disenchanted” world. Bilgrami's essay is part of a current resurgence of interest in the problem of modernity, including such works as Charles Taylor's A Secular Age (2007) and Pierre Hadot's The Veil of Isis (2006). Drawing on Weber's “Science as a Vocation” and other works, Bilgrami describes how, from the seventeenth century to the present, a nexus of commercial, religious, and scientific interests has effectively reduced the world to “brute” matter. Lacking full sentience, the things and creatures of this world are subject to human use, change, exploitation, even destruction without regard to anything other than our internally derived notions of value and calculations of self-interest—a license readily and disastrously extended to peoples deemed to be closer to “brute” nature (the used) than to rational humanity (the users). Of course, the sovereignty of the human will has not gone unchallenged. Bilgrami sketches a countertradition beginning in more radical versions of Enlightenment thought (e.g. John Toland) and continuing through Romanticism (e.g. Blake, Shelley, Morris, Thoreau, and Whitman) to such twentieth-century figures as Gandhi. For this countertradition, the world is “not brute but suffused with value,” and as a result it makes “normative (ethical and social) demands on one, whether one [is] religious or not.” Often, as Emerson and James and many others recognize, these “demands” or “values” are registered intuitively. The attempt by many in Bilgrami's countertradition (which should include Emerson and James) to formulate a compelling account of intuition represents a challenge to the absolute sovereignty of human reason and will. See Bilgrami, Akeel, “Occidentalism, the Very Idea: An Essay on Enlightenment and Enchantment,” Critical Inquiry 32 (2006), 381–411CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ EL, 199. For an account of the precedents for Emerson's intuitionism, focusing particularly on the British romantics, see Keane's, Patrick J.Emerson, Romanticism, and Intuitive Reason (Columbus, MO, 2005)Google Scholar.

³⁷ EL, 268–9.

³⁸ Psychology: Briefer Course, W: 1878–1899, 164. Margolis, Joseph, in Pragmatism's Advantage (Palo Alto, 2010), 93Google Scholar, criticizes James's “lax” diction for allowing objectionable idealist notions, such as a glimpsed but never quite fully understood truth, to slip into the discussion as a “limit concept.” This, of course, is only a problem if one wants, like Margolis or Rorty, to cast pragmatism as thoroughly relativistic and hostile to all invocations of transcendent truth.

³⁹ EL, 76, 168, 116–17, 196, 268, 244–3, 392, 422, 455, 456; Emerson, , Emerson's Antislavery Writings, ed. Gougeon, Len and Myerson, Joel (New Haven, 1995), 37Google Scholar (hereafter this volume is cited as Antislavery Writings); The Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. William H. Gilman et al., 16 vols. (Cambridge, MA, 1960–1982), 14: 404 (hereafter citations of this edition of Emerson's journals appear as JMN).

⁴⁰ “Oversoul,” “Experience,” “Self-Reliance,” “Literary Ethics,” EL, 385, 484, 395, 271, 100.

⁴¹ “Oversoul,” EL, 391, 392.

⁴² “Spiritual Laws,” EL, 309.

⁴³ “Divinity School Address,” “Montaigne; Or, The Skeptic,” EL, 77, 696.

⁴⁴ “History,” EL, 244. As Rudd, Anthony, Expressing the World: Skepticism, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger (Chicago: Open Court, 2003) 231–47Google Scholar, points out, both Buber and Heidegger illustrate intersubjectivity by imagining a sympathetic encounter with a tree. Famously, Kahn, Louis, Essential Texts, (New York: Norton, 2003), 270–71Google Scholar, spoke of honoring the nature of building materials through a form of intuitive recognition: “You say to brick, ‘What do you want, brick?’ And brick says to you, ‘I like an arch.’” Burton, Joseph A., “The Aesthetic Education of Louis I. Kahn, 1912–1924,” Perspecta 28 (1997), 204–17, 204CrossRefGoogle Scholar, cites Emerson and a particular mixture of transcendentalism and pragmatism as early influences on Kahn's aesthetics.

⁴⁵ “Oversoul,” Nature, EL, 386, 11.

⁴⁶ Nature, “History,” EL, 43–4, 243. Emerson associates “understanding” with rationalism and “reason” with intuition: “There is no doctrine of the Reason which will bear to be taught by the Understanding.” “Divinity School Address,” EL, 80.

⁴⁷ “The Method of Nature,” Nature, EL, 117, 43.

⁴⁸ JMN, 5: 337; “Spiritual Laws,” “History,” EL, 319, 256.

⁴⁹ “The Poet,” “The Method of Nature,” EL, 460, 124–5.

⁵⁰ “Intellect,” EL, 419.

⁵¹ “The American Scholar,” “Uses of Great Men,” EL, 57, 622.

⁵² “History,” “Divinity School Address,” EL, 244, 79.

⁵³ “Oversoul,” EL, 392.

⁵⁴ JMN, 7: 150.

⁵⁵ Antislavery Writings, 12; JMN, 14: 404.

⁵⁶ Antislavery Writings, 26.

⁵⁷ “Oversoul,” EL, 385.

⁵⁸ “Circles,” EL, 405–6.

⁵⁹ The Will to Believe, W: 1878–1899, 680, 672 (hereafter cited as Will). For other scholarship placing and elaborating on Emerson's and James's respective acceptances of uncertainty see Paul Croce, Jerome, Science and Religion in the Era of William James: Eclipse of Certainty, 1820–1880 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1995)Google Scholar; Jacobson, David, Emerson's Pragmatic Vision: The Dance of the Eye (University Park, PA, 1993)Google Scholar; and Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory.

⁶⁰ “Oversoul,” EL, 385.

⁶¹ “The Poet,” EL, 408–9; “Great Men and Their Environment,” Writings: 1878–1899 (New York: Library of America, 1992), 641–2 (this volume is hereafter cited as W: 1878–1899).

⁶² “Experience,” EL, 482.

⁶³ Dolan, Emerson's Liberalism, 159.

⁶⁴ JMN 7: 14; “Montaigne,” EL, 706; for an extended discussion of the skeptical aspects of Emerson's outlook see Michael, John, Emerson and Skepticism: The Cipher of the World (Baltimore, 1988)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ “Montaigne,” EL, 693, 702, 707–8.

⁶⁶ Pragmatism, 619.

⁶⁷ Will, 447, 466.

⁶⁸ “A Pluralistic Mystic,” 1312.

⁶⁹ Will, 564; Pragmatism, 619.

⁷⁰ Any inquiry into the relation between James's and Emerson's views of intuition should note that Emerson, along with Benjamin Blood, Gustav Flechner, Henri Bergson, William Wordsworth, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman, exemplified the intuitive mind to James: “Truth came to [Emerson] in gleams.” James, Manuscript Essays and Notes, 316. To illustrate the way that a “higher vision of an inner significance . . . often comes over a person suddenly; and when it does so, it makes and epoch in his history,” James turns to Emerson: “As Emerson says, there is a depth in those moments that constrains us to ascribe more reality to them than to all other experiences.” “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” W: 1878–1899, 848.

⁷¹ Principles, 985–6, 988.

⁷² “Brute and Human Intellect,” W: 1878–1899, 945–6.

⁷³ Principles, 988.

⁷⁴ Hutcheson, Joseph C. Jr, “The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the ‘Hunch’ in Judicial Decision,” Cornell Law Quarterly 14 (1928–9), 274–88, 282Google Scholar, 275.

⁷⁵ Principles, 1265.

⁷⁶ Many scholars have noted the importance of experience or “life itself” to James's pragmatism. For some, James's turn to experience is overtly antitranscendental and antifoundationalist. See, for instance, Lentricchia, Frank, “The Romanticism of William James,” Salmagundi 25 (1974), 81–108, 107Google Scholar. Charlene Haddock Seigfried, “Like Bridges without Piers: Beyond the Foundationalist Metaphor,” in Rockmore, Tom and Singer, Beth J., eds., Antifoundationalism: Old and New (Philadelphia, 1992), 143–64, 157Google Scholar, argues that James's pragmatic theory of truth redirects our attention from foundations to the “feedback loop” of experience. However, such accounts of James's thought ignore his appreciation of surprising or unexpected insights that cut across or interrupt the feedback loop of our own repeated testing of experience and seem to have a source beyond or supplementary to our usual reasoning processes.

⁷⁷ Principles, 985.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 984–5.

⁷⁹ Pluralistic Universe, 746, 739.

⁸⁰ Principles, 985.

⁸¹ Pluralistic Universe, 740.

⁸² Varieties, 73, original emphasis.

⁸³ Pluralistic Universe, 745.

⁸⁴ Ibid., at 726.

⁸⁵ Varieties, 73–4.

⁸⁶ Will, 643

⁸⁷ Varieties, 191. Compare James's description of the unlooked-for solution and Emerson's account of the “unannounced truth”: “We say, I will walk abroad, and the truth will take form and clearness to me. We go forth, but cannot find it. It seems as if we needed only the stillness and composed attitude of the library to seize the thought. But we come in, and are as far from it as at first. Then, in a moment, and unannounced, the truth appears. A certain, wandering light appears, and is the distinction, the principle, we wanted . . . So now you must labor with your brains, and now you must forbear your activity, and see what the great Soul showeth.” “Intellect,” EL, 420.

⁸⁸ Varieties, 357 n. 1.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 223, original emphasis. For James, the chief “originality” of Varieties “consists in the suggestion (very brief) that our official self is continuous with more of us than appears (subliminal self) which accounts for the ‘striking’ experiences of religious persons; and this ‘more’ on the farther side lies open to transempirical realities, and this might allow for the sense of ‘union’ and other mystical experiences being true.” Down Scott, Frederick J., ed., William James: Selected Unpublished Correspondence—1885–1910 (Columbus, OH, 1986), 280–81Google Scholar.

⁹⁰ Varieties, 193.

⁹¹ “A Suggestion about Mysticism,” W: 1902–1910, 1272.

⁹² Pragmatism, 606.

⁹³ Varieties, 303.

⁹⁴ Will, 466.

⁹⁵ Varieties, 305–6, 307.

⁹⁶ Pluralistic Universe, 690.

⁹⁷ Whitehead, , Modes of Thought (New York, 1938), 84, 148Google Scholar.

⁹⁸ “What Makes a Life Significant,” W: 1878–1899, 877.

⁹⁹ Will, 476, original emphasis; Brague, Rémi, “How to Be in the World: Gnosis, Religion, Philosophy,” in Mendes-Flohr, Paul B., ed., Martin Buber: A Contemporary Perspective (Syracuse, NY, 2002), 133–47, 139Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁰ Varieties, 252 n. 1, 455–6.

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