Proposed federal legislation concerning recombinant DNA research attempts to restrict the ability of local governments to regulate the research. In March of 1978, the House Commerce Committee approved a bill that would “bar states and localities from setting their own standards over gene transplant technology.” Two weeks later, the House of Representatives Science, Research, and Technology Subcommittee approved a bill which would permit a state to regulate such researchonly when it is “necessary” to protect local health. The “necessary” standard usually requires strict proof that a regulated substance or activity will cause significant harm to public health. Under this standard a locality might have to wait for significant harm to occur before it could adopt regulations that are stricter than federal requirements.

This anomaly presents the basic question of this article: Who should decide whether recombinant DNA research is a health hazard — the local or the federal government? This article will utilize a legal approach to answer the question, analyzing and weighing the issues presented by pertinent cases.

This article presents an overview of the role of the medical expert witness in litigation involving issues of medical liability or malpractice in order to introduce the potential physician expert witness to some of the major problems and situations that may arise.

The expert medical witness is needed among other reasons, to define the standard of medical care required in the Physician/patient relationship which is frequently the crucial element in a professional liability case. The plaintiff. in order to prevail in his law suit, must show, among other components, (1) what the required standard of care was in his case, (2) that the defendant failed to meet that standard, and (3)th at this failure was the cause of the injury alleged.

The standard of care required of a physician is commonly defined as adherance to “the skill and learning commonly possessed by a member of the profession in good standing.”

This article concerns the exclusion from taxable income of scholarship and fellowship grants received by residents and research assistants under Section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code. As is often the case, frequent litigation has resulted in confusion, and it has become difficult for the individual physician or institution to determine the extent and scope of exclusions that are possibly available.

The enactment of Section 117 in 1954 was intended by Congress to provide an exclusion from taxable income to students for all scholarship and fellowship income received. However, the courts, which had to interpret the intended meaning of “scholarship” and “fellowship” income, developed three often inconclusive and contradictory tests — the primary purpose, compensation, and control tests. 1969, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bingler v. Johnson, synthesized these three tests into a single standard, the quid pro quo test. The Court held that the meaning of “scholarship” and “fellowship” intended by Congress comported with the ordinary understanding of the terms, that is, as relatively disinterested, “no-strings” educational grants, with no requirement of any substantial quid pro quo from the recipient.