Ceasefire agreements are legally governed by international humanitarian law because they have generally been considered in relation to how they affect levels of violence. However, new research in the fields of anthropology, security, and development studies suggests that ceasefires can have many more ramifications. These range from their ability to influence governance institutions, property and citizenship rights, economic networks, and security mechanisms. Consequently, this article suggests that a broader legal framework is needed through which to consider ceasefires and their consequences. While canvassing the option of ceasefires being types of contractual documents or as special agreements under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the article concludes that the best way to regulate ceasefire agreements is through an expanded version of lex pacificatoria. Rather than being governed by hard international law, such a move would allow for the implementation of more flexible programmatic standards to influence the myriad ways ceasefires are negotiated, the conduct of belligerents, and their diverse effects on the ground during wartime.

This article is about a relatively new version of the ‘emerging’ jus post bellum concept. It asks whether the jus post bellum as ‘integrity’ is useful as a normative guide in the interpretation of international criminal law during transitions when the requirements of international criminal law are ambiguous or unclear. It develops the main elements of the jus post bellum as integrity as an analytical framework. It then evaluates the theoretical and practical application of the concept in relation to the task of the International Criminal Court in evaluating the ‘alternative sentences’ regime in Colombia. It argues that a Dworkinian approach to international criminal law must make certain assumptions about the international legal order which are difficult to sustain. The difficulties discussed here are related to the structural conditions needed for a ‘community of principle’ to arise in Dworkin’s theory. The article demonstrates that the jus post bellum as integrity may be useful for identifying the principles of international criminal law that should apply to states in transition from conflict to peace. However, despite its usefulness, the concept is susceptible to the usual arguments against adopting ‘natural law’ constructions in international legal method (and post-conflict law).

Many of the conflicts that have led to the creation of hybrid tribunals were identity-based conflicts – people who identified as members of one tribe, race, ethnicity, or religion used these distinctions as grounds to attack and persecute another group who often responded in kind. This reality means that the criminal justice processes that take place in the wake of such conflicts must take issues of identity seriously to be effective. This article uses the notion of framing contests to examine different identity-based responses to international justice. Defenders of the tribunals seek to portray them as impartial observers while critics paint them as illegitimate outsiders. Because hybrid tribunals have identity considerations as features built into them, they are better suited to promote their own legitimacy in these framing contests. These features include the personnel they use, the witnesses they call, the strategies their prosecutors deploy, and their local outreach programmes. Each of these tools can be used to frame the tribunal as a legitimate means to promote criminal justice and thereby advance the values of transitional justice.

Judges ad hoc of the International Court of Justice have been widely criticized for their supposed lack of impartiality. This criticism may seem all the more powerful if one takes into account that judges ad hoc were created as a means to avoid the Court’s bias and appearance of bias. However, recent developments in the appointment of judges ad hoc indicate that, far from being a detriment to the states’ perception of the Court’s impartiality, judges ad hoc are a means to enhance the perception that the Court as a whole is impartial. Such developments include the increased frequency with which former elected judges are appointed judges ad hoc, the practice of electing judges from the ranks of former (or sitting) judges ad hoc, and the appointment of nationals or non-nationals as judges ad hoc. The institution of judges ad hoc has come full circle, and should be regarded as fulfilling the function for which it was created.

The overall aim of this article is to analyse the principal purpose test as an emerging rule of customary international tax law. By means of the principal purpose test, the tax administration can deny the tax treaty benefit if one of the principal purposes of the action undertaken by the taxpayer was to obtain a benefit. This principal purpose test has been developed by the OECD with the political support of the G20 as one of the actions to tackle Base Erosion and Profit Shifting by multinationals (BEPS Project). At the time of writing, 137 jurisdictions including non-OECD, non-G-20 countries have committed to the implementation of the principal purpose test in their current and future tax treaties. Based on the analysis of the objective element (state practice) and subjective element (accepted as law), there are indications that this principal purpose test can emerge as a principle of customary international law. In the past, international tax law scholars addressed the customary international law regarding the OECD/UN tax treaty Models, the OECD Harmful Tax Practices, and the arm’s length principle. However, current international tax developments, including the BEPS Project, call for an analysis of the main elements of customary international law in respect of the principal purpose test, a general anti-avoidance rule that by its own nature, is often general, vague, and imprecise. Therefore, the findings of this article can be useful for generating new areas of research by international public law, international law, and international tax law experts.

In this article, I explore the concept of resilience and its relevance for evaluating hybrid court design and the impact of hybrid courts in societies that have experienced periods of mass violence or repression. I begin by tracing the evolution of the concept of resilience from the fields of materials science and ecology to human responses to natural and human-made disasters. Then, I examine the implications of how one defines the concept for the policy recommendations that should be provided to the architects and staff of hybrid courts. From there, I assess how the way one conceives of resilience shapes the assessment of the circumstances under which hybrid courts are more likely to be beneficial for violence-affected societies. I conclude by reflecting upon the utility of adopting resilience language in the study of hybrid courts. Resilience may be seductive conceptually because it provides a vision of empowerment and autonomy for victims and affected communities. However, resilience thinking is also consistent with neoliberal prescriptions that are contrary to the realization of the type of emancipatory justice that many hybrid court advocates seek.

International criminal tribunals have developed a number of legal theories designed to hold individuals responsible for their role in collective criminal conduct. These doctrines of criminal participation, known as modes of liability, are the subject of significant scholarly commentary. Yet missing from much of this debate, particularly as regards the International Criminal Court, has been an analysis of how current doctrine on modes of liability responds to the need to hold collective perpetrators criminally responsible for crimes of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Indeed, many writings in this area of the law address perceived shortcomings in the theoretical underpinnings of modes of liability doctrine in the abstract but ignore the application of this doctrine in concreto. As a result, facially neutral writings on modes of liability may in fact be gendered in application, either because they fail to account for the specific characteristics of sexual and gender-based violence or because they are applied in a manner that requires higher thresholds for finding culpability for the commission of SGBV crimes. This article fills the gap between theory and practice, examining past and present doctrine, and suggesting ways in which the treatment of modes of liability by international criminal courts and tribunals can both properly respond to the need for personal culpability and the dangers of collective criminal activity, particularly as regards SGBV crimes.

This article maps out the landscape holding and connecting three interrelated phenomena: art, international criminal justice, and reconciliation. We argue that reconciliation, viewed as a restoration process, is one of the goals of international criminal justice. Yet, its attainment through law is challenging because international criminal justice, strictly construed, is outcome oriented. Art can serve as a ‘bridge’ linking normative legal standards with their reconciliatory aspirations. The key argument is therefore that art has the clear ability to mediate and amplify the law’s restorative potential through three key features. Firstly, art reflects the complexity of the human condition and reserves a place for emotional processing. Secondly, it is a useful relational tool in opening the space for dialogue, the latter being essential for reconciliation. Lastly, art has the capacity to translate legalistic findings into a language accessible to a wider audience.

As the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has an ambitious mandate. However, due to its institutional design, the ICJ depends in large part on whether the states allow it to play this role, and their resistance can prove particularly damaging for the ICJ in this regard. Against this background, the article argues that resort to judicial avoidance techniques may be a pragmatic way for the ICJ to adapt to this reality, and that it seems likely that the ICJ has been relying on such techniques on several occasions. With reference to the ICJ’s case law, the article highlights different avoidance techniques at the ICJ’s disposal, proposes a categorization based on their effects, and evaluates the potential and risks each category holds for the ICJ. Accordingly, the article distinguishes between merits-avoidance techniques, issue-avoidance techniques, and resort to deferential standards of review. It demonstrates that relying on merits-avoidance techniques and issue-avoidance techniques is counterproductive and sometimes even dangerous for the ICJ. In contrast, resort to deferential standards of review allows the ICJ to reconcile its ambitious legal mandate with the political realities, and accordingly holds the greatest potential for the ICJ.

The article explores the extent to which the resilience of hybrid courts is impacted by their selection of cases. It proceeds from the observation that the cases pursued by hybrid institutions are the result of choice under constraints. The article examines the identity of the case-choosers and the relevance of such choices for the internal and external resilience of hybrid courts. The research reveals the need to distinguish between case selection by the drafters and case selection by court authorities in the context of each institution and the tensions between these two sets of practices. These tensions are examined in the context of four hybrid institutions. The Office of the Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone enjoyed a relatively broad measure of discretion in terms of case selection. However, the Extraordinary African Chambers, the Cambodia Chambers and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers seem to have been established with specific accused in mind. The article argues that resilience considerations are probably relevant in instances of case selection by the court officers, albeit they are context sensitive and may vary over time. Case selection prior to the establishment of a court and/or by political stakeholders, on the other hand, is ill-suited for analysis using internal resilience and arguably fall outside its scope of application. For these cases, the research argues that the discussion requires re-orientation with emphasis shifted to concepts such as contribution to national reconciliation as opposed to resistance to external pressure.

The use of criminal law in border control has gained increasing and warranted scholarly attention. International criminal law is no exception, although the orientation of the debates in international law is different from that at the national level. While scholarship on domestic border control is characterized by a deep scepticism of the use of criminal sanction, the focus in international criminal law has been on the exclusion of individuals suspected of involvement in an international crime from the protective sphere of refugee law. The divergence of this scholarship does not fully account for how responses to allegations of involvement in an international crime are often embedded within domestic immigration laws, making concerns regarding domestic border control relevant for discussions in international criminal law. To examine these domestic entanglements, this article analyses an independently generated dataset of 122 cases in 20 countries concerning 102 individuals alleged to have participated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This dataset enables an empirical analysis of the role that international criminal law is playing in their extradition, deportation or domestic prosecution. It argues that these cases are underpinned by plural types of expressive work. They communicate not only an ongoing commitment to recognizing the universal wrong of genocide, but also more ambiguous messaging about what constitutes a fair trial in Rwanda, who constitutes a ‘criminal migrant’ and, to a Rwandan audience, the transnational penal reach of the Rwandan state.