The law of negligence favours redress for damage to property interests over redress for damage to mere economic interests. The question arises whether this preference can be justified. In endeavouring to answer it, the author surveys existing reasons given by courts and commentators for maintaining a distinction between property and economic interests. Each of these reasons, which collectively focus upon the ‘problematic’ nature of economic losses, is found to be either ad hoe in nature or without substantial explanatory power. However, it is submitted that the distinction is explicable on the basis that, whereas an individual's personality is partly constituted by the property that he or she owns, so that property can be seen as essential to the ways in which individuals constitute and define themselves, no such claim can be made with respect to mere abstract holdings of wealth. Although wealth permits the acquisition of property and participation in activities and experiences which might help to constitute and define the self in the future, the very fact that wealth has not been transposed into these things precludes it from being considered as important as actual holdings of property. The protection of property interests ought, therefore, to precede the protection of mere economic interests.

It is still the case in English law that invalid administrative action alone gives rise to no claim for damages. Individuals suffering loss as a result of invalid administrative action may remain uncompensated unless they have a private law remedy against the public body such as a claim in tort or contract. Notwithstanding this prohibition, the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 and developments in Community damages law have greatly increased the liability of public bodies in damages. However, the extension of liability in these areas raises questions as to whether it is satisfactory or even possible for the prohibition on damages for invalid administrative action to be maintained given the anomalies that have and will be created. Statutory reform, drawing on Community law, the Human Rights Act and jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, may go some way towards resolving existing anomalies and providing individuals with an adequate, alternative means of obtaining redress.

Frederic Goadby's Introduction to the Study of Law, written for law students in British occupied Egypt and later Palestine, provides a significant record of colonial attitudes about Western law and the legal cultures encountered in the Middle East. Edward Said's Orientalism offers a deconstructive methodology which reveals the legal narrative of Goadby's work as offering an invitation to the students to become spectators, along with the colonists of their own legal culture. Once imbued with the spirit of English law, Egyptian and Palestinian students passed the test of civilisation. Goadby's book reminds us that while colonial occupation of territory may have ceased the impact of cultural occupations continue. For both coloniser and colonised this discourse becomes part of their legal inheritance, which creates much work for contemporary legal scholars.

This article examines the steps taken in recent years to mainstream equality issues into the law and policy process in Ireland. Although official discourse increasingly recognises the need to tackle inequality and social exclusion, there is little to suggest that the mainstreaming process has been a transformative one. A reluctance to move beyond established legal categories or to radically challenge law and policy-making processes has greatly restricted the potential for reform. If mainstreaming is to be effective, the pursuit of equality must be recognised as a core norm guiding all aspects of law and policy making. In the Good Friday Agreement the Irish government committed itself to promoting equality in all social and economic activity and to demonstrating its respect for the diverse identities and traditions on the island of Ireland. Much work remains to be done if this commitment is to be fulfilled.

The Charity Commissioners have indicated that they possess a law-making role. This paper evaluates the extent to which the Commissioners have exercised this role in relation to charities for the advancement of religion, and evaluates this role in the light of the Human Rights Act 1998. The analysis draws upon both case law and decisions of the Commissioners, in particular the decision of the Commissioners to refuse status as a religious charity to the Church of Scientology.

Much academic work continues to operate within the cramping and pervasive spirit of a black-letter mentality that encourages scholars and jurists to maintain legal study as an inward-looking and self-contained discipline. There is still a marked tendency to treat law as somehow a world of its own that is separate from the society within which it operates and purports to serve. This is a disheartening and disabling state of affairs. Accordingly, this article will offer both a critique of the present situation and suggest an alternative way of proceeding. The writer recommends a shift from philosophy to democracy so that legal academics will be less obsessed with abstraction and formalism and more concerned with relevance and practicality. In contrast to the hubristic and occasionally mystical aspirations of mainstream scholars, it presents a more humble depiction of the worth and efficacy of the jurisprudential and scholarly project in which ‘usefulness’ is given pride of place. Of course, these fundamental charges are not applicable to all legal scholars. Many scholars are engaged in work that not only challenges the prevailing paradigm of legal scholarship, but also explores exciting new directions for legal study. It will be part of the essay to acknowledge those contributions.