The rise in litigation against administrative bodies by environmental and other political interest groups worldwide has been explained predominantly through the liberalization of standing doctrines. Under this explanation, termed here “the floodgate model,” restrictive standing rules have dammed the flow of suits that groups were otherwise ready and eager to pursue. I examine this hypothesis by analyzing processes of institutional transformation in two conservationist organizations: the Sierra Club in the United States and the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI). Rather than an eagerness to embrace newly available litigation opportunities, as the “floodgate” model would predict, the groups' history reveals a gradual process of transformation marked by internal, largely intergenerational divisions between those who abhorred conflict with state institutions and those who saw such conflict as not only appropriate but necessary to the mission of the group. Furthermore, in contrast to the pluralist interactions that the “floodgate model” imagines, both groups' relations with pertinent agencies in earlier eras better accorded with the partnership-based corporatist paradigm. Sociolegal research has long indicated the importance of relational distance to the transformation of interpersonal disputes. I argue that, at the group level as well, the presence or absence of a (national) partnership-centered relationship determines propensities to bring political issues to court. As such, well beyond change in groups' legal capacity and resources, current increases in levels of political litigation suggest more fundamental transformations in the structure and meaning of relations between citizen groups and the state.

Sociolegal theories of why “haves” might come out ahead in the legal system have emphasized legal mobilization and the use of legal representation. Small group research points to the influence of cultural capital on social expectations and interpersonal processes of social influence and deference as another potential explanation for status advantage. This study tests these explanations in the context of state income tax audits. The results indicate that taxpayers owning larger businesses are more likely to mobilize legally, but that legal mobilization does not affect audit outcomes. Instead, taxpayers with high occupational prestige and the owners of family businesses are more likely to come out ahead in tax audits, pointing to a cultural capital explanation of why the “haves” come out ahead. Prestige effects, however, are concentrated among taxpayers who represent themselves; when tax practitioners are involved in audits, status advantages disappear. Further analyses indicate that tax practitioners level the playing field by disrupting social influence and deference processes.

This study examines citation data in state wrongful discharge precedent cases from a network analytic perspective. The main question posed is whether, or to what extent, judges use citations as indicators of substantive influence on their decisionmaking versus devices primarily intended to justify decisions reached on other grounds (i.e., for legitimation). To address this question, I obtained evidence on the usefulness of distinguishing between “strong” and “weak” citations and between citation frequency and breadth. I conclude that citations in legal decisions are meaningful data and that there is evidence of both intercourt influence and legitimation at work.

This paper analyzes who wins and loses in the civil trial courts in Baltimore, Cleveland and Milwaukee. Research was conducted during 1971 and 1972 when a total of 7,800 civil court cases were examined and summarized from the case folders and dockets of courts of first instance with general jurisdiction in Baltimore, Cleveland and Milwaukee. Cases were selected randomly, sampling without replacement, from the 1965 and 1970 records of cases filed from those court records which were open to public inspection (records of paternity suits and adoptions, for instance, were not available). Cases were coded by: (1) the type of legal action initiated; (2) the outcome; (3) the names and addresses of all litigants; (4) the names of law firms and attorneys; (5) the date of filing; (6) the date of last recorded docket entry; (7) the number of court proceedings docketed; (8) the amount of money in dispute; (9) the amount of money awarded as damages; and (10) the census tract of each litigant.

This paper summarizes the findings of a four-pronged research project concerning the behavior of Dutch divorce lawyers, in which lawyers, judges, and clients were interviewed and lawyer-client interaction directly observed. In the first part, some preliminary remarks are made on the practical and theoretical importance of the actual behavior of divorce lawyers and the existing body of research on lawyer behavior. These are followed by a thumbnail sketch of Dutch divorce law and procedure and the role of the lawyer. The second part gives an overview of our own research findings. In the third part, I present some reflections on the role of lawyers in divorce cases: (1) the character and special place of ‘normative, conflict-oriented intervention’ in divorce conflict; (2) lawyers' objective of a ‘reasonable divorce’ and the nonadversarial approach of lawyers to divorce litigation; (3) lawyers as two-way ‘transformation agents’ between the client and the law; and (4) what lawyers actually do and do not do.

In rendering a decision in a particular case, judges are not limited to finding simply for the appellant or for the respondent. Rather, in many cases, they have the option to find for the former on one or more issues and for the latter on one or more other issues. By thus “splitting the difference,” judges can render a judgment that favors both litigants to some degree. What accounts for such mixed outcomes? Several theoretical perspectives provide potential explanations for this phenomenon. First, Galanter (1974) suggests that litigants with greater resources will achieve more favorable outcomes in the courts. Where two high-resource, repeat-player litigants meet in the appeals courts, these more sophisticated and successful parties may be able to persuade the court to render decisions with mixed outcomes that at least partially favor each party. Second, split outcomes may result from strategic interactions among the appeals court judges on the decisionmaking panel. Where majority opinion writers seek to accommodate other judges on the panel, split outcomes have the potential to serve as an inducement for more ideologically extreme judges to join the majority opinion. Finally, Shapiro and Stone Sweet (Stone Sweet 2000; Shapiro & Stone Sweet 2002) propose that courts will sometimes split the difference in order to enhance their legitimacy (and ultimately enhance compliance by losing parties). For example, in highly salient cases, where noncompliance would more clearly threaten court legitimacy, judges may be more likely to split the difference in order to mollify even the losing party. We develop an empirical model of mixed outcomes to test these propositions using data available from the U. S. Courts of Appeals Database and find evidence supportive of all three theoretical perspectives.

Professions are historically specific institutions for organizing the production and distribution of services. American lawyers constructed the contemporary legal profession between the 1870s and the 1950s by forming local, state, and national bar associations through which they sought, with considerable success, to control the production of and by producers of legal services. In the last two decades, these structures of control have significantly eroded. Lawyers exerted no restraint over the threefold increase in law students since the early 1960s or the changes in the composition of that student body. Restrictive practices taken for granted for half a century have been summarily eliminated by judicial decisions and executive action. To the extent that lawyers have responded by seeking to create new demand, they run the risk of intensifying competition, becoming more dependent on the state, and organizing hitherto atomistic consumers into collectivities that can challenge professional dominance. The image of the profession as a homogeneous collection of independent practitioners is harder to maintain. The proportion of employees is growing, solo practitioners are declining in the face of a hostile economic environment, and units of production are growing in size and becoming more bureaucratic. Divisions of race, gender, age, and class, superimposed over the differentiation of lawyers among structures of practice and the stratification of private practice into two hemispheres, make professional unity increasingly problematic. For similar reasons, self-regulation is being undermined from within while it is challenged from without. These cumulative transformations demand that we reconsider whether it is useful to continue thinking of the practice of law as a profession.

In this article I report the results of a quantitative and qualitative empirical study of how those who were injured or lost a family member in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks evaluated the tradeoff between a cash payment—available through the Victim Compensation Fund—and the pursuit of litigation. Responses make it clear that potential plaintiffs saw much more at stake than monetary compensation and that the choice to forego litigation required the sacrifice of important nonmonetary, civic values: obtaining and publicizing information about what happened, prompting public findings of accountability for those responsible, and participating in the process of ensuring that there would be responsive change to what was learned about how the attacks and deaths happened. The results shed light on the framing component of the transformation of disputes, and in particular on how potential litigants see the decision to sue, or not, as a decision as much or more about how they understand their relationship to their community and their responsibilities as a citizen as how they evaluate monetary considerations.

Attitudes toward legal authorities based on theories of procedural justice have been explored extensively in the criminal and civil justice systems. This has provided considerable empirical evidence concerning the importance of trust and legitimacy in generating cooperation, compliance, and decision acceptance. However, not enough attention has been paid to attitudes towards institutions of informal dispute resolution. This paper asks whether the theory of procedural justice applies to the alternative dispute resolution context, focusing on ombuds services. What are the predictors of perceptions of procedural justice during the process of dealing with an ombuds, and what factors shape outcome acceptance? These questions are analyzed using a sample of recent ombuds users. The results indicate that outcome favorability is highly correlated with perceived procedural justice, and both predict decision acceptance.

In the last two decades, federal judges in virtually all states have ordered state governments to alter dramatically the way they operate such institutions as prisons, hospitals, and mental health facilities. The research presented here seeks to improve our understanding of the budgetary linkage between the federal judiciary and state governments by examining the influence of court-ordered prison reform on state expenditures for corrections. Generally, the results indicate that the judiciary has had a limited but positive impact on capital outlays in one-half of the states examined. The influence on state operating expenditures for corrections has been even less noticeable. The analysis suggests that the judiciary's ability to exercise “the power of the purse” is tempered by the dynamics of state-level budgetary processes and the willingness of courts to adopt a comprehensive view of prison reform.

The judiciary & has no influence over either the sword or the purse.

—Alexander Hamilton

A state is not at liberty to afford its citizens only those constitutional rights which fit comfortably within its budget.

—U.S. District Judge

Frank M. Johnson, Jr.

There is an interest among scholars working on cause lawyering to “globalize” the subject by studying professional and political networks that span national boundaries. The globalizing scope of human rights provides a particularly relevant perspective, complementing the more narrowly attenuated focus on the roles and activities of cause lawyers. The subjects of this article are Israeli and Palestinian cause lawyers who have worked in the Israeli military court system in the Occupied Territories. This study adopts a transnational perspective both because the context itself (Israel/Palestine) is composed of relations that span national boundaries (statal and ethnonational) and because it befits a consideration of the international networks of human rights. Following an introductory discussion of transnationalism and a brief background on Israel/Palestine and the military courts, I turn to three aspects of cause lawyering: the political motivations inspiring lawyers to engage in such work; a comparative assessment of the legal and extralegal strategies pursued by lawyers; and the influence of human rights on the politics of lawyering in this context.

Liberal legalism noncontroversially advocates procedural fairness and due process in institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The visible conflicts come with the ebb and flow of international jurisdictional claims, suspicions of racial/ethnic and cultural biases in deliberations and decisions, prioritization of purposes in sentencing decisions, and the intrusion of institutional and international political debates into the liberal legal agenda. These conflicts threaten to create a legitimacy deficit in diffuse support for the ICTY. We examine these conflicts within the context of two surveys about the ICTY conducted in Sarajevo in 2000 and 2003. The results indicate that the citizens of Sarajevo increasingly believe that the ICTY is politically influenced by internationally appointed judges, peaking with the sentencing of Stanislav Galic for the siege of Sarajevo. This conflict focuses on issues of substantive rather than procedural justice and is increasingly articulated as a rejection of international political intervention that subverts the need for a local sense of justice. This may be a sequence of political conflict and disillusionment that is as inevitable as it is unavoidable.

We present a factorial survey experiment conducted with Iraqi judges during the early military occupation of Iraq. Because U.S. soldiers are immune from prosecution in Iraqi courts, there is no opportunity for these judges to express their views regarding highly publicized torture cases. As legally informed representatives of an occupied nation, however, Iraqi judges arguably have a strong claim to a normative voice on this sensitive subject. We are able to give voice to these judges in this study by using a quasi-experimental method. This method diminishes social desirability bias in judges' responses and allows us to consider a broad range and combination of factors influencing their normative judgments. We examine why and how the U.S. effort to introduce democracy with an indeterminate rule of law produced unintended and inconsistent results in the normative judgments of Iraqi judges. A critical legal perspective anticipates the influences of indeterminacy, power, and fear in our research. More specifically, we anticipated lenient treatment for guards convicted of torture, especially in trouble cases of Coalition soldiers torturing al Qaeda prisoners. However, the results—which include cross-level, judge-case interaction effects—were more varied than theoretically expected. The Iraqi judges responded in disparate and polarized ways. Some judges imposed more severe sentences on Coalition guards convicted of torturing al Qaeda suspects, while others imposed more lenient sentences on the same combination of guards and suspects. The cross-level interactions indicate that the judges who severely sentenced Coalition guards likely feared the contribution of torture tactics to increasing violence in Iraq. The judges who were less fearful of violence were more lenient and accommodating of torture by Coalition forces. The implication is that the less fearful judges were freed by an indeterminate law to advance Coalition goals through lenient punishment of torture. Our analysis suggests that the introduction of democracy and the rule of law in Iraq is a negative case in the international diffusion of American institutions. The results indicate the need for further development of a nuanced critical legal perspective.

Congress and the Supreme Court have had many intense conflicts over the years. This paper examines that relationship in an effort to determine whether the Court's role is essentially that of legitimator or disturber of the political universe. Drawing upon the analysis of Dahl as critiqued by Funston, Adamany, and Casper, the relationship is tested using a much broader data base than was used by the previous studies. Based upon this analysis, the Court is characterized as a legitimator but also as a significant wielder of power (contrary to Dahl's earlier assertions).

In this paper, some recent findings about the nature of plea negotiation in the Birmingham Crown Court in England are discussed. These findings, to which the legal profession in England reacted with hostility, raise doubts about traditionally accepted assumptions concerning the role of plea bargaining in English criminal justice.

This article studies law in action as it relates to organized lobster poaching in Canada. It examines the distinct pattern of relationships that constitutes poaching as a business enterprise and analyzes how “living law” operates as an ironic facilitative form for that which it tries to control. We argue that business poachers evade, avoid, and neutralize fishery laws and regulations by creatively using and manipulating the legal boundaries and organizational resources at their disposal. In effect, the law is an enabling structure for blue water illegality. We analyze business poaching activities as a type of workplace crime, and we account for regulatory failure in the lobster fishery.

Here I discuss the response of local state agencies to the problem of arson-for-profit as a way to address the debates in the white-collar crime literature over the problem of class bias and the political autonomy of state institutions. Arson-for-profit makes for an especially compelling case because of the inherent organizational difficulties involved with controlling this crime and the relationship this crime has to the perpetuation of social inequality in urban neighborhoods. I argue that arson-for-profit has been relegated to a nonissue status by law enforcement. Although this can be explained largely in institutional terms, this outcome suggests a selectivity on the part of the state where arson enforcement is concerned. The findings have implications for our understandings of equity in law enforcement processes and the question of class bias in state processes.

This note reexamines the generally accepted belief that persons with discrimination-related grievances are much less likely to complain about their problem than are persons with grievances arising from consumer purchases, torts, or other common kinds of personal problems. We find that previously reported analyses greatly overstate the gap between complaining in discrimination problems and other kinds of problems. Drawing on data from three surveys, each conducted in a different country (the United States, Canada, and Australia), we find that for some types of discrimination problems the level of complaining in fact equals or exceeds complaining in other arenas.

Through the lens of the French law prohibiting Muslim headscarves in schools, this article examines the way in which societal tensions that arise in the context of religious and cultural pluralism are translated into legal discourses relating to human rights and equality. It explores the way in which the law is rooted in France's broader sociopolitical structure and history and contrasts it to the United Kingdom and Turkey. It proposes that the law is based on an anachronistic, formal interpretation of equality that is inappropriate for addressing the inevitable cultural diversity of modern French society, and through its permeation into law and policymaking more widely, it is a primary cause of the heightened social tensions involving the Muslim minority. An assessment of the legitimacy of a law that restricts minority groups' cultural practices in this way in any society should be based on a substantive interpretation of equality and should necessarily involve an active endeavor to understand the meanings of those cultural practices for those groups within their distinct context. Upon this foundation, law and policy can be developed in a way that better reconciles the pluralism of modern society with the common objectives of social harmony, stability, and tolerance.