This article examines the far-reaching implications of Sally Engle Merry’s seminal multi-sited research on human rights measurement and monitoring. As she argued, human rights indicators, which form the basis for measurement, depend upon a highly elaborate, and largely obscured, process of commensuration. Through commensuration, complex social, legal, and economic phenomena are treated as variables that can be measured using statistical procedures that flatten the underlying complexities. Commensuration, in this sense, takes place at all levels: local, subnational, national, and international. At each stage, the process of “measuring justice” through commensuration has the paradoxical effect of becoming more precise as variables become more detached from the nuances of everyday conflicts. In Merry’s analysis, the global “seductions of quantification” reinforce the dominance of commensurability as an ideology of both scientific validity and social change. Drawing on both Merry’s work and wider comparative research in the anthropology of human rights and justice, this contribution to the symposium argues that the anthropological critique of commensuration carries important lessons for the meanings of “justice” more generally. How can justice be measured at a global level if, as Merry’s research shows, the underlying factors that supposedly reflect injustice are highly specific, contingent, and, most importantly, incommensurable? As a potential way out of this dilemma, the article explores the possibilities of conceptualizing “justice” in the vernacular, an approach grounded in local cultural and ethical realities.

Transitional justice lacks a coherent framework for articulating the relationship between distributive and corrective justice. Academic debates remain largely normative, focused on whether and how transitional justice should distinguish itself from the realm of the social, economic, and cultural. Where there is a bridge between legal logics and lived realities, it generally happens through victims’ consultation, but these are often thinly designed processes, revolving around questions like “what do victims want” or failing to turn expectations into action. Taking inspiration from Sally Engle Merry’s “paradox of measurement,” in which measurements produce the realities they assess, we pose a “paradox of justice” in which victims’ lived experiences are filtered and reproduced through the technology of consultation. While important, the question of “what do victims want” ultimately oversimplifies the complexities of how injustice is experienced. Drawing on a unique dataset of everyday indicators of justice from Colombia, this article establishes a framework for articulating the experiential dimensions of post-conflict justice. Ultimately, this framework highlights that justice is a process—whether in the courtroom or in a village reckoning with a massacre—and that the kinds of relationships that justice institutions build with victims are of equal relevance to what these institutions ultimately deliver.

This study challenges the conventional approach to the appropriate indicators of individual success in community courts (CCs) by exploring the different meanings that CC professionals ascribe to the term “success.” CCs conduct a non-adversarial process in which team members collaborate to provide a comprehensive rehabilitative intervention for recidivist participants. We conducted fifty-three in-depth interviews with CC personnel between 2016 and 2020. According to the interviewees, standard evaluation measures such as program completion, reduced recidivism, and systemic reduction of incarceration are necessary for evaluating these courts. Yet individual success is relative, subjective, multidimensional, and must be understood as a continuum. Therefore, it should also be measured by looking at significant processes of change that participants have undergone in various aspects of their lives. Study findings can be translated into measurable well-being indicators, moving the “what works” discourse forward to include more nuanced and diverse manifestations of success in studies evaluating specialized courts.

In the context of a national movement to defund police departments, many American cities are starting to reimagine public safety, as activists demand new practices that maintain safety while minimizing harm, as well as ensuring accountability when harms occur. Drawing on Everyday Peace Indicators methodologies, we argue that “community-centered” measurement, combined with researcher-practitioner partnerships, can help move both researchers and policymakers toward a more meaningful approach to policy design and evaluation. However, the application of community-centered measurement to the context of American policing raises important theoretical and practical concerns—in particular, the question of how community is defined, and who gets to define it. In this article, we ask: how do we define “community” in participatory research contexts where the concept of community is overlapping and contested? Using the example of a recent study carried out in the City of Oakland, we illustrate the complexities of applying a community-centered measurement process to the case of public safety and, more broadly, to police reform in American cities. We conclude with a discussion of both the benefits and limitations of our own approach, as well as a set of considerations for those engaging in participatory research.

Reparations payments are commonly measured as either paid versus not paid, or present versus absent. I argue that this approach causes researchers to overlook systematic variation in the types of abuses that governments include in their reparations commitments. This article makes the case for revising quantitative reparations indicators to reflect the fact that governments often promise and/or pay reparations for some human rights violations and not others. Using original data on reparations promises for nine types of state-sanctioned human rights abuses committed during internal conflicts or dictatorships that occurred in twenty-seven countries in Europe between 1939 and 2006, I show that reparations promise rates vary by type of abuse. I also show that they vary over time as human rights norms change, meaning that a static designation of “paid” or “not paid” is incompatible with the dynamism of reparations programs.

International law obliges governments to assure adequate and effective reparations for human rights violations. To date, most evaluations of such programs focus on outcomes while overlooking the process of how the state engaged victims, or not, in the determination of what they needed to feel repaired. A consensus now points toward the need to better involve beneficiaries in reparations programs in the process of determining these outcomes, yet there remains a need to better understand how to assure meaningful and effective participation. In response, the authors present an expansive view of the right to participation that would oblige governments to assure the quality of this participation in all stages of reparation programming, including design, implementation, and evaluation. They argue that reparative processes are, in themselves, forms of reparation, which go toward citizen restitution. They offer preliminary guidelines on how to assure reparative processes, as well as their evaluation, through a dialogical model that helps reorient the view of “victims” to being active agents in determining not only appropriate reparations but also larger transformations. Reparative processes shift the focus of evaluation to look beyond outcomes and toward the quality of the design and implementation processes, which, if flawed, may ultimately undermine the overall impact of any reparation program.

Individuals within the same jurisdiction often have different perceptions of the legal system, a phenomenon we call legal disagreement. Cross-country analyses of legal institutions generally ignore this kind of within-country variation. This article defines the concept of legal disagreement, identifies its potential causes and consequences, and shows that it can be measured using data from cross-country surveys. We argue that legal disagreement is likely to be caused by differences in individuals’ sources of information about the legal system, how the system treats cases of a given type, or how individuals process legal information, all of which may be related to differences in social position. We also suggest that understanding why individuals disagree about legal systems is valuable for several reasons, particularly when the disagreement reflects systematic differences in beliefs across people in different social positions. We use data from World Justice Project population surveys to create quantitative measures of legal disagreement for 128 countries or jurisdictions. We identify correlations between legal disagreement and measures of its potential causes and consequences, such as perceptions of discrimination and ethnic fractionalization. We also provide evidence that those variations are driven by differences in perceptions that track differences in gender, financial well-being, and class.

The latter half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century witnessed a global wave of constitution writing. Scholarly examination of these new charters found that most embodied liberalism and democracy. Additional study, however, found that textual convergence among these “higher law constitutions” belied important heterogeneity in constitutionalism—that is, in the principles underlying these charters and associated attitudes and behaviors. Scholars adopted several conceptual strategies to accommodate this variation, including attaching adjectives to constitutionalism (for example, “globalizing constitutionalism” and “abusive constitutionalism”). This article analyzes this conceptual innovation, drawing on an original dataset of all mentions of the word “constitutionalism” paired with a qualifying adjective found in the title/abstract of articles or in the title/first substantive page of books/dissertations, written in English, published between 1945 and 2019 and referenced on the Internet. We identified 1,621 “adjective-constitutionalism combinations,” including 564 unique combinations, suggesting both extraordinary empirical variation and little coordination among scholars with regard to conceptualization. Moreover, scholars’ conceptualizations of constitutionalism rarely reference equality, justice, or state responsibility for pursuing those ideals, despite these values being logical extensions of higher law constitutions’ core precepts; indeed, some conceptualizations even reflected illiberal or rights-limiting principles of governance. These findings raise the specter of a disconnect between constitutions and constitutionalism that we hope future studies will examine.

The field of public health law has been honing important transdisciplinary methods such as legal epidemiology and legal mapping. These methods can and should be integrated into socio-legal studies because they provide us with a way to capture the legal elements of interlocking power structures, offer ways to meaningfully compare and predict what access to rights will look like across jurisdictions, and capture a new way to study legal pluralism across and within jurisdictions. To illustrate the benefit of such methods for studying legal pluralism, this article offers the State Reproductive Autonomy Index, which compares all fifty states on seventy-five variables. Modeled on legal epidemiology’s survey of multiple types of law, including laws that can be classified as infrastructural (laying the institutional or policy parameters), interventionist (specifically targeted to produce a result), and incidental (distally related, not intentionally), this method integrates the work of reproductive justice scholars with the work on legal pluralism to illustrate the vast inequalities in access to reproductive autonomy across the United States. The State Reproductive Autonomy Index also shows why reproductive justice, rather than reproductive rights discourse, is a more accurate frame for understanding laws relating to reproduction and bodily autonomy.

In the United States, rural economic marginalization and corresponding gaps in employment, affordable housing, health care, nutrition, and education put individuals at high risk for legal need. Yet many rural regions are “legal deserts” with few, if any, attorneys, and prevailing access-to-justice initiatives tend to neglect the unique challenges posed by rurality. The efforts of rural tribal and state court judges, though often overlooked in scholarship and policy, offer a compelling response to this inequitable access-to-justice context. Building on emergent work on “active judging,” or when judges step away from a traditional passive role to assist unrepresented parties, this manuscript explores how rural place and place attachments shape diverse judges’ interactions with litigants. It draws on mixed-methodological research across seven tribal and state courts in the upper Midwest to shed light on rural judges’ efforts, how these efforts are regarded by unrepresented parties, and to what extent a shared experience of rurality provides a meaningful form of “access.” In so doing, it offers a novel spatial intervention in scholarship on access to justice and active judging and contributes to more rurally relevant justice practices.

The proliferation of problem-solving courts reflects a growing recognition that traditional punitive institutions tend to perpetuate cycles of poverty. Problem-solving courts expand the types of knowledge and resources available to court actors to help them address clients’ basic needs, provide ongoing support, and reduce recidivism. But the same qualities that enable judicial flexibility and collaboration can also undermine court goals, affecting the ability of court actors to understand the needs of indigent clients and resolve outstanding legal issues. This article analyzes the role of a social action membership organization in establishing Detroit’s homeless court. Our findings document how the group’s involvement influenced the court in procedure and substance and created space for negotiations that foreground clients’ self-defined needs. Collaboration shaped how defense attorneys thought about the purpose of the court and what they advocated for when meeting with judges and prosecutors on topics such as court accessibility, client sense of safety, and (in)ability to pay. These findings suggest the importance of having those most affected involved in the earliest stages of court creation to access procedural representation. We also consider administrative barriers to establishing a homeless court model within district courts.

Parole boards possess the notable power to grant release from prison, oftentimes well short of an incarcerated person’s legally allowable length of sentence. Although the exercise of that power is, at least in part, governed by law, extralegal considerations likely play an influential part in decisions to grant release. Indeed, the analysis offered here of parole board hearings in Washington State reveals, in particular, the work that board members perform to reinforce the moral significance of past criminality. In parole hearings, board members find ample opportunities to morally condemn the index offenses that petitioners have perpetrated and to express skepticism about narratives of petitioner change. Instead of helping petitioners ease the burden of being profaned for their past acts, board members often act to reinforce the mark of a criminal record. These realities underscore the significant work necessary to shift attitudes toward those convicted of crimes, and expose the cultural challenges that attempts to reduce incarceration more generally are likely to face, especially in the United States.

Rights constitutionalism faces a global crisis of legitimacy, and recent years have seen a surge in scholarship on the crisis. The vast majority of analyses focus on broad structural factors and processes. This article takes a different approach: sociological and bottom up. I use qualitative discourse analysis to examine how social actors in Israel justified their antagonism toward rights constitutionalism in three cases where judicial intervention for human rights encountered exceptional public opposition and political backlash. The analysis reveals that social actors used discourses of belonging—both liberal and non-liberal—to challenge rights constitutionalism as a constraint on democratic politics, when they perceived rights protection as conflicting with or undervaluing boundaries of collective identity. Based on these findings, I introduce a new concept—the challenge of belonging—that expresses the normative tension between individual rights and collective belonging. By highlighting the ethical dimension of social opposition to rights constitutionalism, the sociological approach allows a nuanced understanding of such opposition. The challenge of belonging can account for mixed attitudes in the same polity and even in the same social group on rights-oriented judicial intervention, and it points to a common normative thread linking attacks on liberal constitutionalism in vastly different sociopolitical settings.

Myanmar’s citizenship law is stratified by ethnic membership, but, on the books, it is gender neutral. Much attention has therefore focused on ethnic discrimination codified in the law. But individuals whose ethnic identities should provide them with a legitimate claim to citizenship continue to face barriers. Why is this the case? This article examines the additional obstacles that women face legitimating their ethno-national membership and conferring citizenship on their children, despite the gender neutrality of the citizenship law. I argue that the patriarchal structure of evidentiary documentation and patrilineal understandings of ethnic membership transmission shared by village leaders operating as key gatekeepers influence which parent’s claim—father’s or mother’s—to taingyintha (Indigenous or national ethnicity) membership can strengthen or weaken an individual’s chances of obtaining citizenship. The ethno-national identity of women is not evaluated equally to that of men, challenging women’s ability to capitalize on their taingyintha identity for citizenship purposes and contributing to the reproduction of statelessness across generations. I focus on this intersection of gender and ethnicity in establishing ethno-national membership and citizenship across variation in regional geopolitical environments to expand socio-legal knowledge on how formal and informal discrimination together exacerbate inequalities beyond the letter of the law.

Scholars studying wrongful convictions have long examined their causes and the ways in which to prevent them and are increasingly interested in exonerees’ post-prison reentry processes. However, research on the experience of incarceration as a result of wrongful conviction is scarce. This article draws on in-depth interviews with eleven exonerees across three states (Illinois, Texas, and New York) to theorize how multiple facets of innocence (personal, relational, and institutional) shape the ways in which former prisoners have navigated their wrongful incarceration: learning to prove their innocence. For many wrongfully convicted inmates, acquiring legal knowledge and mobilizing post-conviction law—specifically, actual innocence jurisprudence—plays a central role in their daily lives given the onerous legal work it takes to prove their factual innocence. I advance what Kathryne M. Young has termed second-order legal consciousness, which prioritizes the social processes that create legal consciousness, as a framework to illuminate how wrongfully convicted inmates constructed legality when pursuing legal exoneration in prison. This article offers new insights into the relational nature of law to show how marginalized groups like prisoners mobilize law when pursuing their rights and allows us to theorize innocence in contexts where the state and society writ large have ascribed a person’s legal guilt.

Contracts are the underpinning of functional business, governmental, organizational, and inter-personal relations across the developed world. It is a methodological advance for contractual research scholars to transform qualitative contractual information into quantitative data to analyze if, how, and why the law is reflected and reproduced in contracts—potentially explaining the continuation or amelioration of social injustices—and/or if contractual content informs human behavior or vice versa. However, efforts to “quantitize” contracts and statistically study them are scattered across subfields without much methodological guidance. The linguistic complexity of many legal contacts, paired with few repositories, makes their comparative quantitative analysis challenging. Prior attempts to quantitatively analyze contracts often lack shared systematic methods for measuring specified textual content, transforming this information into a quantitative format, or statistically analyzing the produced data set. This article presents the power and promise of transforming legal contracts and other similar documents into quantitative data for analysis, reviews the research to date that does so in different ways, and then provides concrete guiding steps and an illustrative example of how to transform contractual content into quantitative data that are valid, reliable, and reproducible, increasing the quality of the data produced and supporting the important socio-legal conclusions that can be derived from their analysis.

This study examines legal opportunity in China after the recent “law-based governance” reforms, including those that have professionalized the judiciary, established NGOs’ public interest standing, and expanded legal aid coverage. Based on in-depth interviews, it finds that despite the generally tightening political control over the social sector, the reforms have helped some law-related NGOs expand their litigation practice, social and legislative influence, and domestic funding sources. At the same time, these changes have had considerable cooptation effects by aligning these NGOs’ interests with the state’s and channeling their activities into state-sanctioned institutional processes. The findings suggest that states can effectively utilize a dualist strategy that combines restrictive and supportive approaches to public participation in the legal process. It thus sheds light on the progression of legality within various political and institutional contexts.

In this article, we: (1) advance a theory for how courts should respond to highly political disputes about jurisdictional authority, and (2) assess whether courts can achieve this ideal. Our theory draws from normative realism to argue that courts should push conflict back into the political realm whenever possible—facilitating free and fair dialogue by outlining rules and principles to guide negotiations, while also rejecting zero-sum outcomes when enforcing jurisdictional powers and related rights. We favor this approach because it can generate legitimacy for the legal and political systems by recognizing the judiciary’s limited democratic standing in structural disputes. To ground this argument in actual practice, we assess how the Supreme Court of Canada has managed two streams of highly political jurisprudence related to jurisdictional authority—federalism and Aboriginal rights cases. We show that the Court has increasingly relied on this approach of facilitating dialogue in both areas. While we argue that this approach is particularly well suited to federalism cases, our analysis uncovers negative outcomes in Indigenous case law. The Court’s approach often fails to strongly enforce the constitutional rights of Indigenous peoples, demonstrating that its facilitator role does not adequality account for the power imbalances between the state and Indigenous peoples.

International criminal law (ICL) is premised upon the principle of individual criminal responsibility—the idea that individual persons, rather than states or other entities, bear criminal responsibility for mass atrocities. This principle has been operationalized in practice through the development of various legal theories, technically known as “modes of liability,” that delineate individual contributions to collective forms of violence. However, the modes of liability have been interpreted and applied differently across international courts and tribunals. Crucially, the International Criminal Court has construed those modes in a significantly more restrained manner than previous international tribunals, essentially limiting the set of situations in which a person could be found guilty of an international crime. This article contributes to the interdisciplinary literature on international criminal justice by exploring the social construction of different conceptualizations of the modes of liability in ICL and their transformations over time. Specifically, the framework focuses on the promotion and contestation of ideas among various actors participating in the international criminal justice field and the power dynamics that govern the field. This is a key issue for ICL and global justice because it demarcates the legal boundaries of “guilt” and “accountability” for international crimes.