Mexico's former opposition parties had specific social bases that would not, on their own, have catapulted either opposition party into power. In the 1990s, specific regional bases of support developed for the parties, reflecting their efforts to develop their organizations more locally. Nationally, this led to the emergence of two parallel two-party systems, PAN-PRI competition in the north and center-west and PRD-PRI competition in the south. In parallel, a proregime-antiregime cleavage came to dominate the Mexican party system, which, combined with local-level opposition efforts to oust the PRI, created new incentives for the opposition parties to abandon past emphases on ideological differences and to act like catch-all parties instead. The regime cleavage fostered the dealignment of the Mexican electorate, a process that promoted the development of catch-all parties. Movement within the parties to behave like catch-all parties has not come without internal tensions, but electoral dynamics prove powerful inducements to catch-all behavior.

As an instrument for governance, summitry is a novel structure for the management of contemporary hemispheric regionalism in the Americas. Such regionalism is a clear case of the “structuralist paradox” of international cooperation. This article attempts to explain the particular asymmetric regionalism in the Americas by using the concept of cooperative hegemony. The underlying hypothesis is that the U.S. government, since 1994, has pursued a strategy of cooperative behavior, at least in regard to power sharing, in two specific phases of hemispheric regionalism: agenda setting and institutionalization. This study tests the hypothesis through a content analysis of the main documents produced at the Miami, Santiago, and Québec summits, then relates these findings to the progress of institutionalization from 1994 to 2003.

This article focuses on the role of multinational corporations in the Colombian conflict, particularly how they contributed to the escalation of land conflicts and to the violent transformation of the rural economy into one based on rentier capital. It also explores how these companies helped in fomenting and financing the war system, an element that could partly explain the protracted persistence of the Colombian conflict.

The 2000 presidential election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox signaled an end to seven decades of Mexico's single-party regime and seemed to herald the advent of truly competitive politics. But by 2003, economic reform had largely stalled, and Fox's party suffered a historically unprecedented midterm loss in the congress. This article analyzes the underpinnings of policy gridlock in the Fox administration. Fox inherited the need for microeconomic restructuring and increased competitiveness, more innovative and pragmatic state policies, the need to pay attention to the country's sharp income inequalities, and the challenge of crafting a political strategy that could build a middle ground and foster policy consensus. With his party's minority standing in the congress, Fox was constrained from the start by divided government. But more effective statecraft and coalition building would have helped. These will be essential elements for the success of any post-Fox regime.

This research examines the data from private polls conducted during Vicente Fox's presidential campaign through the lenses of the “modernization” of campaigning, the creation of image in the modern Mexican presidency, and the survey tools used by the campaign to achieve a historic presidential victory in 2000. Fox's campaign team used polling to determine the potential of the Mexican public to be persuaded by an opposition candidate, to provide a continuous update on how the campaign strategy was working, to assist in solidifying Fox's image and message of change (rather than promoting his policy agenda), and to target demographic groups that were perceived to be important electoral partners. These findings suggest that public opinion polling is a useful tool in Mexico to combat longstanding corporatist structures used to favor the PRI. Presidential campaigns in Mexico are beginning to resemble modern campaigns in other mature democracies in their use of private polling data; future Mexican campaigns will become more image- and personality-based.

In recent years, important indigenous parties have emerged for the first time in Latin American history. Although some analysts view this development with trepidation, this essay argues that the indigenous parties in Latin America are unlikely to exacerbate ethnic conflict or create the kinds of problems that have been associated with some ethnic parties in other regions. To the contrary, the emergence of major indigenous parties in Latin America may actually help deepen democracy in the region. These parties will certainly improve the representativeness of the party system in the countries where they arise. They should also increase political participation and reduce party system fragmentation and electoral volatility in indigenous areas. They may even increase the acceptance of democracy and reduce political violence in countries with large indigenous populations.