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The Instrumental Rule

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 August 2020

JEREMY DAVID FIX Open the ORCID record for JEREMY DAVID FIX [Opens in a new window]
JEREMY DAVID FIX*
Affiliation:
KEBLE COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORDjeremy.fix@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

Properly understood, the instrumental rule says to take means that actually suffice for my end, not, as is nearly universally assumed, to intend means that I believe are necessary for my end. This alternative explains everything the standard interpretation can—and more, including grounding certain correctness conditions for exercises of our will unexplained by the standard interpretation.

Keywords

practical reasonthe willpractical rationalityconstitutivismaction
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , Winter 2020 , pp. 444 - 462
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Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2020

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Footnotes

Thanks to John Broome, Rachel Fraser, Nicholas Koziolek, Thomas Pendlebury, an audience at the University of Oxford, and an exemplary anonymous referee for this journal.

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