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‘Humeanism’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2015

GALEN STRAWSON
GALEN STRAWSON*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTINgstrawson@austin.utexas.edu
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Abstract:

In metaphysics, the adjective ‘Humean’ is used to describe positions that deny the existence of any necessary connection or causal influence in concrete reality. This usage has been significantly reinforced by David Lewis's employment of ‘Humean’ in the phrase ‘Humean supervenience’. It is, however, not at all clear that this usage is appropriate. Lewis himself raised a doubt about it.

Keywords

metaphysicsontologyhistory of philosophyScottish philosophyhistory of analytic philosophyepistemologyskepticism
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , Spring 2015 , pp. 96 - 102
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2015 

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