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A Holist Balance Scale
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 June 2022
Abstract
Scale-based models of weighing reasons face challenges concerning the context sensitivity of weight, the aggregation of weight, and the methodology for determining what the weights of reasons are. I resolve these challenges.
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- Article
- Information
- Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , September 2023 , pp. 533 - 553
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association
Footnotes
I wrote the initial draft of this paper using a generous summer research grant and sabbatical from William & Mary. Daniel Muñoz, Wes Siscoe, and anonymous referees provided very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Conversations with Philip Swenson and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong were also helpful, especially Walter's suggestion that diminishing marginal utility would usefully illustrate some of the issues in the paper. I am immensely grateful for this help from my institution and fellow philosophers.
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