The recent flood of books on the failures of the European social democratic parties in the 1980s suggests that since the turn of the century the democratic left failed to see political opportunities provided by the growth of the welfare state. Two factors make the apparent political oversight of particular interest. First, the historical sequence of enlarging benefits and programs was remarkably similar across countries. Second, early in their development the social democratic left developed fairly detailed policy initiatives for the economy but had much less detailed proposals for social policies and programs. Broadly speaking, the left usually perceived social programs and policies as marginally important instruments for macrosocial change in income redistribution and transfer of wealth but of little political importance. These tendencies are most apparent in the postwar construction of national welfare states but are visible at various critical junctures in political decisionmaking since 1900.

It has become commonplace to acknowledge the exceptionally adversarial nature of business-government relations in the United States. When compared to their counterparts in Germany, France, Japan, and the Nordic countries, American business executives have much more autonomy from the state; and yet, there is also greater distrust between business and government. Such adversarial relations, many students of comparative political economy argue, puts the United States in the late twentieth century at a disadvantage. Faced with competitors in the world market who cooperate with their respective governments on investment, training, and long-term sectoral development, American corporations compete in global markets under a considerable handicap.

I am of course pleased that Professor Becker finds my view of the character and sources of early twentieth-century American economic policy to be “well supported” by the evidence. I value the fact that he does not regard as heresy my failing to call the American economy “corporate” and regulation “corporatist” or “corporate liberal.” And I appreciate his recognition that my book deals with more than that old standby big-business-and-antitrust: that it talks about the impact of new technology (radio, the movies, airplanes, telephones, electricity, motor vehicles) on regulatory policy; about the regulation of farm prices and natural resources; about urban housing and zoning; about labor and taxation and tariffs and banking and investment—in short, about a complex and rapidly changing regulatory order, and not just government and big business.