Political corruption is widespread in contemporary societies, and is regarded by some analysts of the Third World as the single most important obstacle to economic development and political integration. Certainly the frequent régime changes which have occurred in Africa in the last several decades have been accompanied by charges of gross administrative malfeasance and promises to introduce honest government. Perhaps no country in the continent has devoted more attention and energy to continuing allegations of corruption than Nigeria. Indeed, from the late colonial period up until the present, critics of those in power have lamented the level of venality, and numerous published reports have catalogued a wide range of iniquities and called for reform.

Botswana ranks very high in sub-Saharan Africa in income per capita, and in such indicators of human development as public expenditure on health and education. Nevertheless, inequalities of wealth and income are particularly severe, in both international and domestic comparisons. Although wealth and poverty are mediated and expressed in complex ways, the disparities between the very rich and the very poor are established, structured, and growing.

Like the flow of the Nile, the policy-making environment of ruling élites in Eastern Africa has remained remarkably unaltered over the years. New and old leaderships alike confront the perennial questions of building political authority and legitimacy on fragile socio-economic bases, in addition to finding appropriate modes of inter-state relationships. Uganda has occupied a central place in this structure as a participant in regional economic and political interactions, and since the 1970s as the primary source of instability.

Contested territories and challenges to state sovereignty have become almost the norm in post-colonial Africa. The nexus of many of these conflicts resides in a status quo which gives primacy to territorial integrity over the right of peoples to self-determination. The comparative advantage thus accorded to sovereign states has resulted in a disequilibrium that legitimated the violation of both regionally and internationally sanctioned rules enshrined in the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) and the United Nations (U.N.). Thus a normative bias in favour of the imperative of stability and order was justified by reference to the fragility of the newly independent régimes. In the process, the right of self-determination was narrowly interpreted to refer solely to those African peoples waging liberation struggles against European colonialism or white rule.

Political life in Africa was described 25 years ago as ‘an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features’. However, the wave of national conferences in Africa in the current decade would have been inconceivable without the various institutions and beliefs that have persisted despite the prevalence of dictatorship. These ‘fragments of democracy’ have been manifest in trade union movements, voluntary associations, and the nascent political parties that have organised popular protests against authoritarian régimes during the past few years.

The implementation of economic reforms in Africa under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) has undoubtedly produced the kind of social dislocation so well described by Barry Riddell in a recent article in this Journal. The structural adjustment programmes (S.A.P.s) have also in some cases generated growth, as noted by Michel Camdessus, director-general of the I.M.F. in 1991: ‘Soon more than 30 African countries will apply these growth strategies. Where the programmes have been applied rigorously, results have been impressive. ’

This article examines the trajectory of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), currently the ruling party in Mozambique, focusing on the complex interplay between various factors which contributed to the metamorphoses it has undergone since its founding in 1962. Recent work in the field of international relations and historical sociology has thrown light on the rôle of the state as an administrative-coercive entity constantly cross-pressured by domestic and foreign forces, and acting simultaneously on both fronts in pursuit of advantage. While this scholarship has not focused on ruling parties per se, it is arguable that the standard government versus state dichotomy is of limited analytical value in cases such as Mozambique, where the distinction between party and state remained in practice, until recently, a constitutional nicety. When the ruling party has been institutionalised to the extent of Frelimo, and where the state has become almost an extension of the party, it is the latter that is the key variable in any explanation of political and economic change within society.

The ruling National Party (N.P.) asked white voters during the 1989 election campaign for a mandate to negotiate with all concerned about a new constitution, an undivided South Africa, one citizenship, equal votes, protection of minorities, and the removal of stumbling blocks such as discrimination against people of colour.1 Although the N.P. achieved a cleat majority – 93 seats against 39 for the Conservative Party (C.P.) and 33 for the Democratic Party (D.P.) – the right-wing opposition made destinct progress by gaining 17 seats. After the C.P had captured a further three from the N.P. in by-elections, including Potchefstroom in February 1992, President F. W. de Klerk announced in Parliament that whites would be asked the following month to vote in a referendum in order to remove any doubts about his mandate. The carefully worded question which the electorate had to answer was as follows: Do you support continuation of the reform process which the State President began on February 2, 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?