^{Page 550 note 1} ‘SADCC: Development of Infrastructure and Enterprise’, Arusha, 28–29 January 1988, p. 2.

^{Page 551 note 1} In fact, the increase applied only to the price of ‘breakfast’ meal and not, as so widely rumoured, to the staple ‘roller’ meal.

^{Page 552 note 1} Destabilisation is generally considered to comprise all military and non-military measures short of open warfare and invasion, and has been defined by Manley, Michael, Jamaica: struggle in the periphery (London, 1982), p. x, as ‘an orchestrated plan to bring a society to the verge of chaos and paralysis’. In the case of Angola, South African actions have reached, if not actually exceeded, the upper limits of destabilisation.Google Scholar

^{Page 552 note 2} See Hanlon, Joseph, Apartheid's Second Front (Harmondsworth, 1986),Google Scholar and Beggar Your Neighbours: apartheid power in Southern Africa (London and Bloomington, 1986).Google Scholar

^{Page 552 note 3} Loubser, J. G. H., Transport Diplomacy with Special Reference to Southern Africa (Sandton, 1980).Google Scholar

^{Page 552 note 4} According to Bryant, Coralie, ‘Southern Africa: the choices and challenges’, in Development: Seeds of Change (Rome), 1987, 2/3, p. 124: ‘Twenty-five years ago, only 20% of the goods traded by SADCC members and Zaire entered or exited via South Africa; today about 80% of their tonnage passes through South Africa’. Disengagement efforts, notably by Zambia and Zimbabwe, have now reduced the extent of transport dependency to under 60 per cent. See also, Overseas Development Institute, ‘Sanctions and South Africa's Neighbours’, London, May 1987, Briefing Paper, p. 4, which claims that, for the six landlocked states, the proportion of extra-regional trade funnelled through South Africa increased from 50 to 85 per cent between 1981 and 1985.Google Scholar

^{Page 553 note 1} Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 11–17 03 1988, p. 7;Google Scholar Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, p. 35; and Southern Africa Report (Johannesburg), 5, 41, 16 10 1987, p. 2.Google Scholar

^{Page 553 note 2} Les Manley, South African Ambassador, U.N. Security Council, 3 March 1988, s/PV 2793, p. 16, provisional.

^{Page 554 note 1} Bender, Gerald, ‘The Reagan Administration and South Africa’, in Atlantic Quarterly (Harlow, Essex), 2, 3, Autumn 1984, p. 239. Hanlon suggests in Beggar Your Neighbours, p. 34, that the S.A.D.F. bombed Maputo in May 1983 in order to emphasise its opposition to the Foreign Ministry's talks with Mozambique, which led eventually to the Nkomati accord.Google Scholar

^{Page 555 note 1} An earlier categorisation identified four alternatives: accommodation, containment, disengagement, and confrontation or intervention. See Anglin, Douglas G., ‘The Frontline States and the Future of Southern Africa’, in Dowdy, William L. and Trood, Russell B. (eds.), The Indian Ocean: perspectives on a strategic area (Durham, N.C., 1985), pp. 259–64.Google Scholar

^{Page 556 note 1} ‘Pioneers in Inter-African Relations’, Blantyre, 20 May 1970, p. 4.

^{Page 557 note 1} Kaunda, Kenneth, Machel, Samora, and Mugabe, Robert confronted President Banda in Blantyre on 11 September 1986. Despite the reassurances received, a month later the Frontline states returned to the charge that the ‘Malawian government…organised, facilitated and set up conditions for bandit gangs to occupy frontier zones in the provinces of Tete, Sofala and Zambezia’. ‘The Maputo Declaration of October 12, 1986’, Harare, 1987, p. 4.Google Scholar

^{Page 557 note 2} AIM Information Bulletin (Maputo), 147, 10 1988, p. 5. As in 1984, Maputo sought to capitalise on Pretoria's attempt to refurbish its international image during the run-up to the 1988 American elections.Google Scholar

^{Page 559 note 1} In April 1986, Kaunda accused prominent Zambian businessmen of wining and dining in South Africa with S.A.D.F. colonels, and the following month he reportedly withdrew the passports of over 100 suspected of economic crimes or collusion with South Africa. Africa Research Bulletin: political series (Exeter), 1986, pp. 8482 and 8518.Google Scholar

^{Page 560 note 1} Martin, Roger, ‘Southern Africa: a new approach’, in Round Table (London), 303, 07 1987, p. 325.Google Scholar

^{Page 561 note 1} Africa Research Bulletin, 1986, p. 7999.

^{Page 562 note 1} Pretoria has reportedly given private assurances that it will refrain from direct military actions to disrupt the Beira corridor, presumably because it already commands adequate alternative coercive means of maintaining the hostage condition of neighbouring states.

^{Page 563 note 1} See Anglin, Douglas G., ‘The Frontline States and Sanctions Against South Africa’, in Edgar, Robert (ed.), Sanctions and Southern Africa (Trenton, N.J., 1989).Google Scholar

^{Page 564 note 1} Strong, Maurice F., ‘Report on A Mission to Mozambique’, New York, 19 08 1987, p. 16.Google Scholar

^{Page 564 note 2} Ibid. p. 18.

^{Page 565 note 1} The Financial Times (London), 12 11 1987, p. 4.Google Scholar

^{Page 565 note 2} African Confidential (London), 29, 5, 4 03 1988, p. 3.Google Scholar

^{Page 565 note 3} The Economist (London), 17 09 1988, p. 43.Google Scholar

^{Page 565 note 4} Roger Martin suggests, among other innovative ideas, that ‘Western armies might undertake short-term rapid deployment of air-defence systems’ in the Frontline states ‘as gestures of solidarity to make Pretoria's “hawks” think harder’;Google Scholar‘Regional Security in Southern Africa’, in Survival (London), 29, 5, 09–10 1987, p. 402.Google Scholar