^{page 71 note 1} This apt phrase is used by Kasfir, Nelson, The Shrinking Political Arena: participation and ethnicity in African politics with a case study of Uganda (Berkeley, 1976).Google Scholar

^{page 71 note 2} For a cogent argument that political development is essentially a process of institutionalisation, see Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968),Google Scholar ch. I.

^{page 71 note 3} According to Huntington, in a praetorian system ‘social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts’; ibid. p. 196. Also see Watkins, Frederick Mundell, ‘Praetorianism’, in The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1934), XII, pp. 305–6.Google Scholar

^{page 72 note 1} For details on the Afro-Arab schism in the Sudan, see Wai, Dunstan M., The Afro-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (forthcoming).Google Scholar

^{page 72 note 2} Cf. Aguda, Oluwadare, ‘Arabism and Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), XI, 2, 06 1973, pp. 177–200,Google Scholar one of the most perceptive articles written on the Sudan.

^{page 73 note 1} See the Proceedings of the Sudan Constituent Assembly, October 1966, cited by Alier, Abel, ‘The Southern Sudan Question’, in Wai, Dunstan M. (ed.), The Southern Sudan: the problem of national integration (London, 1973), p. 24.Google Scholar

^{page 73 note 2} Toynbee, Arnold, ‘Interview’, in Playboy (London), 04 1968.Google Scholar According to this distinguished British historian, ‘The Northern Sudanese are masters in the Southerner's house as well as in their own, they are trying to make up for lost time. They are trying to assimilate the Southern Sudanese to the Northern way of life – an attempt that they were debarred from making under the British régime. This Northern Sudanese reaction is natural, but it is surely wrong, and this both politically and morally’; Between Niger and Nile (London, 1965), pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

^{page 74 note 1} Aguda, loc. cit. p. 188.

^{page 74 note 2} For further discussion on the notion of Africanism and Arabism in the Sudan, consult Muddathir Al-Rahim, ‘Abd, ‘Arabism, Africanism, and Self-Identification in the Sudan’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, VIII, 2, 07 1970,Google Scholar reprinted in Wai (ed.), op. cit., ch. 3.

^{page 74 note 3} The Southern Sudanese have no crisis of identity: they know they are African and feel so racially and culturally. They have no objection to the Northern Sudanese identifying themselves as Arabs, but they resent being included in this category.

^{page 74 note 4} Huntington, Samuel P. and Dominquez, Jorge in Greenstein, I. and Polsby, Nelson W. (eds.), Macropolitical Theory, Handbook of Political Science, Vol. III (Reading, Mass., 1975), p. 32Google Scholar

^{page 75 note 1} Welch, Claude E. and Taintor, Mavis Bunker (eds.), Revolution and Political Change (North Scituate, Mass., 1972), p. 2.Google Scholar I am indebted to this volume for some insights on the subject of revolution and change.

^{page 75 note 2} Ibid. pp. 2–3.

^{page 76 note 1} Nimiery's co-conspirators all grew up in or near Omdurman. They constituted the Revolutionary Command Council: Nimiery (Omdurman); Khalid Hassan Abbas (Omdurman); Farouk Osman Hamadalla (Omdurman); Hashim el Atta (Omdurman); Abu Gashim Mohammed Ibrahim (Omdurman/Buri); Abu Gashim Hashim (Omdurman/Buri); Zeni el Abdin (Tuti); Mamoun Awad Abu Zeid (Omdurman); and Babikier el Nur Osman (Omdurman/Buri). The only civilian member was Babikier Awadalla, a veteran politician from Omdurman/Khartoum.

^{page 76 note 2} It has become increasingly difficult to distinguish in Africa between actual reasons for a military coup and post-coup rationalisations. Post-mortems often do not tell us much about the real motives of the coup leaders.

^{page 77 note 1} Hashim, Major Abu Gashim, cited in Legum, Colin (ed.), African Contemporary Record, 1969–70 (London, 1970), (B) 48–9, pp. 169–70.Google Scholar

^{page 78 note 1} This discussion on ideological groups is adapted from Wai, Dunstan M., ‘The Sudan: domestic politics and foreign relations under Nimiery’, in African Affairs (London), forthcoming.Google Scholar

^{page 79 note 1} Mahgoub, Abdel Khaliq, Le Monde (Paris), 19 09 1969.Google Scholar

^{page 79 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 80 note 1} Cited in Legum, op. cit. Vol. VI, 1969–1970, p. 1405.

^{page 80 note 2} For details, see copies of The Nile Mirror (Khartoum), 01—03 1970.Google Scholar

^{page 81 note 1} Draft National Charter, Khartoum, May 1970.

^{page 81 note 2} See The Nile Mirror, May—September 1970.

^{page 81 note 3} No attempt was made, however, to scrutinise the implementation of the nationalisation programme. There were many people who were sceptical about the Government's genuineness in pursuing its policies.

^{page 82 note 1} The Sudan Communist Party, August Resolution, pp. 5–6, cited by Shaw, Joan, ‘Crisis n the Sudan’, in Marxism Today (London), 04 1971, p. 107.Google Scholar

^{page 82 note 2} Mahgoub was reputed to be very principled, resilient, and inflexible, as well as charismatic and affable, with a profound distrust for military rule. The vacillations and changes in Nimiery's policies might have proved him right in his decision to refuse to dissolve the Sudan Communist Party.

^{page 83 note 1} Military tribunals were set up to try and convict members of the S.C.P. What infuriated President Nimiery and the public was the machine-gunning of arrested military officers by the el-Atta group when it realised the coup had failed. For details, see The Observer (London), and The Sunday Times (London), 24 07 1971.Google Scholar

^{page 83 note 2} This accusation was factually correct. The régime seemed to hesitate in pursuing its policies, while in the South the military situation had deteriorated.

^{page 84 note 1} The details of the Addis Ababa Agreement are discussed elsewhere: Wai, op. cit. chs. 8–9.

^{page 85 note 1} See Wai, loc. cit.

^{page 85 note 2} Welch, Claude E., ‘Praetorianism in Commonwealth West Africa’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, X, 2, 07 1972, p. 221.Google Scholar

^{page 87 note 1} This list only covers those plots and attempted coups announced by the Government or reported in the foreign press. Sources: Dateline Data, 1969–78 (London); Arab Report and Record, 1969–77 (London); The Nile Mirror, 1970–5 (Khartoum); and Ministry of Information and Culture, News (Khartoum).Google Scholar

^{page 88 note 1} Huntington, op. cit. p. 196.

^{page 88 note 2} Many Northern Sudanese politicians are hypocritical when they argue that there are no fundamental differences between the North and the South; and yet at the same time they advocate policies of Arabisation and Islamisation among the negroid African population in the South.

^{page 88 note 3} At the beginning of 1979, the only Cabinet Minister in the central Government from the South was Vice-President Abel Alier. Philip Obang was the only Southerner out of 45 of ambassadorial rank in the Foreign Ministry, and there are only eight from that Region out of more than 200 Sudanese in the diplomatic service.

^{page 89 note 1} The Democratic Republic of the Sudan, , Ministry of Planning, The Six-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development (Khartoum, 1977),Google Scholar Vols. I and II, 1977–8 to 1982–3.

^{page 89 note 2} In his effort at reconciliation with his main opponents and critics, President Nimiery pardoned leaders of the ‘National Front’ in July 1977, and invited them to return to the Sudan. They could participate politically, criticise constructively, and suggest corrections, as long as they recognised that his régime was based on the S.S.U., the National Charter, the Permanent Constitution, and the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement that granted regional autonomy to the Southern Region.

^{page 90 note 1} el Mahdi, Sadiq, ‘Interview’, in African Affairs, 81, 05, 1978.Google Scholar

^{page 92 note 1} Grundy, Kenneth W., Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: an analysis and preview (New York, 1971), pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

^{page 92 note 2} Various efforts of President Nimiery to exhort the Sudanese civil servants to be more punctual, committed, and responsible have continuously fallen on deaf ears. The only solution seems to lie in structural changes of a revolutionary kind.