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Twenty-Five Years after Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of Death and Dying

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Norman L. Cantor
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Extract

Ever since the 1960s, when medical science became capable of prolonging the dying process beyond bounds that many patients would find acceptable, people have sought “death with dignity,” or “a natural death,” or “a good death.” Once debilitation from a fatal affliction has reached a personally intolerable point, dying patients have sought to control the manner and timing of death via diverse techniques. Some sought the disconnection of life-sustaining medical interventions, such as respirators and dialysis machines. Beyond freedom from unwelcome interventions, some patients intent on avoiding suffering sought access to pain relief medication—even in dosages posing some risk (perhaps even a certainty) of hastening death. Other dying patients sought access to deep sedation, even knowing that they would never emerge from the resultant unconsciousness. Still other patients voluntarily refused to eat or drink or to accept artificial nutrition and hydration.

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Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , Summer 2001 , pp. 182 - 196
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2001

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References

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