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Recent Developments in Health Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

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Extract

In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) developed a policy in conjunction with police and prosecutors that requires pregnant and post-pregnancy women to be tested for cocaine in their urine if they presented with certain factors. If the patient is still pregnant, her first positive test results in referral to a substance abuse program. After a second positive test, or upon failure to comply with the substance abuse program, the woman would be arrested. If a patient tested positive upon delivery of her baby, she would be arrested “as soon as medically possible.” A Solicitor’s Letter given to and signed by each woman after her first positive test explains these comequences. Concomitantly, a letter given to all patients receiving prenatal care informs them of the effects of drug use and warns of possible referral to the prosecutor’s office.

Type
Recent Developments in Health Law
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , Fall 2003 , pp. 455 - 457
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2003

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References

308 F.3d 380, 388 n.4 (4th Cir. 2002) (recounting that a pregnant woman's urine would be tested if she presented with any of the following factors: “(1) separation of the placenta from the uterine wall; (2) intrauterine fetal death; (3) no prenatal care; (4) late prenatal care (beginning after 24 weeks gestation); (5) incomplete prenatal care (fewer than five visits); (6) preterm labor with no obvious cause; (7) a history of cocaine use; (8) unexplained birth defects; and (9) intrauterine growth retardation with no obvious cause”).Google Scholar
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